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EAST EUROPE

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REASONS FOR PUBLISHING 'HISTORY OF TRANSYLVANIA' GIVEN

Budapest ERDELY TORTENETE in Hungarian Vol I 1986 pp 5-11

[Preface to 3 Volume HISTORY OF TRANSYLVANIA edited by Bela Kopeczi, Minister of Culture, co-editors Laszlo Makkai, Andras Mocsy, Zoltan Szasz, and Gabor Barta: Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of History; Budapest 1986]

[Text] 1. One of the significant tasks of our historical scholarship is to examine the relationship of Hungarian history to world history. It is impossible to really understand our past and present situation without knowledge of the countries immediately adjacent to us and in the world surrounding us. In the recent past, Hungarian historical writing has attempted to analyze not only the history of Central- and Eastern Europe, but also of other European areas and even other continents, in their own right and with respect to our relations to them. This reaching outward represents not only an increase in knowledge but also a change in perspective and is a repudiation of the provincial introspection which has characterized Hungarian historiography and nourished the nationalistic consciousness for a long time. The demand for an academic exploration of a broader historical environment and the necessity for shaping public opinion has also guided the historian working group which undertook to write the history of Transylvania from the earliest times to the present.

2. Naturally, the examination of the history of this territory may not be explained merely by the desire to study the surroundings, but also by the fact that for many centuries the history of Transylvania was interwoven with the history of the Hungarian people. In the Middle Ages this territory was a part of the Hungarian state. The existence of the Transylvanian principality as a separate state dependent on the Turks in the 16th and 17th centuries and Habsburg supremacy from the end of the 17th century till 1867 did not mean that relations with Hungary were severed. In the 16th-17th centuries certain parts of the Hungarian Kingdom belonged to Transylvania and the movement of people and economic and cultural threads intertwined the entire region along the border; over the course of centuries, determined efforts appeared in ever new formulations for the re-unification of Habsburg-Hungary and the Transylvanian principality. In 1848 the Transylvanian Diet declared its union with Hungary, although, it is true, with the opposition of a significant segment of the non-Magyar nationalities, but in the spirit of the historical consciousness of the political unity of the two countries and social progress.

From 1867 Transylvania belonged to Hungary within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and from 1918 it belonged to Rumania. In 1940, Hungary was given northern Transylvania in the Second Vienna Awards, and from the end of 1944 this territory again belonged to Rumania. The changes in rule have not broken the cultural and personal contacts between Transylvania and Hungary to this day.

The Transylvanian principality maintained military, economic, and cultural contacts with Moldavia and also Wallachia. From an ethnic standpoint, the connecting link in the case of Hungary was Hungarians, in the case of Moldavia and Wallachia it was Rumanians. Before the appearance of the modern bourgeois idea of the nation ethnic relations aided primarily linguistic-cultural contacts and did not influence state relations themselves. From the end of the 18th century the idea of unifying the Rumanian populated territories had become the determinant element in the conception of the nation state; however, its realization could only occur with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Saxons, Transylvania's third nationality, endeavored to ensure their own autonomy by using the advantages granted by Habsburg rule from the end of the 17th century against both the Magyars and Rumanians and occasionally also taking advantage of Hungarian-Rumanian conflicts, but they could not strive for existence as an independent state. From a cultural standpoint they were primarily oriented toward the Protestant German world.

3. For centuries, stubbornly persistent features of feudalism characterized Transylvania's economic and social development. Capitalistic transformation started late and even lagged behind the development in Hungary, but it outdistanced the Rumanian principalities and, in general, the countries situated further east and south. The underdevelopment affected the various ethnic groups differently. The nobility, the majority of which was Hungarian attempted to maintain its privileges and the overwhelming majority was forced to accept the reforms in 1848 primarily because of developments in Hungary. The Saxon bourgeoisie which had been in the forefront of the development of medieval cities strove throughout to preserve its autonomy within a similarly predominantly feudal framework. A portion of the serfs were either Hungarian or Saxon, but in time the Rumanians became the majority. In the territories settled earlier the situation of the landed serfs naturally developed more favorably than the cotters' or herdsmen's. The free Szekler, falling into serfdom in the 16th century, gaining freedom in the 17th century, and then in the 18th century performing military service in the border defense network, as well as the rural Rumanian border guard from the 18th century on represented a specific factor in social development.

4. The economic-social conflicts in Transylvania were associated with ethnic groups just as in other parts of Central- and Eastern Europe, and these significantly influenced national antagonisms despite the fact that the lot of the classes belonging to different ethnic groups was similar and that they had common interests. In the case of the Rumanians, these conflicts were exacerbated by the fact that only a small percentage of ethnic Rumanians belonged to the ruling class and even in the 19th century they were primarily drawn from ranks of the religious intelligentsia. The mass of Rumanian serfs

found themselves in opposition to not just the rulers in general, but to a large extent to the Hungarian ruling class; thus, their national consciousness was also defined by the social conflict. This dual opposition had already appeared in the 1784 peasant uprising and played a role in the 1848-49 war of independence and later, from the end of the 19th century, in the Rumanian national movement demanding the unification of Transylvania with Rumania.

5. From the 16th century religious tolerance was characteristic of Transylvania which concomitantly also meant greater cultural diversity; some were linked to Western- and Central Europe and others to Byzantium and Southern- or Eastern Europe, in the first instance through the Hungarian Monarchy and in the second instance through the Rumanian principalities. Universal Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy determined the characteristics of the Hungarian, Rumanian, or Saxon cultures respectively, even if the local particularities also represented differentiating factors; religion and ethnicity did not coincide in every instance. Protestants, Catholics, and Unitarians were found equally among Hungarians since the 16th century; we find Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics among Rumanians and Lutherans and Catholics among the Germans since the end of the 17th century.

Since the end of the 18th century, the religious element in culture has been pushed into the background and the linguistic-historical element has come to the fore which slowly suppressed an awareness of Transylvanian statehood and strengthened the feeling of kinship with people speaking the same language outside the boundaries of the principality--Magyars of all denominations with those in Hungary, and Rumanians of the two different denominations with those living beyond the Carpathians.

6. The formation of national states in Central- and Eastern Europe did not only collide with the opposition of the multinational great powers but also with intricate ethnic relations. Socially retrogressive and progressive trends were equally present within the Transylvanian-Hungarian national consciousness. The progressive was often fettered by nationality conflicts, especially if they did not seem achievable within the given framework of the state. The Hungarian representatives of social progress did not renounce the idea of the unification of Hungary and Transylvania only for national reasons but also because they could only hope for support for the implementation of their social program from their Hungarian counterparts. However, the retrogressive forces attempted to protect their privileges precisely by citing the "Rumanian danger." The bourgeois democratic and later socialist representatives of Hungarian progress sought the cooperation of Rumanians and Germans, but this attempt was thwarted by the development of the East Central European nation state.

7. At the end of the 18th century, the Rumanian national consciousness developed largely under the influence of the Transylvanian Rumanian intelligentsia, the so-called Transylvanian school, and initially the aim of the political program was the assurance of equal rights within the framework of the Habsburg empire and secondly the creation of a nation state that would unify all Rumanians. The Rumanian national program could be based on the fact that by the 18th century Transylvania had a Rumanian majority and that the nationality question could be linked to the demand for social progress.

However, this did not mean that in Rumanian circles there were no retrogressive forces, alongside the progressive ones, which sought allies not only in Transylvania or among the Rumanian principalities but also in Vienna. The leaders of the 1784 peasant uprising hoped for a change in their destiny from Joseph II and enlightened absolutism, and did not take into consideration that the emperor would protect the peace of the feudal order with grave reprisals. For its part, the majority of the Rumanian privileged class also condemned the uprising, and at most, used the occasion to strengthen its position vis-a-vis its Hungarian and Saxon counterparts. The leaders of the 1848-49 Transylvanian Rumanian movement likewise turned to Vienna, but now under different circumstances. The imperial court was one of the centers of European reactionism and the Hungarian war of independence--despite all its internal contradictions--was the standard-bearer of progress even according to international public opinion. The Rumanian representatives of progress also realized the contradiction, but attempts at compromise were late in starting, also through the fault of the Hungarian government, which condemned the national aspirations from the viewpoint of a unified nation state. After 1849, Transylvanian Rumanian leading circles sought support from Viennese absolutism thereby contributing to the exacerbation of national conflicts.

8. After the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise the Hungarian ruling class wanted to prevent the Rumanian ethnic group from gaining political ascendancy and especially its union with the Rumanian Monarchy; consequently, it implemented a repressive nationality policy and liberal elements were increasingly forced into the background in governing. The ruling Transylvanian Rumanian stratum legitimately opposed this policy, and, for the reasons already mentioned, could also count on the peasant masses for support. From the end of the century, Hungarian and Rumanian progressives were most likely to meet in the growing Transylvanian workers' movement and their cooperation also continued between the two world wars when they had to oppose the repression of the Rumanian ruling class and not the Hungarian. In 1918, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the bourgeois democratic revolution created a new situation in the development of the relations of the nationalities to each other. In 1919, the Hungarian Soviet Republic offered an alternative to the national state, the alliance of soviet republics, but the international balance of power and national conflicts thwarted the realization of this plan.

9. In 1920, when Transylvania was annexed to the Rumanian Monarchy as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, the Rumanian ruling class, starting from an ideology of a unified nation state, wanted to solve the nationality question through a policy of assimilation. And the Hungarian ruling class--in a totally anachronistic way--wanted to revive a multinational "historical" Hungarian state preserving feudal relations while maintaining its own ascendancy. The confrontation of Hungarian and Rumanian nationalism made it easier for Hitlerite Germany to subjugate the two countries and to play one off against the other. The Paris Peace Treaty which concluded the Second World War strengthened the conception of the national state in Central- and Eastern Europe; however, socialism theoretically made possible a new type of relationship between the states with changed social structures, and consequently it also created new possibilities for arrangement of the nationality question.

10. The Saxons, the third ethnic group in Transylvania, who could not count on establishing a separate state and in the Dual Monarchy found themselves opposing the policy of the Hungarian ruling class which aimed at predominance accepted the annexation of Transylvania to Rumania after 1918. Afterwards, Hitlerite Germany also used the Saxons and Swabians for its expansionistic aims which led to the displacement or emigration of many and resulted in significant changes in the ethnic composition of Transylvania.

11. Transylvania also deserves special attention with respect to the study of general and regional cultural history, since it is an example of both independent development and close contact with national cultures beyond its borders. It is well known that after 1526 Hungarian culture was forced from the central regions to the periphery of the medieval state; the situation was the same in Transylvania. In the 16th and 17th centuries this region became one of the bastions of Hungarian culture and influenced the development of Hungarian culture as a whole. The Hungarian literature of the Reformation, historical and memoir writing, Transylvanian folk literature and arts are all a part of general Hungarian development. In the 19th century it is impossible to speak of Hungarian literature without mentioning Miklos Josika, Zsigmond Kemeny, or Pal Gyulai or about Hungarian learning without mentioning the two Bolyais, Sandor Korosi Csoma, Sandor Szilagyi, or Samuel Brassai. After 1918, a unique Hungarian cultural life developed which was determined by Rumanian economic, social, and cultural relations but which was also in contact with general Hungarian cultural development and produced such talents as Aron Tamasi and Jeno Dsida. The present Transylvania Hungarian culture conveys not only a picture of Transylvanian but also Rumanian reality and in this manner acts as a bridge between intellectual life in the two countries.

12. Transylvanian Rumanian cultural development--especially, in the first half of the 19th century-- was determinant with respect to general Rumanian culture. The Transylvania School with its historical and linguistic work formed the modern national consciousness. The theory of Daco-Roman continuity utilizing the thesis of "historical rights" contributed to the formulation of the political program for the unification of all Rumanians. The publicization of the Latin origin of the language aided not only the strengthening of national awareness but also the reformation of the language and writing style and the development of the culture of the mother tongue. The Transylvanian Rumanians played a large part in the development of new Rumanian literature at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. In prose it is enough to mention the names of Slavici, Agirbiceanu, or Rebreanu and in poetry Goga or Blaga. The contribution of the present day Transylvanian Rumanian writers, artists, and academicians to Rumanian culture is significant, although local characteristics are perhaps less pronounced today than in 1945.

13. The significance of the Transylvanian Saxon cultural history is underscored by the Reformation and the activity of Honterus. Later, the Saxon intelligentsia maintained lively contact with German scholarship. At the beginning of the 20th century the entire German language cultural world took notice of Saxon literature, the unique development of its arts, and historical writing.

14. Over the course of centuries, contacts were formed between the various cultures and the Reformation influenced the linguistic-cultural development of every ethnic group, even the Greek Orthodox Rumanians. One of the characteristic traits of Transylvanian life was the cooperation of the intellectuals of different nationalities in the 18th century and even at the beginning of the 20th century. The contacts decreased with the intensification of national conflicts, but the efforts which progressive movements generated in the interests of cooperation brought about results which should not be underestimated, and even today represent a tradition that could be continued.

15. It is not easy to write a history of Transylvania. Archaeological findings and place names provide a certain guide for eras from which written records are not available, but these are not sufficient to reconstruct the economic, social, and, especially, ethnic relations. Only after the time of the Roman conquest does the picture become much clearer. The early Middle Ages represent a separate problem, primarily, the history of the era of the great migrations which permits a broad range of speculation concerning the ethnic origins of the peoples living in Transylvania and their settlement. Precisely because of this our study augments the historical framework provided by the critically examined earlier written sources by concrete examples and verified, real archaeological findings. The historical material of the first centuries following the conquest of Hungary is scarce; only after the 13th century are we able to rely on documentary evidence. The unevenness of research in economic, social, and cultural history and its relative inadequacy presents a difficulty with respect to understanding later ages. This also means that the participants of this undertaking did not only rely on analyzed source materials and studies but also endeavored to conduct primary research to fill the gaps.

In the absence of sufficient facts and studies we could not undertake to also provide a detailed historical summary after 1918; we had to be content with an outline which summarizes the main developmental characteristics of the economy, society, culture, and the ethnic situation.

In writing the history of Transylvania we endeavored to carefully follow the destinies of all three ethnic groups and the development of their relations with each other. In addition to Hungarian historians we also relied on the work of Rumanian and Saxon historians. The task was not made easier by the fact that historians of different nationalities formulated divergent views regarding questions such as the continuity of individual ethnic groups, the nature of Transylvanian statehood in different periods, the relation of the state and ethnic groups in history, the interrelationship of class struggle and the struggle for national independence in the region and in Europe as a whole, and the place and role of the multinational and national state.

The authors present their individual opinions developed through the course of their research, and there was no editorial attempt to always reconcile their views on everything. Thus, there are differences of opinion on the demographic and ethnic relations at the time of the conquest of Hungary and on the direction and ratio of the settlement of the Magyars. In general, it may be noted that until the 18th century there are no available suitable

statistical data which would accurately reflect the size of the Rumanian, Hungarian, and Saxon populations and their ratios to each other. Thus, the authors were only able to rely on estimates from which it also follows that they were unable to determine in detail ethnic changes between the eras. There are different opinions concerning the extent of the economic growth of the Transylvanian principality in the 17th century. There are also differences of opinion in the evaluation of the possibilities of Hungarian and Rumanian progressives in the 19th and 20th centuries. After 1867 the otherwise understandable predominance of political history relegates the presentation of cultural efforts to the background which also indicates a conceptual difference in comparison to the first section. The various authors present certain phenomena and prominent figures of cultural history in differing proportions and depth; the controversial issues are indicated in the literature. Nevertheless, the differences of opinion are not what is characteristic of the work but rather the common view held by the authors that historical facts must be considered, and they must be analyzed and evaluated within a historical context, that is, by taking into consideration the circumstances of a given period. They reject all forms of reductionism which attempt to explain historical processes from the earliest times by ethnic factors or determinism which uses the 20th century to establish the characteristics of earlier ages and the trends stretching through them. Our viewpoint is characterized by the utilization of the fundamental categories of historical materialism since we are convinced that history is primarily an account of the struggle between social progress and the forces that are opposed to it even if these struggles are closely associated with the development of various ethnic groups, peoples, and nations, and since the end of the 18th century it is intertwined with the development of the nation and the nation state. Our basic point of view is also determined by a relative historical optimism which assumes that new social development could contribute to the development of socialist nations and to the rapprochement and cooperation of nations that were formerly enemies. We would also greet with pleasure the possibility that, during the course of this change, Rumanian, Saxon, and Hungarian historians would write the history of Transylvania, and together would recount what is common and different in the development of their peoples and their evaluations.

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ROMANIAN CRITICISMS OF 'HISTORY OF TRANSYLVANIA'

'Conscious Falsification of History'

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 2, 1987 pp 103-115

[Article by Academician Stefan Pascu, Dr Mircea Musat, and Dr Florin Constantiniu: "The Conscious Falsification of History Under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences"]

[Text] The work "The History of Transylvania" (Erdely Tortenete), an extensive synthesis in 3 volumes totaling about 2,000 pages, produced by a staff of researchers, with Bela Kopeczi, the minister of culture of the Hungarian People's Republic, being editor in chief, recently appeared in the Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Hungarian People's Republic. With Transylvania, an ancient Romanian land, being the subject of the investigation of the team of Hungarian researchers, the interest that the work has stirred up among Romanian historians is natural--especially as they are entitled to know in what way the old nationalistic, chauvinistic theses and cliches in the old order and the old historiography have been abandoned.

"The History of Transylvania," under the coordination of Bela Kopeczi, does not respond in any way to this expectation. From the very outset, we find, regretfully, that we are in the presence of a work that does not differ in its basic theses and conclusions from the old Hungarian historiography of a chauvinistic and revisionist orientation. Examining the pages of this work, the reader gets the impression of an incredible departure from the temporal framework, because the volumes published in 1986 by the Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences seem to have been written 4 decades ago. And yet, the reality is that this work was published in our times, with the endorsement of the highest scientific forum and having a member of the Hungarian Government as editor in chief.

Romanian experts will analyze "The History of Transylvania" and will have their say on each of the major matters approached in the pages of this work. What we want to do now is to offer our readers a general picture of the work in order to point out the elements needed for an evaluation that can lead to only one conclusion: We are in the presence of a gross distortion of Transylvania's history and, implicitly, the Romanian people's history, in the presence of the dissemination of theses about our people that are as noxious as they are offensive, in the presence of the deliberate attempt to dispute Romania's territorial integrity. On the basic matters of the Romanian people's

history such as the continuity of our Geto-Dacian ancestors, our Daco-Roman origin, the continuity in the ancestral abode, the unity of the Romanians in the Middle Ages and their political and legal status, the struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians for national and social emancipation, the great battles fought for independence, the forging of the unitary national state, and the place of the Romanians in world history, on all these essential coordinates of the Romanian past, the authors of "The History of Transylvania" are--as will be seen--at the antipodes of historical reality, distorting and falsifying the historical truth.

From the very first chapters, devoted to ancient history, the authors' intention of denying any continuity of habitation in Transylvania, and in fact, in the whole Romanian ethnic area, is clearly seen. Naturally, no one denies that population movements occurred in the historical periods--the Paleolithic, the Neolithic, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age. However, archeological research has shown that, despite these population movements, there was always a group of natives that was not displaced by the successive migrations of other population groups. However, what concerns the authors of "The History of Transylvania" is to make this part of the Dacian area a sort of crossing of the populations, which came, went, and sometimes left it empty, that, at bottom, belonged to no one. This is a method of disputing any continuity of habitation and thus denying the antiquity of the native, Geto-Dacian element and its state organization in the time of King Burebistas, 2 millennia ago.

Then, following the thread of history, we again find the thesis turned into an obsession of Hungarian historiography: the extermination of the Dacians by the Roman conquerors, a thesis asserted in order to dispute the unbroken continuity of habitation in the great Dacian area north of the Danube and particularly within the Carpathian arc. What we read in this regard in "The History of Transylvania" is identical to the old nationalistic Hungarian historiography: "In the analysis of the depopulation, the fact that precisely the central part of Decebalus' country (that is, Transylvania--our note) became a new province is not immaterial either. It was the territory whose population, in particular, was wiped out not only in war--which also occurred largely on this territory--but also because there the Dacians resisted to the end and remained loyal to Decebalus up to the cup of poison. The Romans massacred, in particular, this region's population, it went into slavery, or it fled before the conquerors to unoccupied territories." On this matter too, the authors deliberately ignore the results of the archeological research that revealed right in the Roman camps in Transylvania Dacian vases or fragments of Dacian vases--Micia, Angustia, Bologa, Buciumi, and Orheiul Bistritei--not to mention the Dacian settlements discovered at Lechinta de Mures, Casolt, Noslac, Obreja, etc., or the cremation cemeteries of the same native Dacian population--as well as those at Soporul de Cimpie, Casolt, Obreja, etc., which prove, along with other evidence, that the answer to the question that scholar B.P. Hasdeu posed back in his time--"Did the Dacians vanish?"--is a categorical no. And while the authors of the "The History of Transylvania" nonetheless deliberately and dishonestly ignored the archeological discoveries, incontestable proof of the Dacian material and spiritual culture, of the Dacian continuity in this abode of habitation, an elementary requirement obliges them to be familiar with the famous inscription at Crammeni, near the ancient city of Philippi in

Macedonia, an inscription that produced an entire revelation in the world historical front. At no time does this inscription mention--as the authors of the work pretend--that Hero-King Decebalus died by "drinking a cup of poison" together with "the ruling class of the Dacians, which committed mass suicide."

Reviving Robert Roesler's old unscientific theory from the second half of the 19th century regarding the south-Danubian origin of the Romanians, the authors of "The History of Transylvania" deny the possibility of the Romanization of Dacia, claiming that "The replacement of the language, which represented the highest degree of Romanization, and the taking of Latin as a mother tongue cannot be demonstrated in Dacia, nor does the historical and social development make them possible." The assertion is necessary to the authors in order to place the process of the formation of the Romanian people exclusively south of the Danube, somewhere in the Balkan Mountains, where, in 271, on the occasion of the withdrawal of the Roman administration and Army from Dacia, decided by Emperor Aurelian, the Roman colonists would also have left this province: "It is possible," the authors admit "concessively," "that the entire population did not leave the province, although nothing supports this possibility. In any case, on the basis of what has been shown thus far, it can be stated that the number of those remaining was insignificant." And then: "Some 200 years of archeological research in Transylvania have not been able to offer yet definite proof of the continuity of the 'Roman' population in Dacia, which could be taken into consideration." In the purest Roeslerian tradition, surpassing even their "master," the authors revive the theory of the Daco-Roman population gap north of the Danube in order to be able to then present Transylvania as a land empty of natives and colonists, "a country of everyone and no one," as the authors state somewhere. Then the Goths, the Huns, the Gepidae, the Avars, the Slavs, and the Bulgarians succeeded one another on this land of no one, but not a trace of a Daco-Roman and then Romanian population would have existed.

Did the authors forget that a Hungarian historian, Andras Huszti, wrote lines like these: "The descendants of the Getae live even now where their ancestors lived and speak the language that their ancestors spoke long ago. No nation has a language so close to that old Roman language (Latin) as the language of the Romanians--which is a sure sign and which cannot belie that they in Transylvania are the descendants of the old Roman colonies, regarding which we note briefly: The name of these people in their own language is from 'Roman,' that is, from Rome, or Romanian"? We do not quote this author as a decisive argument; we want only to mention that some Hungarian historians were able to utter objectively a truth of the Romanian people's history: the Daco-Roman and Romanian continuity north of the Danube.

While, according to the authors of the work, the area between the Carpathians and the Danube would have been under the control of the first Bulgarian czar-dom, the Hungarians made their appearance in the Carpathian basin in 894: "The first place of colonization of the Hungarians was thus Transylvania. The path of colonization then taken was through the valley of the Mures and the Crisul Repede and perhaps through the Meses Pass, in the direction of the Pannonian Plain."

The authors of "The History of Transylvania" try to arbitrarily change the historical reality, reversing the positions, that is, making the Romanians migratory and the migrators sedentary. However, the reality is that, after the arrival of the Hungarian tribes on the Pannonian Plain in 896 and then after the defeats that blocked their way to the west, they began incursions toward the interior of the Carpathian arc, thus into Transylvania. There, however, the Romanians had lived for centuries, organized into political formations confirmed by various historical sources, including the very chronicle of the anonymous notary of King Bela, that is, by a chief source of Hungarian historiography. Instead of this reality, the authors of "The History of Transylvania" present the Hungarian tribes as first "settling" in Transylvania, in the middle of a Slavic population, along with which there would also have been proto-Bulgarian elements, and then heading toward the Pannonian Plain. Transylvania thus becomes "overnight" an ancient "cradle" of the Hungarian tribes, older than the Pannonian Plain itself, where the Hungarian state exists today.

But the Romanians, the reader asks, where were those who formed the majority of the population of Transylvania? The authors declare with false prudence: "We cannot engage here in the dispute about the so-called Daco-Roman continuity, that is, the continual existence of a Romanized population in Transylvania, beginning in ancient times, but must just repeat the earlier finding that no historical, archeological, or toponymic proof of the existence of the Romanian population in Transylvania exists before the start of the 13th century." In reality, this proof exists and is abundant, a result of decades of investigation by Romanian historiography. The authors of "The History of Transylvania" ignore it, minimize it, or purely and simply "suppress" it.

The "treatment" applied to King Bela's anonymous notary (Anonymus) constitutes a convincing example of denying the sources that do not fit into the prefabricated molds. On entire pages, the authors try to "demonstrate" that he erred in stating that the Hungarians found Romanians in Transylvania, when they began the first incursions into the Carpathian arc. The effort made by the authors to "suppress" Anonymus is strange and amusing alike: Rarely has such a frenzy to discredit and refute the historical accounts offered by one of the oldest sources of one's own history been seen in historiography. Anonymus' crime? In the eyes of the authors it is of exceptional seriousness: He mentions Romanians in Transylvania and mentions "a certain Romanian," Gelu, "the duke of the Romanians." It is easy to understand that for those who deny the continuity of the Romanians in Transylvania, the anonymous notary is a difficult "obstacle," his crime requiring the punishment of "annihilating" his chronicle or, more precisely, the information about Transylvania and, above all, about the Transylvanian Romanians. The authors decree that Anonymus erred, understanding incorrectly a passage from the old Russian chronicle "The Tale of the Olden Days" and projecting into the 9th-10th centuries a reality from his time, that is, from the end of the 12th century: the existence of the Romanian-Bulgarian Empire.

We will not revive here the discussion--so old--about the value of Anonymus' chronicle as a source. We limit ourselves to repeating the observation, which has already been made, that as long as there was no political interest in presenting Transylvania's history in a distorted manner, no one, not even anyone

in the entourage of the kings of Hungary, hesitated to recognize the existence of the Romanians in Transylvania for centuries, before the incursions of the Hungarian tribes. Despite the limits imposed by his time, Anonymus was much closer to the truth than the authors of "The History of Transylvania," who use every means to distort the truth: the autochthony and continuity of the Romanians in the intra-Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area, thus also in Transylvania, confirmed conclusively by historical, archeological, linguistic, toponymic, ethnographic, logical, and other evidence.

Is it really possible to doubt the existence of extensive political formations on the territory of Transylvania like the voivodeships (duchies) or "countries," as the Romanians called them in the era, at the end of the 9th century and the start of the next century? Describing the penetration of the Hungarians into Transylvania, Anonymus shows how the Hungarians' armies conquered first, as a result of fierce battles, the territory of such a voivodeship, situated westward to the Tisa, north of Satu Mare, eastward to Piatra Craiului and Portile Meșesului, and southward to the Mures.

Such a political formation, a country (terra) mentioned by the chronicler, corresponds completely in territory to the big concentration of settlements found in northwest Transylvania; its leader (dux) was called Menumorut, according to the same chronicler, and had his residence in the city of Biharea (near Oradea). Here is what the chronicle of Anonymus, the royal notary, says: "In fact, Arpad's representatives, Usubuu and Veluc, crossed the Tisa River at the Lucy Ford, and after they left there, coming to the Bihor fortress, they saluted Duke Menumorut and gave him the gifts that their duke had sent him. At the end, however, telling him what they had to say on Duke Arpad's behalf, they claimed the above-mentioned territory. However, Duke Menumorut received them with kindness and, loading them with various gifts, asked them to return on the 3d day. Nevertheless, he answered them, saying to them: 'Tell Arpad, the duke of Hungary, your ruler: We are obligated to him as a friend to a friend with everything that is necessary to him since he is a stranger and needs much. However, as long as we live, we will never cede him the territory that he asked of our benevolence. And we were sorry that Duke Salanus ceded him a very big piece of territory, either from affection, as the story goes, or from fear, which is denied. However, we will cede him not one plot of land, either from affection or from fear, although he said that he has a right to it. And his words that he spoke to us, that he is descended from the people of King Attila, the scourge of God, do not worry us.'"

However, the authors of the new "History of Transylvania" declare that "the romantic images and minor battles described by Anonymus" do not have any sort of confirmation. Let us mention first that we are in the presence of a unique case, when a historical reality is reflected in a single narrative source such as Anonymus. In such situations, it is important that the source be subjected to a rigorous analysis that reveals the authentic elements. The "hypercriticism" of the authors of "The History of Transylvania" regarding Anonymus reminds us of the well-known saying about throwing out the baby with the bathwater. The legendary elements—which are found in medieval chronicles, including that by Anonymus—do not have to conceal the reality, especially if it is also confirmed by other written and archeological sources: In

the 8th-10th centuries, political formations, run by judges and voivodes, existed in the whole area inhabited by Romanians. The marking of a map with the archeological discoveries within the Carpathian arc offers an outline of the very three political formations mentioned by Anonymus, who was able to err in some details, but not in the great reality of the precedence of the Romanians vis-a-vis the Hungarians in Transylvania: The trees must not stop us from seeing the forest.

By denying, avoiding, and falsifying the historical sources, the authors of "The History of Transylvania" revive the old arsenal of the adversaries of Romanian continuity north of the Danube. For them, the Romanians represented a pastoral population, which, as it decreased south of the Danube, increased north of the river. In order to appear concerned with scientific "rigor," the authors write with simulated precaution: "Nevertheless, we must venture the hypothesis that the relatively late documentary appearance of the Vlacho-Romanians in the Southern Carpathians, with a reference back to 1210 at most, does not mean that they actually did not appear there just a little earlier." And in order to not "venture" too much in their assertion, the authors agree that it can be admitted that the organization of the Romanians in the Southern Carpathians, as border guards appointed by the Hungarian kings (of course!), "can be considered to have occurred between 1150 and 1200" instead of 1210.

Once the thesis of the late arrival of the Romanians first in Walachia and Moldavia and then in Transylvania from "their south-Danubian homeland" is "launched," the authors constantly try to convince the reader that a series of disasters sweeping over Transylvania favored the Romanians alone! When the great Mongol invasion in 1241 produced extensive devastation in Transylvania, the beneficiaries were who? The Romanians! "One direct consequence of the Tatar invasion was also the massive immigration of Romanians," the authors write. Then, it is asserted that the Hungarian royalty populated the devastated areas around the cities with "Romanian shepherds, who withdrew northward from Bulgaria and Serbia." In the view of the authors of "The History of Transylvania," another "ally" of the Romanians would have been the great epidemic of plague that struck the continent toward the end of the first half of the 14th century: "The plague epidemic in 1348-1349, which brought destruction to all Europe and which, according to sources in the country and abroad, also decimated Hungary's population,...opened the way for the Romanians to the villages of the missing Hungarians and Saxons. The landowners, who needed manpower, populated the villages in inner Transylvania, partly or wholly depopulated, with Romanians, who were hurt less by the plague and who, in any case, had grown in number through continual migration." We leave it to the reader to judge if this can be called scientific reasoning!

Once "nomadized" as to way of life and "balkanized" as to area of origin, the Romanians are depicted as a primitive population, found at a level of development below the other ethnic groups in Transylvania. The authors delight in dwelling on the backwardness of these shepherds, silently and stealthily infiltrating the Carpathian arc, where they would have been "absorbed" as a result of the policy of colonization and the disasters producing large uninhabited areas. Nevertheless, the authors forget that one of the most brilliant political and military personalities of the 15th century, Iancu of Hunedoara--

also made governor of Hungary—rose from the ranks of this population described as "vagrant, primitive, and barefoot." In the authors' view, the only progress made by the Transylvanian Romanians was that of progressive but very slow sedentation: "Those who turned to the sedentary way of life represented just a small part of the Romanian peasantry in Transylvania at the end of the 16th century. The majority of them kept the seminomadic way of life of herding and raising livestock." And then: "These groups, not tied to the land, migrating freely with their animals,...represent the embodiment of the Romanians in Transylvania in the 17th century."

In the authors' opinion, the Transylvanian Romanians would have had a strong army, capable of ensuring their victory on the level of the demographic structure of Transylvania; they, these wandering shepherds with their flocks, would have ended by becoming the majority in relation to the sedentary Hungarians, Saxons, and Szeklers due to three factors: sedentation, which put an end to the movements and thus gave the authorities the chance to keep track of them (therefore, it is not a question of a true increase in the Romanian population, but only of the registration of it by the state or the feudal lords), immigration, and birth rate. According to the authors of "The History of Transylvania," in certain periods there were massive flows of Romanian population coming from beyond the Carpathians—from Walachia and Moldavia—especially to avoid taxation. And Transylvania accepted them because, the authors tell us: "Transylvania in 1687 was a country that could provide protection, a relatively consolidated country, with new possibilities and greater and greater needs for manpower. Therefore, it welcomed any newcomer."

We agree with the authors that at that time Transylvania was "a country that could provide protection, a relatively consolidated country," but at that time it was an autonomous principality and did not belong to the Hungarian kingdom, collapsed and disintegrated in 1541, after the transformation of central and southern Hungary into an Ottoman pashalic; Transylvania, like the other two Romanian countries—Moldavia and Walachia—possessed broad autonomy, accentuating even more the ties among them.

As regards the natural population growth, let us mention just that, regarding the "nomadic" Romanians in Transylvania, the authors do not hesitate to mention..."their polygamy."

We found ourselves obliged to reproduce the above insulting and defamatory assertions and characterizations regarding the Romanian people in order for the reader to get a little idea of the "scientific integrity" of the authors, of the elementary lack of respect for the historical truth, for the Romanian people's millennia-long history. But let us allow history—this "bedside book of each nation"—to judge the truth.

We now dwell on another matter. Why does "The History of Transylvania" not give the reason why the Hungarian royalty adopted the voivodeship as a political and administrative formula in Transylvania, that is, an institution that had in medieval Romanian society a specific content, similar to the Walachian and Moldavian voivodeships, that integrated it into the political structures of the Romanian area? Why does it not explain anywhere a great reality of the

Middle Ages, namely that, as Romanian historiography has shown, the voivodeship of Transylvania had basic features identical to those of the Walachian or Moldavian voivodeship? It is known that, just as in Moldavia and Walachia, the Transylvanian voivode concentrated in his position all the military, administrative, and judicial prerogatives of the state. He had complete authority--like beyond the mountains--the only difference being that he could not call himself "sole ruler." There is no explanation in this "History of Transylvania" regarding why, as has been demonstrated, "nowhere on the territory of the old kingdom in Hungary--once so vast--do we find traces of any territorial and political organization similar to that of the Transylvanian voivodeship. This organization was, on one side of the Carpathians and on the other, a specifically Romanian product that the Hungarian penetration into the center of our political space was not able to destroy despite the repeated attempts that it made over the centuries." It was to be expected that in the pages of this work of synthesis of Transylvania's history the specific character of the structures of the voivodeship in relation to the administrative organization of the Hungarian kingdom would be explained, but such matters--which are nonetheless essential--did not concern the authors, and it is easy to understand why. They would have had to admit then that, due to the presence of the Romanians with their specific institutions, the voivodeships and principalities, organized throughout Transylvania, the royalty would have found itself obliged to recognize and accept the political and administrative institutions of the Romanian natives. Instead of a solid and objective analysis of Transylvania's history, the authors preferred falsehood and denigration. For them the main objective was not the truth, that is, the true reconstruction of the facts, but the "demonstration" of a preconceived thesis, with an obvious political goal: the absence of the Romanians in Transylvania during the penetration of the Hungarians into the Carpathian arc and, in this way, the contesting of the Romanian people's legitimate rights to their ancestral abode.

Why do the authors of the work really ignore the opinions of historian Elek Farczady, who wrote back in 1912: "The kings of Hungary were obliged to accept the distinct organization of Transylvania, with strong voivodes at its helm, under the acute pressure of necessity, since the feeling of independence there was so deeply rooted that the state formation, once begun, could no longer be stopped"?

Another example indicative of the "scientific" procedures of the authors is the presentation of the status of the Transylvanian Romanian nobility and the beginnings of the policy of excluding Romanians from Transylvania's political life. In the authors' view, the regime of social, national, and religious discrimination to which the Transylvanian Romanians--ultimately reduced to the position of a "tolerated" population--were subjected appeared as a result of their late arrival, through the immigration of pastoral elements or through the fleeing of peasants from Walachia and Moldavia in the 17th-18th centuries, which would explain their marginal position in Transylvanian social and political life. The authors "admit," as has been seen, the sedentation of part of the Romanian population and the existence of a Romanian nobility, but they explain as follows the absence of a medieval Romanian "nation" (in a medieval, that is, political, sense of the term; in the Middle Ages, "natio" included only the privileged stratum of an ethnic community): "At the end of the

Middle Ages, the Romanians had come to be in large numbers serfs of the Hungarian or Saxon nobility and partly of the Romanian nobility raised from their ranks. This is also the reason why a separate Romanian nobiliary 'nation' was not formed, because the serfs, regardless of nationality, did not have political rights, and the nobility, also regardless of nationality, represented a single nation." And then: "The Romanian noble knowingly declared himself a member of the 'Hungarian' nobiliary 'nation,' and while the voivodes and boyars in Walachia and Moldavia, with the exception of isolated cases, took more and more the position of compromise with the Ottoman power, the Romanian nobles in Hungary engaged with self-sacrifice in the struggle against it alongside the Hungarians, a condition for their privileged position."

We will not dwell here on the denigrating statement about the "isolated cases" of struggle against the Ottoman Porte, because any reader can measure the hoax perpetrated by the authors when he knows that, in fact, these "isolated cases" are the epic of the medieval history of the Romanian people, conquerors of the Ottoman military power so many times under the leadership of brave and patriotic rulers--Mircea the Great, Vlad Tepes, Stephen the Great, Radu of Afumati, Prince John the Brave, Michael the Brave--who, with an army formed of people of the soil, with one hand on a plow and the other on a sword, secured for the Romanian countries a status of autonomy vis-a-vis the Ottoman Porte, while the majority of the states in central and southeast Europe were broken up and turned into pashalics. Indeed, for what reasons were these national and military leaders recognized by European public opinion of the time as defenders of European civilization? What we want to show, in connection with the Romanian people's history, are the methods of falsification used by the authors when the historical reality defies their attempts to present it in a distorted manner. It is known that the king of Hungary, Louis I of Anjou, made a number of decisions in 1366 that marked the beginning of the elimination of the Romanians from the political life of Transylvania. The most serious of the royal decisions had to do with making adherence to the Catholic faith a condition for recognition of nobiliary status. We find with amazement that this moment of exceptional significance in Transylvania's history is not seriously discussed by the authors in the paragraphs on the Romanians but, surprisingly, appears in the chapter on...the medieval culture in Transylvania, in the paragraph on the medieval religious culture of the Transylvanian Romanians. A matter of political history of the greatest interest is purely and simply treated as a minor religious matter; in order to create confusion, the authors deliberately associate the measures of King Louis I of Anjou and the proposals of forced conversion made to the sovereign by Vicar Bartolomeo of Alverna, and the authors conclude that "this loathsome zeal not only did not have an effect on Louis the Great, who did not start a new action of conversion, but aroused repulsion in many, especially among the Transylvanian Hungarian nobles interested in stabilizing the Romanians." In reality, the measures promulgated by the Hungarian sovereign in 1366 marked the start of a process that would culminate in the alliance among the Hungarian nobility, the Saxon patriciate, and the leaders of the Szeklers (*Unio trium nationum* in 1437), a political formula on which Transylvania's structure would be based for centuries on end and which would make the native and majority inhabitants--the Romanians--"tolerated" in their own land.

In the same paragraph devoted to the medieval culture in Transylvania, the authors also discuss the matter of Christianity. They state that Latin-rite Christianity and Orthodox-rite Christianity coexisted at first in Hungary and that "Transylvania was at the confluence and, at the same time, the periphery of the two Christian cultures. The Roman church was represented by the Hungarian and German ethnic groups and the Byzantine church by the Romanian and Ruthenian ethnic groups." Regarding the Romanians, the authors assert that their Christian traditions were of Balkan and Slavic origin. We are again in the presence of the "scientific" procedures used by the authors. They ignore the well-known fact that the basic terminology of Christianity was in the Romanian language of Latin origin, that Christian relics from the period after the withdrawal of the Roman Army and administration from Dacia have been discovered on Transylvania's territory, and that, therefore, a Romanian population of the Christian faith, revolving around the patriarchate in Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire, existed at the time of the infiltration of the Hungarian tribes into the Carpathian arc. The Christianization of the Hungarians occurred in 1000 under the aegis of the Roman church (the schism between Rome and Byzantium occurred in 1054, but it was preceded by tensions and breaches), and as the authors correctly state, the two religions coexisted at first. It is easy to understand that, under these conditions, the presence of the Christian Romanians in Transylvania favored the spread of the new religion within the Hungarian population. Concerned with "bringing" the Romanians from the south of the Danube, however, until the 14th century, the authors do not breathe a word about this aspect of Transylvania's history.

After "resolving" the source of the Romanians, their place of origin, allowing them to go "wandering through the mountains of Transylvania behind their flocks of sheep," the authors turn to another matter, namely: the depiction of Transylvania as a component part of Hungary. The collapse of the Hungarian kingdom as a result of the Battle of Mohacs (1526) and the new political status of Transylvania, becoming an autonomous principality in relations of subordination to the Ottoman Porte, like the other two Romanian countries, do not stop the authors--in this matter too, faithful continuers of the nationalistic Hungarian historiography--from presenting this ancient Romanian land, inhabited forever by Romanians, always representing the majority of the population, as a new Hungarian "country": "Hungarian rulers and leaders of Hungarian policy therefore determined the fate of Transylvania, turned into a state. Thus, in the decades after 1556, as regards its essence, the new state, which was working out its own fate with more and more consciousness, remained what it had become in the bloody decades of its formation: an eastward-jutting remnant of the medieval Hungarian state. Outside coercion severed this territory from the mother country, changed its state form, and imposed on its leaders a new and bold foreign policy. However, it was not able to overcome the thinking, the consciousness of the Hungarianness of the guiding forces of society." Consequently, the principality of Transylvania is presented as a continuation of the Hungarian kingdom, a political entity distinct from the other two Romanian states, Walachia and Moldavia. The authors depart here from a number of chroniclers, historians, and geographers who stressed Transylvania's totally different orientation from Hungary. Thus, chronicler Mihaly Cserei observed that "the threat for Transylvania always came from Hungary and the Hungarians," while historian Sandor Szilagyi pointed out in 1866 that "The history of

Transylvania cannot be integrated into Hungarian history, since it has a specific character," and geographer Jeno Cholnoky pointed out that "Transylvania has its own history, distinct from Hungarian history." Distinct from Hungarian history, and, we add, integrated into the whole of the Romanian area and society. This is what the Transylvanian aulic chancellery in Vienna recognized when, in 1779, it noted "the close connection that existed between the great principality of Transylvania and the neighboring countries, Moldavia and Walachia," with which it formed a true economic unit.

As early as the preface of the work, the authors assert that "for centuries, Transylvania's history was interwoven with the Hungarian people's history." It is also known how much of a fuss was made in the old Hungarian historiography and how much of a fuss is also being made today--especially in the circles of Hungarian emigration--about Hungary's millennium-long rule over Transylvania. But simple arithmetic shows that the period in which Transylvania constituted a component part of Hungary is reduced to the 51 years that separate the institution of the Austro-Hungarian dualist system in 1867 from the decision of the Grand National Assembly of the Transylvanian Romanians on 1 December 1918 to unite Transylvania with Romania. As for the rest? By the time Hungary fell under the attack of Suleiman the Magnificent, Transylvania was, as has already been said, a voivodeship with a vigorously delineated political personality. Becoming an autonomous principality in 1541, it could no longer have ties with Hungary--as the authors assert--because Hungary had ceased to exist as a state, with Buda itself becoming the center of an Ottoman pashalic. When the Hapsburg offensive caused the Ottoman withdrawal after 1683, Transylvania became a principality in the Hapsburg Empire, then a great principality administered separately by Hungary. Where then are the centuries and the millennium of Hungarian rule? Only in the overheated minds of revisionists who are no longer capable of even a simple calculation.

No at all objective presentation of the close political, economic, military, and cultural relations between the Romanians on one side of the Carpathians and the other is found in this "History of Transylvania." The unity of the Romanian people is denied, and the political, economic, and military collaboration among the three Romanian countries is ignored. The first union of the Romanian countries, achieved by Michael the Brave, is described in a way that arouses disgust. Not only is the great voivode presented as a "mercenary," as a tool of Emperor Rudolf, and as ungrateful to his Rathoryist "benefactors," but the consciousness of descent of the Romanian people and of the one who united the Romanians under a single scepter for the first time is disputed: "We do not have," the authors say, "any data from which it would follow that Michael intended to give a political role to the Transylvanian Romanians. On the contrary. Just as he brought some Walachian believers to Transylvania, he summoned Szeklers and Hungarians to Walachia for help in governing." Therefore, the political work of the first unifier of the Romanians, one of the dear symbols of national unity, is presented with the same dishonesty that alters the historical reality to the point of disfigurement. The steps taken by Michael the Brave for the benefit of the peasants and the Romanian clergy, and his religious policy, in which the effort to displace, through religion, the formula of "Unio trium nationum" is easily distinguished, are deliberately ignored by the authors, concerned with presenting the great voivode as a brutal

and bloody conqueror: "The ruler and military leader went with his soldiers against Moldavia, and in May he drove out Prince Ieremia, a friend of Poland. The insignificant loot that was found in this poor country was able to offer a solution only for several weeks; toward the end of summer, most of the triumphant army was able to subsist only by looting. The local population—Hungarians and Romanians alike—tried to defend itself with weapons, but this only caused the repression to increase." The bright image of one of the most prominent personalities in the Romanian people's history, who signed at the sacrifice of his blood the document for the union of all the Romanians, is thus stained with the mud of calumny disguised as historical research.

It is no wonder that, being obsessed with the desire to dispute the Romanian character of Transylvania, its organic integration into the Romanian land, history, and life, the authors present in just as distorted a manner the main stages of the struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians for national emancipation, Romanians who would have become the majority—the authors say—only in the second half of the 18th century! The national character of the Revolution of 1784, led by Horea, Closca, and Crisan, is called in question, there is no analysis of the claims contained in "Supplex Libellus Valachorum," for which there is substituted the assertion that "its authors could not really expect that, in the system of the three nations, a place as a separate political entity would be given to their nation," and the history of the Revolution of 1848 is seriously distorted. The struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians is depicted as a counterrevolutionary movement, with the Apuseni Mountains, where Avram Iancu led the resistance of the Romanians, acquiring the appearance of a so-called Transylvanian "Vendee" (a reference to the French province where counterrevolutionary actions were organized during the great revolution). The serious mistakes in the national policy of the government run by Lajos Kossuth are totally ignored, the Hungarian nobility's ill-fated decision to unite Transylvania with Hungary is justified by the authors "even only from self-defense," and the 30 May 1848 decision of the Cluj diet, which voted on this union, is characterized as achieving "the union of the two sister countries," Hungary and Transylvania. On the other hand, the Romanian revolution and its leaders are harshly criticized: Simion Barnutiu, who through his "confused" outlook would have aroused "foreign distrust," also threatened "the harmony among nations," causing "the breaking of realities." In the Blaj assembly in May 1848, counterrevolutionary tendencies would have been manifested, with the Romanian intellectuals inciting "religious and national hatred."

Regarding the Romanians, the aspects of violence are pointed out in the context of the events in 1848-1849: "'From pure vengeance,' the Romanian rebels in retreat set fire to Alud, with its college and library, and organized a dreadful bloodbath in the Hungarian city."

The Sibiu diet at the start of the 1860's, in which the Romanians had the majority of the deputies, is regarded as "the docile tool of the Vienna government" and the Sibiu delegates in Vienna as "beggars" and "the puppets of the government." Minimizing the struggle of the Romanians and of the Sibiu diet for national and social rights, it is asserted: "A durable arrangement could not be obtained against the leading stratum of Hungarian society, against the Hungarian liberal and conservative camp, the oldest force in the country, with

the strongest economic positions, with the greatest political potential, having strong allies beyond Piatra Craiului."

On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian dualist system, established in 1867, Transylvania's incorporation into Hungary, and the policy of Magyarization do not find the merited condemnation in the book. Moreover, the Romanians would not have known how to appreciate "constitutionalism, as well as the union of the Romanians in Transylvania with those in Hungary, the gathering of them into a single camp." It was to be expected that the Hungarian historians would undertake a thorough analysis of the consequences of the dualist formula for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which Marx, Engels, and Lenin denounced as a state of social and national oppression, a true prison of the peoples. Did the authors forget that, back in 1848, Friedrich Engels described the Austrian monarchy as "a motley complex, resulting from inheritance and petty larceny, this organized hodgepodge in which 10 languages and 10 nations are mixed together, this random mixture of customs and laws of the most contradictory sort"? (Fr. Engels, "The Beginning of the End of Austria," in Marx and Engels, "Works," Vol 4, Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1963, p 511) Did the authors forget what Marx wrote in 1875: "In Hungary, the majority of the population subject to the Hungarians does not sympathize with them and bears their yoke against its will, hence a continual struggle"? (K. Marx, "The Conspectus of Bakunin's Book 'State and Anarchy,'" in Marx and Engels, "Works," Vol 18, Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1964, p 609) Did the authors forget that, in 1916, V.I. Lenin shared the idea that "the elimination of Austria-Hungary represented historically only a continuation of the breakup of Turkey, being like it a necessity of the historical process of development"? (V.I. Lenin, "The Junius Pamphlet," in "Complete Works," Vol 30, Politica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1964, p 8) Silently bypassing this dark page of world history, the authors content themselves with still making a superficial criticism. Thus, when a more severe policy during Dezsó Bánffy's government is mentioned, the "scientific" conclusion immediately follows: "But even at that time (in Dezsó Bánffy's time—our note) there was more smoke than fire."

It is a commonly known reality that in the short stage of 51 years between 1867 and 1918, the government in Budapest promoted a policy of persecution and oppression of the non-Hungarian nationalities, of forced Magyarization of them by draconian means, that aroused the opprobrium of all international public opinion. For example, here is what the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy wrote about the policy of denationalization, of Magyarization: "What is sadder is the fact that Count Apponyi (one of the most vehement politicians in Budapest in the measures of denationalization—our note) has abroad the reputation of a pacifist, while in Hungary he does not grant even the status of human beings to the non-Hungarians. Any person in his right mind must tear from this man's face his lying mask, to show the whole world that he is not a benefactor but a bird of prey." And the Norwegian writer, "the Giant of the North," as B. Bjørnson was called, declared: "In my youth, I greatly loved and admired the Hungarian people. Later, knowing them more closely, I began to detest their chauvinism. Sooner or later, these injustices will lead Hungary to its downfall." The economic and cultural policy, education and justice, the church and colonization, the police and prisons—everything was put into play to

modify the demographic, economic, and social relationships in Transylvania, to change its ancient Romanian physiognomy.

The memorialist movement is disregarded, the authors trying to present it as an isolated action, viewed by contemporaries as "begging in the anteroom." Can historians who claim that they are analyzing the past from the positions of historical materialism really evaluate in this way the national claims of the Transylvanian Romanians, subject to a regime of discrimination and oppression? To use the term "begging in the anteroom" today is an insult to the memory of the Romanian fighters, and those who use it are the same as those who sent the memorialists to prison.

The words filled with a great truth, uttered by Ion Ratiu, the chairman of the Romanian National Party of Transylvania, at the trial of the memorialists, are worth recalling: "We are not the accused, but the accusers. Can it be here a question of judgment, of defense in the legal sense? No! Do what you will. We are innocent, but you control our physical persons, but not our consciousness too, which, in this case, is the national consciousness of the Romanian people. You are not competent to judge us, but it is another, greater, more enlightened, and certainly more impartial court that will judge us all: It is the court of the civilized world, which will punish you once again and more harshly than it has punished you thus far. Through the spirit of intolerance, through a fanaticism unmatched in Europe, by punishing us, you will succeed only in proving to the world that the Hungarians are a discordant note in the concert of civilization."

We are surprised by the fact that, in the 2,000 pages that this work contains, the authors devoted not a single page to the historical legitimacy of the modern Romanian state in 1859, whose objective necessity was the natural consequence of the lawlike process of affirmation of the Romanian nation in the entire Dacian area. In vain, we may seek in the pages of "The History of Transylvania" an analysis of the nation's formation, of the national problem, of the lawlike path of the reintegration of the national state. Instead of such analyses, we find a distorted picture of the great events in 1918, within which the action of "a group of Romanian bourgeoisie in Arad" is substituted for the Romanian nation's effort and desire to again be within the borders of a single state--the unitary national state.

A reality from the field of the evidence demonstrates that the peace treaties in 1919-1920 gave international recognition to the creation or completion of the national unity of the states in central and southeast Europe. The Romanians' struggle to achieve national state unity by virtue of the right to self-determination, within representative, democratically elected, plebiscitary assemblies, by virtue of the desire of the Romanians under foreign rule to be united with the country, also goes into this broad framework. This reality too is falsified and distorted. The "Treaty" of Trianon (4 June 1920) is presented as an imperialist treaty that led to the "breakup of the historical Hungarian state." Imposed by imperialist states, the peace treaties "did not take into account the people's right to self-determination and, in many situations, even the ethnic realities," the authors state, specifying that the only socialist state, Soviet Russia, did not recognize them and "never gave up

Bessarabia, nor did Bulgaria agree that southern Dobruja belonged to Romania." Referring to the struggle of the Romanians and their leaders for unity, it says that, instead of accepting the fair solution to the national problem on the basis of centuries of cohabitation in the Hungarian state, they left "the final decision to the Romanian Royal Army and the peace treaties." The Treaty of Trianon is made jointly responsible for the reactionary, fascist orientation of Horthy's Hungary: "The fact that the breakup of the historical Hungarian state occurred simultaneously with the defeat of revolutions and with peace terms that caused grave national harm prevented a democracy from being established in the country, a democracy within which Hungarian society would have gradually accepted the lawlike process of the changes and would have forgotten grudges and, relating creatively to the new conditions, would have sought together with the neighboring peoples the ways of cooperation"--a pitiful attempt to vindicate Horthy and his regime through "the imperialist system of peace," which the authors give him as a convenient alibi. The authors exhibit a surprising "discretion" toward Horthy's fascist regime, showing themselves to be quite miserly in his well-deserved condemnation, long since validated by history.

The period after World War I is treated briefly, "in the absence of suitable data and workups"--as the authors state falsely, because such data exist in abundance. "After 1918," it says in the work, "Transylvania's history is part of Romania's history. We must now analyze the economic, social, political, and cultural processes that are going on, or the new ones in progress, from the angle of all Romania. And the situation on the territory that we are examining is changing." Transylvania's union with Romania had negative consequences for the Transylvanians--the authors assert tendentiously--because of the "annexation" to a poorly developed country and the alleged cornering of the wealth and businesses there by the heavily colonizing "royalists." Defying the reality of the interwar years, the authors assert that the Hungarian nationality did not have full possibilities of development "partly because of unfavorable economic and social processes, partly because of the national policy that discriminated, or the process of Romanianization.... The Hungarians in Transylvania were disoriented and demoralized in the early moments of the transformation of history. They could not accept either the idea that the millennium-long state organization, to which they too organically belonged, had disappeared in a few weeks or the idea that, due to annexation to a foreign country built on a less developed economic and social base, the fate of minorities awaited them."

As a result, after 1918, nowhere in the work is anything said about Transylvania's organic integration into the unitary Romanian national state, about the fact that it was united with the other Romanian provinces, or about Romania's reintegration, but, again and again, only about "the change in rule."

Throughout the presentation of Transylvania's history, the authors totally ignore the judgments of the Romanian documents on the crucial moments of this history and do not find space in the 2,000 pages to devote a few lines to the organic ties--economic, demographic, cultural--between Transylvania and the other Romanian provinces, but coming to the period after 1918, when the Romanians' constant aspiration to forge and live in a unitary national state

became an accomplished fact, an irreversible historical reality, they remember, finally, a quotation from a document--it is a question of the decision of the Third RCP Congress (1924), imposed, as is known, by the Comintern--through which "the people's right to self-determination to the point of separation was declared, and it was established that Romania, by unifying the various regions, turned from a national state into a multinational state."

The fascist Vienna dictate is presented as "arbitration" requested by the Romanian Government, and the repression and crimes of Horthy's regime are softened by means of an invented similar policy of the Romanian authorities: "The so-called national policy of reciprocity thus began, and expulsions were answered with expulsions by the other party, internments with internments, the closing of schools was answered with the closing of schools, with uncertainty being created as to the fate of the Romanians in the north or, respectively, the Hungarians in the south." Consequently, an equal sign is put between the situation of the two populations, the fact being ignored that, besides expulsions and internments, which the authors mention, a reign of terror of unprecedented ferocity was unleashed in northwest Romania. Men and children slaughtered, pregnant women cut open, whole families exterminated, clergymen and notable intellectuals murdered, mass butchery like that at Ip and Traznea, horrible crimes like those at Moisei and Sarvas--that is what marked the dreadful years of the invasion of northwest Romania by the Horthyists. These are facts that cannot be conjured away, because they are still vivid, painfully vivid, in the memory of the people of these Romanian areas.

Without the most elementary scruples for the historical reality, the authors, consistent in their concern for distortion and falsification, also suggest a similar parallel as regards the situation of the Jews in Transylvania during World War II. It is asserted that "a significant part of the Jewish population, about 90,000-100,000, was transported" from the territory invaded by the Horthyists, while "387,000 Jews were murdered" in Romania. Does really not one of the authors know that not a significant part, but absolutely all, not 90,000-100,000, but over 160,000 Jews were deported from the territory under Horthyist occupation? Does really not even one know that Horthy himself admitted that the deportation, as the Hungarian police called it, surpassed in cruelty even what happened in Nazi Germany? Is it possible that the authors are completely unfamiliar with American historian Randolph Braham's works on the holocaust in Hungary and in the region stolen from Romania by the Vienna dictate, an American historian who pointed out that the Jews there "were exterminated at an unprecedented rate through the most terrible program of deportation and butchery encountered in the whole war"? And referring to Romania, the same historian states that, under those terrible circumstances, Romania constituted a haven, an oasis for Jews.

We believe that the examples of falsifying Transylvania's history and denigrating the Romanian people's history are sufficient. Nevertheless, we also add the work's conclusion, which is as grievous as it is biased: "Transylvania is a distinct ethnic and cultural entity in central and Eastern Europe, and the evolution of its situation influences the development of this region...." Consequently, in the authors' opinion, Transylvania is not a component part of the Romanian state, but a "distinct ethnic and cultural entity,"

the sovereignty of the Romanian state is implicitly limited, while "its (Transylvania's--our note) situation influences the development of this region" (central and Eastern Europe--our note). In the face of these untruths, any honest reader, any honest-minded person, cannot read these lines without the reading of them arousing indignation and protest regarding the provocative statements of the staff of authors led by Bela Kopecki. How do the authors of this book, on whose cover is written "The History of Transylvania," venture to try to invalidate the result of a long struggle, which imposed sacrifices on the Romanian people, to fulfill a constant, millennia-old aspiration: national unity? How can such a work serve "friendship between the two peoples," as the editor in chief of the work stated emphatically?

It is a unanimously known fact that, thanks to the policy of the Romanian Communist Party, the national problem has been fully and permanently solved: The Romanians and the coinhabiting nationalities have the same rights and duties and are engaged in the common effort of building the multilaterally developed socialist society. But the authors say almost nothing about socialist Romania's great accomplishments, obtained in all fields, including in the national problem, again explaining, childishly, that...they do not have information.

In reality, the finding that the authors are concerned not so much with the fate of the Hungarian nationality in Transylvania as especially with creating a diversion and misleading public opinion comes from reading the work. Their action is thus integrated into the attempts to create a false problem of "the minorities in Romania," for which no objective basis exists. United by their work and struggle over the centuries, the Romanian people and the coinhabiting nationalities are now giving a new appearance to their common homeland, the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Through its political orientation, "The History of Transylvania" is a work written in a revisionist and chauvinistic spirit, it thus being perfectly connected with the nationalistic Hungarian historiographic literature that, from the past century to today, has tried to justify the revival of anachronistic political and territorial structures.

Out of the multitude of works of Horthyist propaganda we mention just the volume "Transylvania," published by the Hungarian Society of History, whose preface is dated 1 August 1940. Written--it too--by a staff of authors, also including Pal Teleki, the then prime minister of Hungary, and various historians, including Laszlo Makkai, also present now among the editors of "The History of Transylvania," the work "Transylvania" tried to convince Hitler and Mussolini that Transylvania had to belong to Hungary. Consequently, shortly before the odious Vienna dictate, Horthy's regime asked Hungarian historiography to provide, through its representatives, the historical legitimization of the revisionist, annexational claims to Romanian Transylvania. Let us also mention that the minister of propaganda of Hitler's Reich asked a commission of experts, led by W. Czeli, for an evaluation of this work. The one asked undertook a rigorous examination of the work, at the end of which he concluded that what was destined to influence the position of the fascist great powers was nothing but "political charlatanry." Nevertheless, the interests of

Hitler's Germany and fascist Italy led to the Vienna dictate, through which the northwest part of Romania was offered to Horthy's Hungary.

In 1946, during the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference, the same Laszlo Makkai published, in the French language, a "History of Transylvania" whose purpose, this time, was to convince the anti-Hitler coalition that, throughout its history, Transylvania had belonged to Hungary and that, therefore, the so-called injustice of Trianon must not be repeated. The author's "reasoning" was not convincing, and the paltry business attempted in Paris, to steal at least a part of Transylvania's territory for Hungary's benefit, failed.

Today, the same Laszlo Makkai, who wrote for Hitler and Mussolini and then for their conquerors, is testing--along with other colleagues--his skill as a falsifier and denigrator of the Romanian people's history. Regarded in his country as an "expert" on Transylvania's history, he is, in fact, a belated "apostle" of a revisionist creed invalidated by history.

Whom do the authors want to now convince that Transylvania is a "distinct ethnic and cultural entity"? One who compares the three cited works, which go from the time of Horthy's Hungary to our times, finds that the basic theses are the same, and, sometimes, even their phrasing. The authors' premises regarding "the application of the basic categories of historical materialism" prove to be empty words: We are in the presence of a work written in a reactionary, nationalistic spirit, with chauvinistic, revisionist outbursts.

The method of the staff of Hungarian authors is, as has been seen, very "simple": Everything that does not fit into the molds of their predetermined interpretation, with a political goal of the clearest revisionist essence, is eliminated. The treatment applied to Romanian works of history, whose conclusions are ignored or declared "obsolete," is characteristic in this regard. A dialogue, that is, a true exchange of opinions, done with competence and objectivity, thus becomes impossible. However, do the authors of "The History of Transylvania" imagine that, by closing their eyes to the evidence that refutes their theses, it thus ceases to exist? Coming from centuries and millennia, this evidence--from that of Herodotus about the Getae to the contemporary sources--will always be solid proof of the Romanian continuity and unity in the Dacian abode. And any interpretative construction that ignores it will end by collapsing.

One specification is necessary: We do not find in this work absurdities to which the old Hungarian historiography inured us, such as, for instance, the assertion that the Romanians became the majority in Transylvania due to a diet characteristic of shepherds, that is, based on dairy products! The falsifiers of today are more refined. They no longer invoke such absurdities: They now try to slip their propaganda into a more credible package--that of "scientific," "objective" research. This is what was tried by the so-called Committee for Transylvania, for example, created by immigrants of Hungarian origin in the United States, which published in 1980 a supplement to its publication CARPATHIAN OBSERVER, under the title "Transylvania and the Theory of Daco-Roman-Romanian Continuity." There is no notable difference between the assertions of the authors of the passages in this supplement and those of "The

History of Transylvania." Perhaps that is why a discussion among four historians from the Hungarian People's Republic--Gyorgy Gyorffy, Peter Hanak, Laszlo Makkai, and Andras Mocsy (the last two being editors of "The History of Transylvania")--was also reproduced. There is no difference between the historiography of the Hungarian immigrants and the historiography in the Hungarian People's Republic when it is a question of Transylvania, more precisely, the revisionist position on it.

It is astonishing and makes one indignant that such a work that defies the historical truth, falsifying grossly and denigrating the glorious millennia-long past of the Romanian people, was able to appear under the aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. How is it possible to allow an institution meant to represent the highest forum of scientific integrity and professional ethics to give its endorsement to a work that has nothing in common either with science or with ethics, which unscrupulously falsifies and distorts the most elementary truths, which revives calumnies and theses that we believed long since buried in the garbage can of history, disseminating noxious, dangerous ideas that can only arouse contempt and anger, can only divide people, create dissension, poison the air?

"The History of Transylvania" is a model of how history should not be written. The deliberate ignoring of sources that do not fit and of specialized literature with different conclusions, the arbitrary interpretations (the biased manipulation of the population data offered by levies and censuses offers a graphic example), and falsehoods and denigration characterize this work, which seems to us to be a belated, anachronistic, and regrettable edition of the old positions of Hungarian historiography, even as far back as the period of Horthy's Hungary.

History is, above all, called upon to find and utter the truth, and everything that is built on truth is durable and beneficial. Like the languages in the famous fable by Aesop, history--depending on how it is written--can bring together or divide people. We are living in a world that aspires to peace, security, and cooperation: Why can we not put history in the service of these ideals of all mankind? Why should the noble cause of closeness and mutual knowledge among peoples not be served, as is fitting? Why should we lower it to the disagreeable position of a spreader of hatred? Proceeding in that way, we defile history as a science and disqualify ourselves as professionals of it; this is what the authors of "The History of Transylvania" forgot, unfortunately, putting themselves in the position of falsifiers of history.

Surprise, Indignation Asserted

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[Article by Dr Mircea Musat, university lecturer]

[Text] It is an indisputable truth, proven by our glorious, many thousands of years of history, that the Romanian people asserted themselves in the consciousness of humanity through their lofty features and moral-political values, their working for peace and collaboration, honor and diligence, power to understand and recognize the legitimate aspirations of other peoples, respect for the historical creation of all nations, good neighborliness and mutual assistance among all peoples of the world.

In the context of these facts, we are surprised and made indignant by the appearance of a work in which the incontestable truths in the history of the Romanian people have been distorted, denigrated and falsified flagrantly. As an historian I can understand the diversity of opinions, viewpoints and differing opinions and confrontations of ideas regarding certain persons or historical events. However, the historians' job is to contribute to clarification of them on scientific bases so that treatment of these problems leads not to a sharpening of divergencies and contradictions but rather to finding what was and is common, to stressing the lessons we should learn for the present and the future.

With a sharp memory of the evil experience of the not-too-distant past, when revisionist, revanchist and hostile theories dominated regarding the Romanian people and their good-neighbor relations, we question the aim of the recent appearance of the work entitled "The History of Transylvania" in the People's Republic of Hungary. It is a question of three volumes totalling around 2,000 pages, the work of a collective of researchers whose main editor was Bela Kopeczi, Hungary's minister of culture. And, we state, the work appeared at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Publishers and was given a tumultuous release of unprecedented proportions.

All these details, however, do nothing more than increase our indignation and revulsion, because even from the first pages we are faced with a work which continues the concerns of the old Hungarian historiographers with chauvinist and revisionist orientations. It seems strange, but through its basic theses and conclusions the work printed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Publishers is almost identical to those which appeared many decades ago, those whose goal

was to flagrantly distort the history of Transylvania and, implicitly, that of the past of the Romanian people, circulating the most poisonous and insulting ideas about our country, deliberately disputing the territorial integrity of Romania.

In presenting all the basic problems of the history of the Romanian people, the authors of "The History of Transylvania" are at the antipode of historical reality, distorting and falsifying historical truth. From the first chapters, devoted to ancient history, we clearly see the authors' intention to deny any continuity of living in Transylvania and, generally, in the Romanian ethnic area. But, even in the Paleolithic, Neolithic, Bronze and Iron Ages of long ago, when frequent shifts of population took place, archeological research done on the Romanian territory proved the permanent existence of a mass of natives who could not be dislocated by the migrating hordes. Having a preconceived idea of making the Dacian geographic area like a kind of "boulevard" for all the populations coming and going and leaving it nearly empty, belonging to nobody, the authors of this work actually are disputing the ancient and native Geto-Dacian element and its state organization during the time of King Burebista.

Once having reached this point, we also meet the thesis--which has become an obsession with Hungarian historiography--of the extermination of the Dacians by the conquering Romans and, thus, the creation of a vacuum of inhabitation north of the river, particularly within the Carpathian arc, following withdrawal of the Roman army and administration to the south Danube. "In analyzing the depopulation (of Dacia--author's note) it is not indifferent," the authors of "The History of Transylvania" write, "that it was precisely the central portion of Decebal's country (that is, Transylvania--author's note) which became a new province. It was the territory whose population was reduced to nothing not only in war--which for the most part also took place on this territory--but also because it was here that the Dacians resisted up to the end and remained faithful to Decebal until the cup of poison. The Romans massacred primarily the population of this region and it became slaves or took refuge from the conquerors on unoccupied territories."

Along the same line of falsehoods, the authors also deny the Romanization of Dacia ("replacement of the language, which represented the highest degree of Romanization and taking over Latin as the mother language cannot be demonstrated in Dacia nor did historical and social development make it possible"), again releasing the old, nonscientific theory of R. Roesler on the southern Danube origin of the Romanians. (Footnote 1) (MAGAZIN ISTORIC, No 8, 1983). They place the formative process of the Romanian people exclusively in the southern Danube, somewhere in the Balkan Mountains, where in 271 supposedly all the Roman colonists of Dacia withdrew together with the Roman army and administration. As a concession these authors admit that it could have been possible "that not all the population abandoned the province, although nothing supports this possibility." Then they hurry to go further with their distortions and say that "no matter what, on the basis of what has been shown until now, one can affirm that the number of those remaining was insignificant." In complete contradiction with the truth, they assert that "archeological research in Transylvania, 200 years old, has not been able to offer until today a sure proof of the continuity of the 'Roman' population of Dacia which could be taken into consideration." As in other cases, here we see not a matter of the existence of proof but rather

the desire for (or interest in) objectivity in any case, in accepting and taking it into consideration. However, to take it into consideration would mean moving away from the writing of "master" Roesler. The authors of the recent work, in many regards surpassing their predecessor, pick up the theory of the vacuum of Dacian-Roman population at the northern Danube precisely in order to present Transylvania as "a country of everyone and of noone," a land on which follow Goths, Huns, Gepeds, Avars, Slavs, Bulgarians, without there existing even a trace of native Dacian-Roman and later Romanian population.

But why is there so much enthusiasm for emptying the former Roman province of Dacia of its population and, particularly, the intra-Carpathian area? Because in the logic of the authors of this work, any denial of proof must make room for a falsehood. They assert that while the area between the Carpathians and the Danube was under the rule of the first Bulgarian tsar in 894, "the first spot for settling down for the Hungarians was Transylvania. The road then traveled was through the valleys of the Mures and Crisul Repede and perhaps through the Meses Pass in the direction of Cimpia Pannonica." That is, exactly the opposite of what took place. We know that in 896, the Hungarian tribes came to Cimpia Pannonica and tried to go forward to the west, but their road was blocked in this direction; only after that could they begin to make incursions toward the interior of Transylvania. And so, through a simple artifice, that is how Transylvania became an ancient "cradle" for the Hungarian tribes, older than Cimpia Pannonica, where the Hungarian state of today is. The authors claim that prior to the beginning of the 13th century there was no proof, not historical, archeological or toponimic, of the existence of a Romanian population in Transylvania." And because Anonymus (notary of King Bela III), one of the oldest Hungarian chroniclers, recorded in his work the heroic resistance in the 9th and 10th centuries by the Transylvanian and Banat Romanians under the leadership of their military and political chiefs Delu, Glad and Menumorut, to the invasion of Hungarian tribes, the authors subject him to harsh treatment of "being done away with," asserting that "the Romantic personalities and insignificant struggles" he described have not found any kind of confirmation. We recall that it is a question of the work of a Hungarian chronicler who, however, has an unforgiveable sin: he recorded what dishonest historians do not want to know or hear--the existence of Romanian, independent political formations opposed to the Hungarian kinds which blocked them in their expansionist tendencies toward the Romanian area.

Bringing back to today the entire arsenal of enemies of Romanian continuity north of the Danube, the authors of "The History of Transylvania," although they do nothing but deny, falsify or ignore historical sources, want to wrap the "work" in a "scientific" aura. They feign the precaution: "Still we must risk the hypothesis that the relatively late documented appearance of the Romanians-Walachians in the southern Carpathians, going back at most to 1210, does not mean that they actually did not appear here at least a little earlier." When exactly? "Between 1150 and 1200." Then come the elements of the entire theory, of the late arrival of the Romanians from "their southern Danube country," first to Muntenia and Moldavia and then later to Transylvania. "The arrival" of the Romanians in Transylvania, we find out from these same authors, was favored by an entire string of calamities as, for example, the Tatar invasion of 1241 or the plague at the middle of the 14th century! This epidemic, they say, "decimated the population of Hungary" and in the same way "opened for the Romanians

the path toward the villages of the Hungarians and Saxons who had disappeared. The rulers of the land, who were suffering from a lack of labor force, colonized the Romanians in the villages of interior Transylvania, which had been partially or completely depopulated; the Romanians had been hit less by the plague and somehow had increased in number through permanent migration."

So once they were "made nomads" as a way of life and "Balkanized" as a place of origin, the Romanians are presented as a primitive population with a level of development inferior to the other Transylvanian peoples; even in the 17th century the Romanians of Transylvania were forming some "collective groups not connected with the land, migrating freely with their animals."

Faced with so many mystifications, lies and dishonesty, we ask: Why in nearly 2,000 pages is there not one single word about the Transylvanian princship as a formula of political-administrative organization of the country of purely Romanian origin? Because it would have been hard to explain the existence of an element in the superstructure when you are trying your best to deny, to not see a certain structure. Because the main purpose of the work's authors was not to establish historical truth but "to demonstrate" a preconceived thesis with proven political end: the absence of Romanians in Transylvania during the period the Hungarians penetrated this region and in this way to dispute the legitimate rights of the Romanian people over their ancient hearth.

But whereas the authors of "The History of Transylvania" take refuge in so-called silence or little information and impreciseness of documentary sources for the ancient and middle period, what excuses could they invoke for the distortions and gross lies committed in presenting and interpreting some of the more recent points in the history of the Romanian people?

For example, nowhere in the entire work can one find what comes close to an objective evaluation of the close political, economic, military and cultural relations between the Romanians on one side of the Carpathians with those on the other. The unity of the Romanian people is denied constantly, while the multiple aspects of the political, economic and military collaboration between the three Romanian countries are avoided. The unity achieved by Mihai Viteazul is presented in a manner which is truly revolting. The great prince is nothing more than a "mercenary," a tool of Emperor Rudolf and "one who was ungrateful" to the "doers of good" of the Bathory family. They deny the great prince his awareness of people: As the authors assert, "We have no information showing that Mihai intended to give a political role to the Transylvanian Romanians. On the contrary. Just as he brought several Muntenian faithful to Transylvania, he called Hungarians and Szeklers to aid in the government." So the measures taken by Mihai in favor of the peasants and the Romanian clergy as well as his religious policy by which he intended clearly to remove the formula of "unio trium nationum" through religion are simply denied, while the great prince is presented as a brutal and bloody conqueror and his army, as a hungering mish-mash racing after its prey. The bright picture of one of the important personalities in the history of the Romanian people, who paid for the act of uniting all the Romanians with the supreme sacrifice, is besmirched by the mud of defamation and is concealed in historical research.

Obsessed with the idea of disputing the Romanian nature of Transylvania, the authors present in a totally distorted way the most important points in the

struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians for national liberation. The history of 1848, the revolutionary year, for example, is not only distorted but also seriously libeled. In the view of the authors of "The History of Transylvania," the struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians under the circumstances of 1848 is no more or no less than a counterrevolutionary action, with the region of the Apuseni Mountains, where Avram Iancu led the Romanians' heroic resistance, being presented as a kind of Transylvanian Vendee (Footnote 2) (A reference to the French province where powerful counterrevolutionary actions were organized during the French Revolution of 1789). In exchange, the grave mistakes committed in national policy by the government led by Lajos Kossuth and the decision of the Diet of Cluj of 30 May 1848 for the arbitrary annexation of Transylvania to Hungary are completely passed over, characterized as presenting "the unity of the two sister countries." The leaders of the Romanian revolution are severely criticized and loaded with all the faults; people with "confused" concepts who stirred up "foreign lack of faith" and threatened "the harmony among nations," causing "the break with the facts," and so forth. The same authors assert that counterrevolutionary trends were demonstrated during the Cluj Meeting of May 1848, while the Romanian intellectuals fanned "religious and national hatred."

While the Diet of Cluj of May 1848 is viewed with such sympathy and scientific "objectivity" by the work's authors, the same thing does not occur with the one in Sibiu in 1860, the majority of whose delegates were Romanians. It is seen as "the docile tool of the government in Vienna," while the Sibiu delegates to Vienna were "beggars" and "extras of the government."

The authors' view changes radically, however, when they discuss the events which would take place just several years later: Austro-Hungarian dualism. The pejorative expressions toward the governing circles in Vienna disappear completely. The act of incorporating Transylvania into Hungary and the magyarization policy initiated following the establishment of Austro-Hungarian dualism in 1867 are simply passed over, criticizing the Romanians (the height of hypocrisy!) because they did not know how to value "constitutionalism as well as the union of Transylvanian Romanians with those in Hungary and bringing them into a single camp." I had the occasion to show readers of MAGAZIN ISTORIC what the dualist regime basically meant, in the articles published in No 3-4/1986, so I shall not dwell on this point which had such serious consequences for the majority of the Transylvanian population established of Romanians and for the fate of the other nationalities seriously oppressed by Hungary.

The memorandist movement is presented in this same mystifying, defamatory and insulting manner, with the authors seeing it as a completely isolated action, viewed by contemporaries as a "waiting-room begging." To use such terms today is not only an insult to the memory of the Romanian patriots; those using it identify themselves with those who judged and imprisoned the memorandists. And there is more. It means launching yet another lie since the cause of the memorandists and the national liberation movement of Romanians in Transylvania were alive and favorably commented upon in the Europe of the last decade of the 1800's.

It is in vain for us to look in the 2,000 pages of the recent "The History of Transylvania" for an analysis of the establishment of the nation, of the national problem, of the legal road for reunification of the national state. In place of that we find a seriously deformed picture of the great events of 1918.

The effort and will of the entire Romanian nation to unite and live within a single state--the united national state--are minimalized and labeled as an action by "a group of Romanian bourgeoisie from Arad."

The 1919-1920 peace treaties gave international recognition to the creation or completion of the national unity of the states and peoples from central and southeastern Europe. Also included in this broad process was the struggle of the Romanian people to complete its united national state. This reality also is seriously distorted in the pages of the recent "The History of Transylvania" published in Budapest. Its authors question the correctness or timeliness of establishing certain national states, which basically means making an apology for domination and oppression and bringing back into discussion the reactionary theses and ideas knocked about earlier and presently by ideologists and politicians who deny the revolutionary, progressive role of the people's liberation struggle. This means the failure of taking into account not only the principles of scientific socialism but even the most elementary bourgeois-democratic concepts. Only in this way can we explain that, for example, the 4 June 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which legalized at the international level the act of will of the Romanian people achieved in 1918, is presented and labeled an imperialist, unjust treaty. In exchange, paradoxically, the hateful fascist dictate of Vienna of 30 August 1940, by which the northwestern portion of the country was ripped from the body of Romania, is presented as an act of historical justice.

We did not propose to point out here the entire list of falsifications and distortions contained in the voluminous work published last year under the sponsorship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. I think the examples I have given are significant for its denigrating nature at the expense of the history of the Romanian people. And if we also add the conclusion at the end of the work, it is precisely in order to underline once again how serious and tendentious the act committed by the group of historians headed by Bela Kopeczi is. They maintain, "Transylvania is a special ethnic and cultural entity in central and eastern Europe and the evolution of its situation affects the development of this region." In other words, Transylvania is not a component part of the Romanian state, whose sovereignty the authors implicitly limit, feeling that the situation of one portion of Romanian territory "affects the development" of an entire region of Europe.

Does this type of work serve "friendship among the two nations" as its responsible editor states? No way! Through its political orientation "The History of Transylvania" is a work thought out and produced in a revisionist and chauvinist spirit, connected perfectly with Hungarian nationalist historiography, which attempts to justify the trend toward resurrecting certain anachronistic political and territorial structures.

However, in this regard there is an element of consistency. And we think it is particularly significant to mention it. In 1943, another collective of authors, among which was also then Hungarian prime minister Pal Teleki, published in German and Italian the volume "Transylvania" under sponsorship of the Hungarian History Society, whose purpose was to convince Hitler and Mussolini that Transylvania should be returned to Hungary. In 1946, during the Paris peace conference, a new work in French entitled "The History of Transylvania" came out, whose purpose this time was to convince those who had fought Hitler and Mussolini that

through its entire history Transylvania belonged to Hungary. One of the main authors in both the first and second works was Laszlo Makkai, in his country considered a "specialist" in the history of Transylvania. Today he appears with absolutely no disguise in the collective of authors of the recent "The History of Transylvania" under the sponsorship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Makkai, along with his other colleagues, once again is practicing the trade of denigrator of the history of the Romanian people and not researcher serving historical truth and the good-neighbor relations between the two countries. It is a late "gospel" truth of a revisionist creed invalidated by history. Whoever confronts the three works finds that the basic theses and ideas are the same (sometimes even in the formulations). But, we ask, whom do these authors wish to convince this time that Transylvania is "a special ethnic and cultural entity?"

Do they imagine that by ignoring the documentary evidence refuting their theses these objective proofs will cease existing? It is true that today's falsifiers have become more refined. They have rejected the enormities which we used to meet in the old Hungarian historiography (of the type where the Romanians became the majority in Transylvania due to the diet based on milk products!) attempting to sift propaganda through a packaging polished with the qualifications of "scientific," "objective" research. What surprises and makes us indignant, however, is the fact that this type of product could appear under the sponsorship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. How was it possible for an institution intended to represent the highest forum of scientific integrity and professional ethics in the neighboring country to endorse a work completely estranged from the most elementary standards of sciences and ethics, one which ignores, falsifies and distorts without scruples the clearest truths, which resurrect calumnies and theses which we thought had long ago and forever been cancelled out by historical facts, circulating poisonous and dangerous ideas which can only provoke scorn and anger, can only disunite, can only create dissension and can only poison the atmosphere?

The work which came out in Budapest in 1986 entitled "The History of Transylvania" is nothing but a grave example of the way history should not be written.

8071

CSO: 2700/196

CURRENT CONCERNS IN CAMPAIGN AGAINST RELIGION

Tirana MESUESI in Albanian 3 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Astrit Hoxha, Candidate of Science, Honored Teacher: "A Spark that Lights the Great Fire Against Religious Obscurantism"]

[Text] Twenty years ago, on 6 February 1967, Comrade Enver Hoxha, at a joint meeting of several Tirana basic party organizations delivered his speech, "Further Revolutionizing the Party and the Government." This document of great historical and political importance has become a source of inspiration for the broad masses of people, a source of initiatives and actions to implement the decisions of the 5th party congress. Great and small arose to criticize themselves and others courageously, to combat shortcomings, weaknesses and errors, to purify socialist society from the remnants of the old society. Pupils and students and, in general, the teaching collective was widely included in this struggle.

In this important speech of our beloved and unforgettable leader, Comrade Enver Hoxha, inspiration was found by the already well-known movement of the "Naim Frasheri" Middle School of Durres, entitled, "With the sharp sword of the ideology of the party against religious ideology, prejudice, superstition and backward customs."

Within the framework of this movement, the aim was to use revolutionary means to combat the roots of religion, together with the institutions that remained alive. This was seen to be closely linked with the struggle against foreign manifestations. Under the leadership of the party, the movement realized its objectives step by step, while overcoming various obstacles and difficulties.

The mass character given by the party to the movement, as well as the full support and solidarity it found among the working masses and all the youth of the country, gave it the dimensions of a powerful avalanche. Within a short time, the people themselves closed all centers of religious obscurantism, such as churches, mosques, tekkes [religious centers of the Bektashi dervish order] and monasteries, together with their property. Important actions were taken on a nation-wide scale to destroy the religious literature that poisoned the conscience of people. There was also an action to collect and destroy religious relics, icons, various symbols, etc., without any sort of value.

One aspect of the movement has been and remains, in our day, the struggle to affirm fully the personality of women. Practices and customs which degraded our mothers and sisters were attacked and unmasked. These included the selling of girls [in marriage arrangements], engagements at a very young age, inequality of men and women in the family, underestimation of the strengths and abilities of women and girls, etc.

Of additional value to the movement as a source of inspiration to lead it further was the speech given by Comrade Enver Hoxha at the 4th congress of the Democratic Front where--among other things--he said: "It required only a spark dropped by the revolutionary pupils of the 'Naim Frasheri' school in Durres, inspired by the teachings of the party, to ignite that great fire which swept the centers of religious obscurantism from the face of the earth." Inexpressible joy was excited in the masses of pupils and students by Comrade Enver's meeting with a group of pupils from the school at the "Aleksander Mojsiu" theater, as well as by the visit paid by Comrade Ramiz Alia to the "Naim Frasheri" school.

New tasks to advance the struggle against remnants and old customs were assigned to all the youth of our country by the 9th congress of the AWP. In the report to the Congress, Comrade Ramiz Alia said, among other things: "Just as it has up to present, youth and its organizations must always remain at the forefront of the struggle and must assault remnants of old, backward customs, as well as the dissolute and degenerate influences of the capitalist and revisionist world..."

In order to implement these instructions, youth in school has been launched into concrete action. Work groups have been revived to operate within the framework of the movement against religion. In the youth organizations, various phenomena are being attacked, such as prejudice, the belief in fate, etc. On the other hand, every manifestation of indifference and tolerance toward religious ideology has been combatted. The healthy spirit of youth has penetrated outside the walls of the school as well, into the bosom of the family where some remnant of the past still exists here and there.

But the movement against religion has been seen as closely linked with the tasks that the pupil has in school. It is stressed that one cannot be a youth fighter against religious ideology without being well trained ideologically and scientifically, together with all the knowledge given by the school. For that reason, in discussions that are held and in analyses of work, as well as by means of wall-posters, negative attitudes toward study are attacked: learning only for the sake of grades and a diploma, searching for easy ways, petit-bourgeois tendencies to obtain undeserved grades, etc. Aside from this, included in the movement "standard-bearers of the teachings of Comrade Enver Hoxha and fighters for implementation of the decisions of the 9th congress of the AWP," school youth participates in various actions, such as those for the hygiene of neighborhoods and villages, caring for olive and other trees, etc. A harsh struggle is waged inside and outside of school against every alien manifestation in clothing and behavior, in speech, in improper behavior in public places, etc. These are accompanied by educational activities such as: theme-oriented evenings, the organization of variety shows and sketches with

themes that attack various faults, meetings and conversations with writers, etc. Greater attention is being shown to technical and scientific study circles, etc. In this way, the struggle against religion and backward customs, with the features of this stage of development, has been included in the broad front of tasks assigned by the party to the school for the communist education of the young generation.

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POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF UNOFFICIAL YOUTH MOVEMENTS NOTED

Budapest IFJUSAGI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 6, 1986 pp 24-35

[Article by Mate Szabo, research fellow, ELTE State Research Center for Political Science and Jurisprudence: "Alternative Social Movements and Reform in Hungary"]

[Text] The issue of autonomous social initiatives has been one of the "gray areas" of Hungarian domestic policy over the last few years. The invigoration of citizens' action and the demand for political participation in areas that were formerly almost exclusively the domain of the state as, for example, environmental protection and the peace movement are new phenomena in our country.

Social movements are always a reflection of the development of society as a whole, and of its politics: by and large, they are a product of the most urgent problems and their manifestation, its determinative structures and mechanisms, are a reflection of the whole. The social movements participate in social education, in innovation, and the function of reform and they teach, could teach, us to recognize the problems of our own society. It is a fatal political and theoretical mistake to ignore this "signaling function of movements".

Social movements may become the true "engines" and shapers of progress only at rare times in history. It may also be true that these "turbulent" periods are not really even the constructive phases of development. The historical role of the social movements has an indirect and perhaps a more unambiguously positive effect. The social movements serving, as it were, a "catalytic function" raise problems and offer solutions regarding the political structure which the political institutional system may then adopt and could institutionalize by way of reforms--which however could lead to either the institutionalization or the dissolution of the initiating movement. In my opinion the new types of alternative social movements could today contribute either directly or indirectly to the reformation of our political-institutional system.

About the Interrelationship of Political Innovation and Social Movements

In as much as we do not examine social movements in their own right we may situate the stages of their development within the context of broader sociopolitical change. The movements have "peaks" and "valleys" which correspond to the cycles of sociopolitical development.

The English sociologist Sidney Tarrow formulated the correlation between sociopolitical innovation and the cycles of reform and the dynamics of movements. (Footnote 1) (Sidney Tarrow: "Social Movements, Resource Mobilization and Reform During Cycles of Protest," Working Paper No 1, Cornell University, 1982) The demands, interests, and challenges stemming from society exert pressure for decision-making and action on the political system. At the same time, the structural opportunities provided by the political system create the framework for the emergence of social protest and social movements. Thus, the relation between the social movements and the political institutional system is reciprocal, and could be analyzed within a mutually dependent relational system. One of the main goals of the social movements is bring about political innovation and reform. At the same time, the political reforms and innovation influence the appearance of social protest behavior and its opportunities. Tarrow considers the analysis of the reciprocal effects of the reform cycles and the movement cycles to be the crux of the problem. The development of the movement cycles is determined by the changes in the social, economic, and international circumstances, but it is directly influenced by the realm of political possibilities, i.e., the structure of the realm of possibilities "allotted" to protest and movements by the political system.

The relationship of the movement cycle and the reform cycle is multidimensional. In certain political systems and situations the movement cycles lead to the inception of reform cycles. At the same time, reform cycles could precipitate movement cycles by restructuring the the political possibilities. Both mechanisms exist in a political structure open to social demands, and it is impossible to separate their effects from each other. Thus, a certain degree of correlative correspondence could be posited between the reform cycle and the movement cycle. If we accept the hypothesis associated with the theory of Karl Wolfgang Deutsch that the dynamics of modern society are such that society subjects the political organizational and institutional systems to general challenges for change, innovation, and modernization which the political organizations and institutions always "fall short" of due, in part, to the nature of their stability then we must assume the presence of a "gray zone" existing alongside that of the institutional system which is concerned with the problems neglected by the institutional system and has a constantly changing size and structure, either more or less institutionalized. (Footnote 2) (Karl W. Deutsch: "Politische Kybernetik," Rombach, Freiburg, 1973) This area is, in part, formed by social movements which as a result of the complexity of society represent the diversity and plurality of the movements and organizations. The "world of

movements" has a unique "dysfunctional functionality" for the system as a whole which simultaneously represents a challenge to the institutional system and, at the same time, could aid its renewal, innovation, and reformation.

The social movements are an indication that institutional politics has "fallen short" of addressing certain social demands. In this respect, social movements are a sign of instability, conflict, and crisis. Often only one relation appears for the bureaucratic "political logic" (Marx): the movements are simply crisis symptoms, the termination of which promotes the stabilization of the system's framework. However, from a different perspective, the social movements are an indication that the potential for conflict and a crisis plexus are in the process of formation, the aversion of which is a political task, and they propose certain remedies and direction for this. The ambivalence of this "signaling function" of the social movements is similar to one of the "signaling systems" of our bodies, that of pain: we don't like it, we try to avoid and eliminate it but we need it since this indicates a threat to our body and the source and nature of the threat. The state of the political system is likewise burdened with its own "signaling system," the "dysfunctional functionality" of pain. The nature, willingness, and method of processing the signals actually reflects the relational attitude, the extent and type of innovative ability of the political system as it relates to social demands. (Footnote 3) (Mihaly Bihari: "Innovation in the Political System and Social Reforms;" Mihaly Bihari: "The Political System and Socialist Democracy," ELTE AJTK Tudományos Szocializmus Tanszék, Politikatudományi Fuzetek, vol 6, Budapest, 1985, p 227-246)

Social Movements in the Socialist Political System

The size, structure, character, role and function of the social movements is qualitatively variable, system- and situation specific. The movement problematics of various social and political arrangements, aside from certain commonly held basic structural issues, significantly differ from each other. The phenomena of social movements in modern society is closely related to the civilian sphere of society. Thus, the questions of the socialistic mode of existence and the structural changes of civilian society could hold the key to understanding the social movements of socialism.

How is the development of the social movements' sector and the structure of civilian society interrelated in Eastern European socialism? Gramsci juxtaposes eastern and western societies and concludes that the East is characterized by the underdevelopment of the institutions of civilian society and also by the preponderance of state authority, and this made possible the speedy (but problematic) completion of the socialist revolution. (Footnote 4) (Antonio Gramsci: "The New Prince," Magyar Helikon, 1977, p 129-130) The role and function of the social movements in Eastern European society under capitalism is different from regions of classic Western European development. The restrictions of laws governing associations and the state regulation of the civilian sphere are much greater here, and this, in part, propels the interest representation of society in the state and other more formalized and institutionalized

spheres. At the same time, characteristically extreme movements that want to transform the whole of the sociopolitical system from the "outside" are spreading which reject the strategy of institutional reforms. In this case, the formalization-centralization and institutionalization are in conflict with the radical rejection of institutions.

Following the socialist transformation the situation changed radically. The social movement and the workers' movement now came under the dominion of the state. During the period of the transition of power a heightened national and international crisis situation and the monopolization and takeover of the social movement sector characterize the basic conflicts surrounding the creation of a new society. This is the sum total of political power; thus, it leads to the homogenization of the diversity of movements and to the "appropriation" of the whole of the "movement sector". Parallel with this the large-scale institutionalization and formalization of the social movements and its party which are being integrated with the organizations of state authority occurs which, in this manner, becomes characteristic of the entire social movement sector. This characteristic is what produces the predominance of the pseudo- and quasi-movement types characteristic of socialism even today. (Footnote 5) (Martin Kolinsky, William E. Patterson (ed.): "Social and Political Movements in Western Europe," Croom Helm, London, 1976, p 336) On the one hand, largely formalized and institutionalized organizations with little or no ties to movements want to be identified as social movements (pseudo-movements). On the other hand, social movements are forced to develop within institutions and organizations, i.e., their true identity as a movement is unable to actually emerge (quasi-movement). These types of social movements occur in the earlier phases of historical development and also in other types of societies but become particularly representative in socialism as a result of the monopolized, one-dimensional and institutionalized nature of the movement sector.

During the transitional phase in the domestic-international crisis the political state's efforts to totally politicize civil society prevail which calls into question social autonomy and plurality. With the easing of the crisis situation and parallel with the process of normalization the harshness of the basic conflict associated with the transition dissolves and the relative autonomy of the civil society increases. This process enriches the sphere transmitting the expression of social interests and theoretically makes possible the revival and pluralization of the movement sector dominated by pseudo- and quasi-movements on the foundation of the new type of structure of civil society. (Footnote 6) (Concerning the relationship between the civil society and the political state in socialism: Attila Agh: "Social Self-Directed Organization and Socialism," manuscript, 1986; Attila Agh: "The Defensive Society," manuscript, 1986; Tamas Kolosi and Zsolt Papp: "The Historical Metamorphosis of Social Structure," Tarsadalomtudományi Közlemények, 1971, vol 2)

I would like to contrast the two, differing in character and structure, ideal types of social movement sectors possible in socialism.

1. The Normal Condition. Its characteristics are:

the autonomy, plurality, and differentiation of civilian society;
a reduction of the political state and the multi-channel nature of the expression of societal interests;
the "sui generis" nature of the social movement sector and the unique role and function it plays in the political culture and in the interest representation system;
the differentiated, pluralistic composition of the social movement sector and the elimination of ideological-organizational uniformity. (The social movement sector is, as it were, an element of sociopolitical innovation.)

2. The Crisis Condition. Its characteristics are:

the political state questions the autonomy, differentiation, and plurality of civil society; the predominance of the political state and the restriction of the expression of interests to a single channel;
the institutionalization of the social movement sector, its transformation into pseudo- and quasi-movements, its demotion to subculture status in the political culture, and in the expression of interests the melding with the institutional organization system;
the ideological-organizational uniformity of the social movement sector and its monopolization. (The social movement sector is by definition a dysfunctional, "anti-system" factor.)

I think that the elements of the two ideal types are intermingled in our sociopolitical reality. It is my belief that the stabilization of the socialist sociopolitical system and the democratization of the political system points in the direction of the normal condition. However, I would not presuppose a linear development in this regard. Instead, I would emphasize the transitory, turbulent contradictory, and ambivalent situation between the two types. This situation requires sociological, in particular, political science research to attempt to describe, analyze, and explain the situation that has evolved and the role and function that the social movements play in the existing socialist political system. This task could and should be undertaken on several levels. Historically: with regard to discovering the traditions still extant today in political culture. Synchronically: with regard to the movement phenomenon manifested through the interest transmitting system, as well as, in connection with the relationship of movements and innovation and reform.

Thus, we will try to examine what the characteristics of the social movements in Hungary are today.

The major feature is the predominance of the state, in particular, of the administrative organs in interest representation, the intermingling of the state organs with all the other types of institutions (party, interest representation), i.e., their domination and supervision of them (associations, social movements); the emergence of the "party-state"

complex. But we must quickly add that the political reforms (the separation of representation and administration, the increase in the autonomy of the interest representation organs, the restructuring of the election system, the re-regulation of the activities of associations, etc.) introduced in tandem with the economic reform process have the effect of leading to democratization and loosening the integrated from "above" character. (Footnote 7) (Concerning our country's political system: Mihaly Bihari: "The Characteristics of the Political System in Socialist Society in Hungary," op. cit. p 101-126) This could improve on the present considerably ambivalent position of the autonomous social movements in two respects: state-institutional-legal framework is created for their support, i.e., for their tolerance; favorable political conditions are created for them, i.e., there are indications on the part of the party, the social movements, the interest representative organizations and the mass communications complexes of a willingness to engage in political dialogue and acknowledge identity.

The creation of these state-political parameters could contribute to allowing the autonomous social movements to fulfill their roles as innovators in the political system of the society in contrast to the institutions foundering because of the ceaseless change in the value-, information-, and interest processes--as a consequence of their stability and structure. At the same time this role only refers to the entire "lower sector" of the social interest transmitting process as a whole (interest representative organizations, associations, interest groups, etc.) and could develop within the framework of the democratization process decentralizing the interest transmitting system and opening it up to society.

The social movements could have a function in promoting the stabilization of the political system through political socialization and the political elite, i.e., also in the renewal of its members. Spontaneous social activity is the most suitable in combating widespread apolitical tendencies. In a system integrated from "above" the social movements could represent new alternatives to the limited, centralized, conformist channels which train individuals to become political and a political activist.

Who's doing What in Our Country?

Over the last few years a network of "new social movements" has emerged in our country, especially in Budapest and in a few of the larger cities. It is much smaller than western movements; nevertheless, in domestic terms, the participation of a few thousand individuals which this represents is not negligible. Its importance is underscored by the fact that its foundation is the youth, primarily the intellectuals of the future, the students of today; thus, this phenomenon is hardly avoidable by a future oriented viewpoint. Let us examine these "Hungarian movements."

1. At present, the anti-nuclear movement is not represented in the the ecology movement. The construction of the Paksi atomic energy power plant did not precipitate widespread social protest. However, a domestic protest movement, the Duna Kor, the "blues" emerged instead protesting the construction of a

similar large technological energy power plant, the Bos-Nagymaros hydroelectric plant. (Footnote 8) (Miklos Persanyi: "The Development of Citizens' Environmental Protection Activism at Home and Abroad," doctoral dissertation, 1986; Endre Bilecz: "Concerning Intercultural Types of Social Movements," manuscript, 1986; Laszlo Solyom: "Social Participation in Environmental Protection," manuscript, MTA Allam- es Jogtudomanyi Intezete, 1986) This initiative is a typical "transitory team". (Footnote 9) (John McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald: "The Trend of Social Movements in America," General Learning Press, Jonestown, 1973, p 63; John McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald: "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology, vol 82, no 6, May 1977) This expression defines a type of social movement organization in which a small number of professional intellectuals, who have a lot of free time, make an attempt to organize a broader social protest in order to solve a given concrete political task. This entails collecting money and signatures, organizing the vote, and disseminating information to the masses. That is to say, this type of team does not undertake to initiate broader mass mobilization or to alter a type of life style. On the basis of its signature collecting and propaganda activities we could include the Duna Kor among this movement type which contains small, active "cores" and an extensive periphery.

The transitional team does not belong in the concept of citizens' initiative; the latter means the mobilization of the total membership of a social movement on a topic, thereby establishing a relationship with the alternate life style movement. However, one may find citizens' initiated phenomena in the environmental protection sphere. (Footnote 10) (An example of this is the Environmental Club of the ELTE KISZ Committee. For a description see: Persanyi op. cit., Solyom op. cit., Bilecz op. cit.) In my opinion, the alternate life-style movement in Hungary is most authentically and consciously represented by the Interdisciplinary Academic Students' Circle which has a small membership but is theoretically well prepared. (Footnote 11) (Istvan Siklaky: "Designs for a Worldview," published by author, 1986; Zsuzsa Sovari: "Must Fly in Lead," Valosag, 1985 vol 9) Their ideas concern an alternative, communistic life style which they try to include in a concept of comprehensive sociopolitical change.

Ecological sensitivity is vigorously "spreading" in our society. The "tip of the iceberg" simile could be used to characterize the structure, or rather, the social force of the ecological movement. The strength, or rather, the opportunity for the activity itself, of the activity of the small numbers of "organized", "professional" activists is assured by a broad spectrum of social support. The willingness to give occasional financial or intellectual support extends to a far wider sphere than to the activists' circle, i.e., the movement itself. In this regard, the role of "intermediary personalities" who are relatively prestigious, and possibly have an opinion forming role on the basis of which they could do a lot for the wider acceptance and propagation of the social movements is rather important.

The only plausible intermediary and comprehensive force here that could exercise control over spontaneous local initiatives of a primarily environmental protection nature is some type of social-political

organization, presumably the Popular Front. The possibility of this, at least until now, has not been ruled out by the activists themselves; as a matter of fact, they made an attempt to obtain the support of the Popular Front. However, the "incorporation" of the still emergent, spontaneous movements into the institutional system could only be successful if they could, to a certain extent, continue to preserve their autonomous identity as a movement and are not forced to totally submit themselves to the organizational framework and organizational expectations. For citizens' initiatives and institutions the development of the institutional intermediary background could lead to creative interaction between the forms of social participation required by values and ideology, but not fully realized in practice to date.

2. The new peace movement has also appeared in our country. Its origins may be traced back to the operation of the Dialogue Circle which today is only of "historical" interest and which in its "heyday", 1982-83, was replaced by a network of peace clubs and associations forming the "semi-institutional" background of the "state" peace movement. The Dialogue Circle was important for the Hungarian alternative movements because as a result of its relatively early appearance, grass roots-, participatory democracy structure and rural network it trained a cadre of activists who later keep cropping up among the participants of other types of domestic alternative initiatives. This "cadre training" role of the Dialogue contributed to the development of the movement network. A relatively permanent personnel core was created which could be mobilized for various issues. The domestic circumstances of the dissolution of the Dialogue differentiate it from the fate of the western peace movements, but its effect parallels theirs. In advanced capitalist countries the activist period was also followed by decline, less spectacular, introspective, "maintenance" type of network work, and in our country this "change" was also manifested in the replacement of the Dialogue with the peace club movement. (Footnote 12) (Mate Szabo: "The 'Hot Autumn': The Peace Movement, Political Protest, Opposition in FRG, Ifjusagi Lap es Konyvkiado, Budapest, 1984)

3. We cannot yet truly speak of the appearance and presence of the new feminism in our country even on a theoretical level, but the "intellectual ammunition" obviously found the channels leading here in the same way as in the case of either the ecological or peace movements. Presumably, there are other reasons for the absence of adaptation. The discussions conducted under the title "women's issue" in our country are still proceeding within the framework of the complexus and complex of the "second sex" (who is responsible for the break up of the family, who dies younger, etc.), i.e., they are far from the feminist viewpoint which emphasizes the existence of unique female traits and problems. Hungarian women as yet have not really questioned patriarchal and sexist models.

Presumably, the effectiveness of sexual taboos have prevented the formation of lesbian or male homosexual movements which are closely associated with feminist movements. In the West the two latter types of movements are closely associated with alternative movements, i.e., with feminism.

4. Similarly, the problematic of the Third World is a politically barren area in Hungarian social movements. In our country this topic which in the advanced capitalist states is the most integral part of the ecological and new peace movements, and for that matter, of the feminist view remains totally on the level of official foreign policy and economic relations. Would the solidaristic actions initiated from above have pulled the carpet out from under the autonomous initiatives? It's not certain. In comparing the "alternative movement sectors" of the advanced capitalist countries, we find a direct correspondence between the level of development and the intensity of involvement with the developing world. This topic, or rather, its lack corresponds to the resources available to the society, the quality of life style models and values, and the country's international and economic situation which also determines its role in the Third World politics. Given our present economic and standard of living situation this topic, for the time being, is legitimately absent from social initiatives. Although autonomous initiatives have been made on the topic of the redistribution of domestic, national welfare policy (SZETA), but on the international political level, foreign policy (discounting the peace politics) has not crossed the threshold of social sensitivity and activity above the level which would lead to the establishment of autonomous social initiatives. Of the global issues, the domestic theories of the ecological and peace movements have, at best, arrived at the conflict of the two superpowers and primarily the East European problematic, in particular, national questions are emphasized.

5. In the advanced capitalist countries the youth subculture, as a whole, could also not be listed among the alternative movements. There primarily its politicized spheres belong to it, partly the anarchist, and partly the new left trends which also undertake violent and terrorist actions. We do not have this type of politically oriented activism in this country, and presumably it will not develop in the near future. Here it is more likely that the issue waiting clarification is whether the domestic ecological and peace movements could be considered manifestations of the youth subculture? (Footnote 13) (In the domestic literature there are some who are inclined to classify the alternative initiatives as "youth" or connect them with generational change. Magdolna Balazs: "Confession about a Generation Born in the Consolidation," Valosag, 1986 vol 4; Miklos Persanyi: "Greening Generation," Ifjusagi Szemle, 1985 vol 4; Gyorgy G. Markus: "The Ideology of the Youth Subculture," Valosag, 1985 vol 3)

In the West the alternative movements are not youth movements, although the youth do play a significant and prominent role in them. The program and problematic of the new social movements are "new" but not "youth related", for that matter, it is not even a generational problem, and the same can also be said for their social basis. In both respects, the thesis of Ronald Inglehart concerning the post-materialist value changes which only partly coincide with generational change is of great significance. (Footnote 14) (Ronald Inglehart: "The Silent Revolution," Princeton University Press, 1977. Ronald Inglehart: "The Withering Away of Marx," manuscript, IPSA 13th World Congress, 1985) Value changes and a whole series of other general sociopolitical problems are mirrored in the

generational changes, and the converse is not true as the conservative and neoconservative analysts and critics of the new social movements would like to think. (Footnote 15) (Ibid.) The generational change is the vehicle for broader and more general social change--but not its cause.

What is the situation in Hungary regarding this? To a large extent the youth constitute the social basis of the domestic alternative initiatives; this is why the problematic is related to issues of generational change and the youth subculture. It is related to but not identical with it. We must call attention to the "tip of the iceberg" problem already mentioned in connection with the social basis of the ecological movement. In the West and the East, but primarily in the East we primarily find youths at the "top", in the narrower circles of the activists; however, the "iceberg" which carries the group of activist which have never really been very significant socially, presumably includes all the groups of the society.

In both social systems, the basis for the "activism" of the youth is the extended period of socialization, i.e., the educational process which assures the youth of a relatively great deal of discretionary free-time and the basis for "living for politics" (Max Weber). In the advanced capitalist countries where "the crisis of the work society" is in progress today, this socialization-educational process lasts much longer and is longer for a far broader social strata than in Hungary. There the presence of 30-40 year old "youths" in movements is more striking than here where the this period ends somewhere around age 25 when the none too pleasant task of finding an apartment and founding a family replaces activism. The West is not familiar with the fairly rigid restrictions in force here "after college". Since a large majority of the college students there are "preparing" for unemployment, they are glad to lengthen their period of study for the movement or choose amateur or rather semiprofessional movement activity as a career.

Thus the "youth of the youth" is qualitatively different in the two social systems. In our country "the crisis of the official work society" is accompanied by "the development of the non-official work society" which does not undermine, but rather re-creates, or, in fact, creates in Weber's sense the "protestant work ethic". Thus, the autonomous youth movement is recruited primarily from the 18-25 year old age group, although there are present especially in the "transitory team" type movement organizations 30-40 year old "youths" in the western sense and also elements of the post-materialist intelligentsia and the middle class. It is hardly possible to speak of a "youth subculture" since the ratio of those who are college educated, i.e., who graduated from high school is dominant among the younger autonomous generation. Instead we are talking about the future "intellectual elite".

The problem is not negligible just because we are hard pressed to find the same widespread participation from the total social spectrum as in the West no matter how we view the social basis of the domestic spontaneous initiatives. Although the post-materialist intelligentsia may also be dominant in the West, it represents a stratum that is far stronger and has more extensive social ties there. The reason for this is the expansion of

education, the loosening and merging of the intellectual-physical and leader-follower roles based on the new technology as well as the relativization of the separation of city and countryside which is already not very significant because of the long historical traditions of urbanization. In contrast, the domestic "alternatives" could be considered "city-intellectual subcultural" rather than "youth subcultural" phenomena because the domination of the eastern, "intelligentsia" type of intellectuals in this country of the post-materialist value change primarily affects the conscious-ideological, but not its everyday material and institutional existence and its restrictive effects on the intellectuals, the maintenance and recreation of the differences and conflicts between city and countryside, as well as the very much materialist aspects of the existence of intellectuals.

Consequently, I feel that the prospects and possibilities of these movements circumscribed precisely because of the position the "intellectual subculture" occupies in our society.

Thus our topic is not identical to the youth problem, although it does affect broad strata of youth. To the extent that we associate the criterion of deviance with the concept of the "youth subculture" this phenomena also exists in our country, but is not relevant from the viewpoint of the problems of the domestic alternatives. (Footnote 16) (Janos Kobanyai: "On the Margin," Szepirodalmi Konyvkiado, Budapest, 1985) However, in the West this correspondence is at least partly justified (see: homosexuals, autonomists, and squatters). Within the context of the characteristic isolation of a subculture within the total and political culture the problem is not the "youth", in general, but rather, the leaders of the big city subcultural or cultural post-modernist intellectuals, i.e., the problem of its elite role. I myself am inclined to characterize the domestic alternative movements as an intellectual subculture which has a network of relations throughout society that is smaller, but to a certain extent, nevertheless similar to the western model.

What do we have that is totally absent in the West? The College Self-Governing Movement. At the 1985 meeting at Szarvas, the autonomous initiatives of the participating specialized colleges could cite unique Hungarian traditions (NEKOSZ) [National Association of People's Colleges]. In Eastern Europe the student residence halls represent something other than in the West today where as a consequence of single occupancy rooms, the large choice of activities in big cities, and student societies with different political viewpoints the residence hall as an organizational framework for a movement is precluded. In this country, these forums characteristic of the student movements represent their own unique color on the movemental palette. Even the "type" itself is interesting: it "is a movement within an organization" which is made possible and necessary by parameters which increase the possibilities of spontaneous organization within the already developed organizational framework in contrast to independent and autonomous initiatives disregarding these parameters.

Similarly, the cultural and political clubs' movement is unique to Eastern Europe. So many ideological and political topics get bottled-up at the "lower levels of the movement dynamic," at the consensus forming and the debate group level, which, under more favorable political and cultural circumstances, could perhaps lead to presumably more extensive propaganda and political-movemental organization for the development of movements. The developments stuck at the initial level of this dynamic primarily serve as cultural, educational, and political leisure-time centers, i.e., to a certain extent they provide a background network and public forum for existing movement initiatives. (Footnote 17) (The clubs of Budapest, mostly college clubs, are aptly presented in: Bertalan Diczfazi (ed.): "The 405 Circle is 5 Years Old: 1980-1985," BME, Flora Martos Kollegium, 1985)

The development of the movement sector is cyclical: certain types of movements "revive" while others "wither" and the movements and their various forms have nadirs and apogees which are relatively independent of each other. Within this complex interactive system the cyclical change and dynamics of the whole of the movement sector relative to the institutional structure of the political system could be observed. There are periods of greater or lesser "activity"; sometimes the role of the social movement sector grows and sometimes it declines. The social movement sector is characterized by the dynamic interaction created between the various types of social movements themselves or their supporting organizations and the "social movement organizations". The movements and organizations have a division of labor relationship, have conflicts and cooperate with each other; they are either separated or connected by networks, symbiosis, and antagonisms.

Thus, the spontaneous initiatives "sector" in Hungary is connected to the "first society" through various channels, from which it receives significant support without which it could not have been born. At the same time, the various types of initiatives create their own separate public which incorporates various informal communications and information networks within itself. Similar mechanisms also came into existence for the mobilization of financial resources which are to a large extent produced by the economic, political, and educational institutions of the "first society". But it is also a fact, that the receptivity of our society to the new cultural models and life styles, and to the new movements could not be considered too great. Presumably, the obstacles to political innovation likewise need not be attributed only to the centralization of the political state, its bureaucratization and estrangement--or to the deficiencies of the "first society". The structure of the "first" and "second" society, the civil society and the political state, are not only divergent, conflicting, but they also mutually support and define each other. That is why the need for democratization in Hungary is not merely with regard to the state-political sphere. This demand is ineffectual from the start if it does not also incorporate the restructuring of the "casemates" (Gramsci) of civil society. Therefore, it would be necessary to develop in this country a new type of system of relations between the social movements and the institutional reforms, as well as the civil society sphere.

In the past, in discussions concerning reforms the question has been raised several times concerning the social basis of reform, and as a consequence of this the existence of social support as the fundamental prerequisite for reform was formulated. In any case this social support is necessary for the reform to transcend the utopian phase of waiting for the reform and building reform castles in the air and that it truly become a creative part of our reality. In the course of creating this social basis the academic and political debate about reform conducted in wider circles popularizing, i.e., the debate enriching the discussion itself could also play a large role which helps to clarify the reform alternatives and the formation of the social basis. The social movements need reforms, and the reforms may not stop without a social reform movement. There is no mutually exclusive contradiction between reform and social movement, although, in an unfortunate manner, they have often been separated from and in opposition to each other in the development of the traditionally "directed from above" societies of Eastern Europe. But it is precisely their interconnection which could result in a scenario which may perhaps supersede this dysfunctional model of Eastern European history.

9965

CSO: 2500/154

NEED FOR STRENGTHENING MARXIST IDEOLOGY IN CULTURE

Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian No 6, 1986 pp 23-27

[Article by Istvan Toth, Department head at the MSMP Political College: "The Party's Role in Cultural Guidance"]

[Text] In the course of undergoing reorganization and renewing its cultural policy, the party faced yet another widely disputed question: what does the party and state cultural guidance mean? The essence of the question was how to interpret the party's leading role in culture in the process of building the socialist society. In the spirit of its general two-front policy, the party rejected the instinctive approach right from the beginning, since it departed from the premise that the carrying out of the cultural revolution and the development of culture in a socialist spirit require a high level of consciousness, consistent political and ideological orientation and organization. On the other hand, however, it drew back from the MDP's principles and practice of cultural guidance that proved wrong. In this respect, the HSWP had to overcome a burdensome legacy. Therefore, the party performed one of the greatest turnabouts exactly in the interpreting, the principles and practice of cultural guidance. These principles, methods and priorities, although have changed adjusting to new circumstances, are basically still the same.

The Primary Importance of Ideological Conviction

In the process of the renewal it was decisive for the party to draw back from practicing indirect guidance over all areas of culture. During the political consolidation following the counterrevolution, the heaviest emphasis was placed on this in the struggle to win over the intelligentsia, while the principle of ideological conviction gained importance in the propaganda. At the same time, it also became important to take into consideration the characteristics of culture.

Also in the area of culture, the party's guidance means ideological, political guidance as an organic consequence of the party's leading role. Despite this, from the beginning the party has not ruled out, but has made it a task of state organizations to use administrative measures against "destructive, shoddy slap-dash works" to "stop harmful, negative intentions and to thwart hostile attempts". It is very important, however, that it considers such instances exceptions, and does not build its system of guidance on them. It shows the strength and attractiveness of our socialist system that prohibition has never had to be used as a major measure in the last 3 decades.

We have to take into consideration that the changes in the party's cultural guidance are closely interrelated to the modification of the major basic principles of its cultural policy. I wish to call the attention to those which are the most important from the point of view of our topic. One of these principles is the interpretation and the assurance of the creator's freedom, held valid and repeatedly confirmed by the party not only in the field of culture and arts, but also in the scientific life, including social sciences. In the spirit of this principle, non-marxist creators are given a chance, too. The principle of freedom was closely linked to and complemented by the recognition and authorization of the autonomy of different cultural workshops and forums, always emphasizing the concomitant great ideological and political responsibility of these workshops and their leaders. And here I would refer to the relationship between the cultural policy and the coalitional policy, which stemmed from the already mentioned cultural freedom and from the taking into account the real state of mind of the society. The party broke away from the illusion of the exclusivity (monopoly) of marxism and its aspiration is to constantly strengthen the leading role (hegemony) of marxism in the intellectual life. The consequences were the importance attached to ideological conviction and the need to conduct an ideological debate to clarify values, and to accept and to have them accepted. The validity of the principle of cooperation and debate did not cease with the end of the political consolidation, but continues today as well.

Especially since the turn of the 1970s and 80s, a complicated domestic and international situation has evolved which resulted in a growing ideological and political sensitivity in the cultural and artistic life, creating a need for meaningful ideological debates. At the same time, a sense of uncertainty of the marxist theory can be experienced, which is in a broad interrelationship with our sociological and ideological life, and with the general state of marxism and the international communist movement. Criticism, either by marxist artists, or by social sciences, has not been able to tune in for the debate required in the new situation, and consequently, its orientational force weakened. This explains the fact that the presence of marxism is not always determinant in cultural life. That's why one of our most important cultural policy tasks today is to strengthen the position of marxism.

The Tasks Of the State and Party Organs

From the point of view of the development of the political guidance, it is to be stressed that the relationship between the party and state organs was placed on a more correct basis from the beginning. The party determines the main line of cultural development, takes a stance in the major ideological

questions of development, guides and controls the work of the involved state organizations, which, in turn, take care of the implementation of the principles.

Since the years following 1956, the involved state organizations' role has strengthened and the system of guidance has been built out in all areas of the cultural sphere. According to its working style, the party has formed a partner relationship with the state, and let's add, with the social organizations interested in the guidance of culture, and supports the growth of their autonomy. In the course of the preparation and implementation of the different cultural policy decisions, there is a dynamic working relationship and cooperation between the involved state and social organizations.

It is a consequence of the nature of the cultural sphere, that it has some areas which, by character, are not only important forums of our intellectual life, but also exposed ideological terrains, which reflect the ideological balance of forces and directions of movement of our society. Let's only think of the role of the cultural and literary press. Therefore, the creative representation of the party's political principles and general ideological goals forms an organic part of the state organizations' work of guidance.

The HSWP has emphasized from the beginning, that the autonomy and responsibility of the local cultural institutions and creative workshops have to be increased, and that the different professional counseling bodies, committees and associations have a great role in the direction. In this spirit, since 1957, a wide network of counseling bodies has evolved besides the authorities and councils that practise the central state direction, and in institutions and workshops: special committees working in different branches of arts, in public education, in higher education and in science.

There have been significant changes in the number and sphere of authority of the counseling bodies. In certain areas they have overgrown, their personal composition has petrified, but their presence and operation have been indispensable even during the period of their trying to find their place. Today, the work of these organizations and bodies has to be cleaned from the formal elements attached to them over time and they have to be further developed, since they form an organic part of the democratic order of cultural guidance.

The clarification of the relationship between the party and state organizations, the marking out of functions among them began immediately after 1956, but it cannot be considered closed even today. On the one hand, this continuous need and pressure of renewal is closely related partly to the fact that the role of the state and party organizations and the assessment of their interrelationship in our political system changes parallel with the development of our society. On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that to separate the tasks of the social and political guidance pertaining to the party, and the more professional type tasks assigned to the state is not without problems. It is because of the nature of politics, that no caesura can be drawn, that the two groups of tasks cannot be mechanically separated. The explanation is that the ideological, theoretical work and the special professional problems are not markedly separated. In certain

instances, the most professional question may become a political one, or conversely, earlier often raised political questions lose their political significance. The implementation of the correct principle is not very simple. It is proved by the fact that in the past decades the party--often at the level of the highest authorities and county party committees--took a stand in questions that can be classified as professional (e.g., in the 1972 education policy decision). On the other hand, it has also occurred that state organizations did not go beyond the repetition of the party's "ideological and political" theses (objections against the 1983 higher education concepts in the youth parliament).

All this raises the question of the professional and ideological, political preparedness of the cadres working in the party direction of the cultural sphere. It continues to be important that the party abstain from dealing with concrete professional matters and from taking over the tasks of the state and professional organizations. However, it has to increasingly try to strengthen its role of political orientation.

The Methods Of Orientation and the Preparation of Decisions

In the educational policy, the party direction focuses primarily on the sociological and political questions and tries to exert influence with ideological and political tools. The principle, that the party direction has to cover the major questions of substance, has to be kept in mind. It is to be noted that the justification of the ideological conviction and the ideological orientation is generally recognized by everybody, however, the less independent and less prepared communists often question the practical usefulness of the more theoretical positions saying that these are "not concrete enough" and "what can I do with it".

The above said do not exclude but, on the contrary, presuppose that the party has tried and is trying even more to lay a professionally better foundation for its cultural policy decisions. Therefore, it involves experts from outside the party in the preparation of its decisions and resolutions, and invites them to the meetings of leading party organizations. Even more important, the mechanism of the preparation of decisions that, over time, has become general as a part of the democratic development of the society, and in which far-reaching educational policy decisions and resolutions are elaborated by working committees composed of a wide range of experts for this purpose. In addition, before the party takes a stand on an issue, wide-ranging social debates are organized about the draft in professional and scientific circles and in the interested social organizations.

With the preparation of decisions democratized this way, the review of the different branches of the educational policy, the determination of the topical and the long-term tasks together, and the supervision of the implementation of the decisions have become a practice. (This is shown by the 1969 scientific policy guidelines, the 1972 educational policy resolution and the 1984 position, the 1974 public educational resolution or the 1984 arts policy position, etc.) The introduction of this kind of direction style and method first in the highest levels of the party leadership played a great role in that this decision preparation has spread on the lower levels of the

leadership, too. In this process, educational policy questions became more regular at the party committees and more frequent in the primary organizations, contributing to these questions' becoming a more organic part of the party work. Here it needs to be added, and this conclusion can be drawn from the historical experience of several decades, that in the area of cultural guidance we are much stronger in making resolutions than in supervising their implementation. That's to say, we make less efforts and spend less energy on creating and promoting the conditions for the implementation. Often, the large number of resolutions does not leave enough time for this.

The theoretically unified political direction needs different forms and methods in the different branches of culture. Obviously, different methods are needed in the case of technological and natural sciences, and different ones in social studies, where guidance is much more direct because of the ideological and political characteristics of this field.

In the spirit of this principle, it has become a practice that from time to time the counseling, more seldom the leading, bodies of the party review the ideological and political situation of the individual social sciences and determine the direction of the most important tasks. In the area of the social sciences, it has long become a special practice of the party guidance to offer certain topics, judged to be particularly important and topical, expressing social needs but requiring scientific basis, as themes for research. This way, it orientates scientific research, helps the development of the theory and the scientific basis for its decisions. Continuity and constant renewal has to be realized with respect to forms and methods, too, and there must be a readiness to break away from the old forms if necessary. To keep this in mind is especially important today, when the development of the different elements of our political system is on the agenda and, obviously, this will have an impact on culture as well.

The Organizational Framework of Guidance

The continual political guidance is implemented through the different levels of party bodies and organizations, party organizations at workplaces, and state and social organizations. It is implemented by those communists, who, in a broad sense, work in culture-related areas, who represent, shape and implement the cultural policy. Thus there is reason to address those party organizational frameworks that play a decisive role in the political orientation of culture.

The congresses of the party, the Central Committee and the Political Committee analyze with relative regularity the theoretical and political questions of the cultural field, but obviously, cultural topics can rarely be discussed on these forums. The primary role of these organs is to set the long-term goals, to determine the most important tasks and the way of implementation, to assess the experiences yielded by the implementation, the changes in the social environment of education and to identify new priorities as warranted.

The Agitation and Propaganda Committee of the Central Committee of the HSWP, the working committee traditionally in the most direct relationship with the

Central Committee concerning the cultural sphere, plays a distinguished role in the ideological and political orientation of culture. This body consists of personalities filling the leading positions of the ideological and cultural life and the mass media. With its analytical work and suggestions, it helps the leading bodies, gives preliminary opinion on the proposals submitted to the Political Committee and the Central Committee. Its decisions are not binding, but positions taken to orientate the communists working in the party, state and mass organizations. It regularly supervises and reviews the implementation of different resolutions and positions.

The Educational Policy Working Association is a counseling body consisting of the leading communist scientists and intellectuals of the scientific, cultural and ideological life. More or less regularly, the Working Association discusses --mostly with the cooperation of the professional apparatus of the Central Committee--the more professional, i.e., more directly theoretical, ideological-type proposals and position drafts, made by party or state organizations or different working committees. With the party's approval, these are sometimes published under its own name like the position it took last time about the topical tasks of the art policy.

As a result of the guidance method of the party established after 1957, the role and the responsibility of the regional, the Budapest, county and village party committees have considerably increased. This is partly due to the fact that as a result of the conscientious cultural improvement of the countryside there are more and more scientific, higher education and cultural institutions of national or even international rank (libraries, schools, colleges, research centers, theaters, museums, ballets, magazines, etc.) in the counties. The political guidance of these is the job of the regional party organizations. On the other hand, the responsibility of these organizations in the guidance and shaping of the educational policy has increased also because the authority of the local state and professional organizations has considerably and continuously grown since the 60s.

Experiences show that the local party organizations of different levels, i.e., the communists working on behalf of these, are not adequately aware of the ideological and political responsibility falling on them as a result of the indicated cultural development and the modernization of the public administration. In order to eliminate the still existing anomalies and to implement the unified and coordinated political guidance, an even closer working relationship has to be formed between the regional party organizations and the involved organs of the Political Committee, and between the regional party organizations and their state counterparts.

There have been changes also in the organizational framework in order to make party direction more efficient. For instance, already in the mid-70s communist action committees were created and started to work in artistic associations, which take part in the ideological and political orientation of the artistic life. Obviously, the continuous increase of the artistic associations' autonomy and responsibility places new and different requirements on the political orientation and the party guidance, and both the party and the communist action committees have to prepare for this.

On the basis of the favorable results of experiments, since the end of the 70s increasingly more stratum party organizations, i.e., party committees (pedagogical party committees) have formed in the cultural sphere--primarily in the educational field--, in an increasing number of cities and, breaking away from the rigid regional principle, capital districts. Recently, the party committees of the big universities received greater authority as a result of their having received city party committee authority, and thus have helped create the organizational conditions for most efficient work.

Undoubtedly, this cultural policy guidance that has been formed and undertook, and in which indirect methods played a decisive role, posed a great deal of risks. But the professional, ideological and political benefits resulting from the consistent implementation of the principles are much more plentiful. In certain nooks of the cultural sphere--first of all in the artistic life--the way of eliminating the ideological and political problems, that currently can be experienced, is not to give up the principles, but to more consistently implement them in accordance with the social environment determined by the special international conditions and our internal development.

13212

CSO: 2500/334

CZYREK MEETS 'CONSENSUS' GROUP

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 14-15 Feb 87 p 2

[Text] Jozef Czyrek, the vice-chairman of the PRON National Council, met members and supporters of the dialogue group, "Consensus" who informed him about that group's activities to increase public dialogue, the activities of the discussion club and preparations for the publication of the biweekly KRAJ.

J. Czyrek presented current information on the realization of the idea of a public agreement and discussed the projects for improving relations between the government and church within a broader international context. He pointed out the strategic and long-term rather than tactical nature of cooperation between the state and church and stressed the great importance that the reforms being carried out in the Soviet Union have for the renewal process in Poland.

The subject of discussions were the problems associated with the new stage of democratization such as dialogue and cooperation between people with different philosophies, how the press, publications and public performances are controlled, the growth of the self-management movement and the principles of personnel policy. It was stated that it would be appropriate to increase the activities of "Concensus" among intellectual communities outside of Warsaw.

The vice-chairman of the PRON National Council, Zdzislaw Pilecki, and the secretary general of the PRON National Council, Jerzy Jaskiernia, participated in the meeting.

12261

CSO: 2600/399

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ON PRESS CONFERENCE TECHNIQUE

Poznan WPROST in Polish No 16, 19 Apr 87 pp 4-6

[Interview with Jerzy Urban, government press spokesman, by Piotr Andrzejewski and Krzysztof Golata: "Atypical : I Wound up in the Political Kitchen by Accident but It Was Not Blind Coincidence"]

[Text] [Question]: Mr Minister, it is easy to note that former journalists Mieczyslaw P. Rakowski, Wieslaw Gornicki, and you play a significant role in our political life. Is this the rule, or is it a mere coincidence?

[Answer]: The list could be expanded. You could add Jan Glowczyk and Jozef Barecki. Similar phenomena, after all, occur throughout the world. Willy Brandt started out as a journalist, and Winston Churchill's curriculum vitae includes journalistic experience. In our country politics took in several journalists who did not practice journalism merely in passing but spent most of their adult lives in that pursuit. I think that work in journalism is one rather good introduction to politics. It refines skill in preparing public presentations. It provides training in dealing with many different issues and handling, for example, problems related to electronics today, issues in the realm of social relations tomorrow, and international affairs a week from now. Furthermore, the journalist's view of reality is tied to skill in grasping the essence of things.

[Question]: But there is some superficiality in this too.

[Answer]: That fault is a virtue. When a politician makes a decision, for example, on economic issues, he is not acting as a professional who has analyzed all the aspects. He has experts to do this, but he himself is not an expert in any area except the conduct of politics. It is this very specific skill that is his own profession.

[Question]: But are you not overvaluing "the journalistic trade" as an aid in conducting political activity?

[Answer]: Of course the quality of a politician does not depend on his past occupation. I am only saying that political journalism is not bad training for the political arena, better than dentistry, for example.

[Question]: How did Jerzy Urban come to be a politician?

[Answer]: First of all, I am not a politician but an aid to politicians. A politician is one who has been elected, given a social mandate, one who makes the decisions. As for myself, I became fascinated with politics very early, at age 15. I wanted to become a politician, although at the time this was more a dream than a real aspiration. As a journalist I handled largely internal policy. Therefore, although I wound up in the political kitchen was accident, it was not blind fate.

This began in very stormy times, when different unconventional personnel decisions were made. The person who had been my editor in chief for several months became vice premier. He gathered around him a group of "social advisers," and I was one of these. Therefore, I started moving around the palace of the Council of Ministers. I really do not know why I was offered the job of government spokesperson. It is possible that the events of the night of 6-7 August 1981 had an influence on the decision. Government negotiations were held with Solidarity. Solidarity broke them off. We gathered well after midnight. There were four of us: Rakowski, Gornicki, Ciosek, and me. We decided to ready the text of a communique to the society, to give out in the morning, ahead of Solidarity, taking them by surprise. This seemingly technical acceleration of the government statement was actually very important. For many months of answering Solidarity, of defending ourselves, we took the initiative, we went on the propaganda offensive. This was very important psychologically. Because my name was linked to this fact, 10 days later I was asked to become spokesperson for the government.

[Question]: In his recently published journal "Pojdz za mna" (Follow Me), Jerzy Wittlin claims that General Jaruzelski "dreamed up" the notion of having Jerzy Urban as government spokesperson.

[Answer]: F. Rakowski told me that this proposal came simultaneously from the former premier, Wojciech Jaruzelski, and from the Central Committee's First Secretary, Stanislaw Kania.

[Question]: Observing your work in this position, one could easily draw the conclusion that Tuesday is the most difficult day of your week.

[Answer]: That is usually the case. It is 3 hours of work each Tuesday preparing for the weekly press conference. The conference itself lasts about 2 hours, and it also requires great concentration of attention. Then I have to authorize the television broadcast and the PAP transmission. Tuesday is therefore an extremely busy day for me, but there are worse days.

[Question]: Your interviews have become kind of a spectacle with their own special sort of drama and continual publicity. Did you intend this, or did it just turn out this way?

[Answer]: That is the way it came out. For the most part, these conferences were not dreamed up at my desk. It happened that on 13 December 1981, after martial law was introduced, Major Gornicki and I went to the foreign journalists to explain the situation to them and respond to questions. After 2 days it turned out that my presence was wanted again, partly because the

most absurd news was coming out of Poland and had to be corrected. Journalistic needs caused me to become a frequent guest at Interpress, to the point where I scheduled the meetings on a regular basis.

[Question]: Looking at the press conference accounts, we wonder often to what extent your sometimes lightening-quick responses are the result of knowing the questions ahead of time and to what extent they are improvised.

[Answer]: My colleagues and I try to foresee the line of questioning. We go after information when we are preparing the answers. Through appropriate consultations, we prepare the government's position on matters that can be the subject of questions. Of course, we are not able to foresee all the questions. It sometimes happens that I do not have detailed information. Then my response is improvised and is too general.

[Answer]: Such improvisation runs the risk of making terrible mistakes. For example, you became famous as the author of the statement: "The government is feeding itself ..."

[Answer]: That experience was very educational. Basically, it was not a terrible mistake. I simply said that it was not true that American restrictions were interfering with the government. They were interfering with the nation in Poland. This is absolutely true, because there is no problem feeding 2 or 3 dozen people but there is with feeding several million, but it was criminally awkward from the psychological point of view. People read this as arrogance on the part of the authorities, who were making a distinction between their fate and the fate of the people. I was therefore treading on the public's sensitive toes. From this "feeding the government" statement I learned that we must always take into account our specific way of hearing certain phrases, to see that the thought construction is politically correct. The general way of thinking has to be taken into account.

[Question]: Government spokespersons all over the world make political mistakes. Can you tell us about other mistakes you have made?

[Answer]: There was only one time I made a political mistake that I had to set straight right away. During the Pope's last visit, I said about the second meeting between John Paul II and General Jaruzelski that it came about at the Pope's request, instead of saying it was at the Church's request. For the ordinary person hearing my words, the difference is negligible, but for people familiar with political nuances it is important, because the former refers to the Pope and those around him, but "the Church" is a broader concept, which includes not only the Pope but also the Polish bishops.

[Question]: Do you often have to clarify your statements?

[Answer]: I am wrong rather often. In responding to many various questions, I sometimes get the figures mixed up, or certain facts, such as, whether a given issue has already been taken up by the Sejm or has only reached it. I straighten out omissions and errors without any internal resistance, because clarification does not reduce the credibility of a spokesperson. On the contrary.

I sometimes receive letters from certain institutions that consider minor things to be big mistakes. For example, I have here a big statement calling on me to make a public correction, because I said "the Authors' Union" and not "the Union of Polish Authors." Of course, I have no intention of doing it. It is natural for people to use abbreviated forms frequently in the course of common speech.

It also sometimes happens that based on my general knowledge of government policy I am forced to make an ad hoc improvisation of the government's stand on some matter, although it has not been drafted yet. Then I present it to my superiors and seek approval after the fact. It can happen, for example, that what I said omitted some essential element. Then I look for a pretext to come back to the matter, so that I can add what is necessary. For the average reader, this is not noticeable, but for a person interested in the government or an embassy analyzing what I say, this is important.

[Question]: Your statements are analyzed first by journalists, including foreign journalists. Among them, do you have your "favorites," ones who ask questions that are particularly difficult?

[Answer]: At one time, a certain journalist from Spain whose name slips my memory kept incessantly asking questions that were impulsive and politically aggressive. But in keeping with the saying about the cow that moos a great deal but does not give much milk, her journalistic activity was not harmful to Polish interests. She did not write much or in a thoughtful way. She sustained herself in our meeting halls. She finally left our country. Questions from Renata Marsch-Potocka of the DPA agency show that they are inspired by so-called opposition groups. She seldom asks questions for publication. More frequently it is, for example, to provide an interested party with information on whether he will receive a passport. Despite the intentions of the originator, I do not consider such questions particularly difficult, however. Christopher Robinski of Britain's FINANCIAL TIMES is an interesting figure. He is of Polish descent, has lived in our country for some time, and is married to a Polish woman. He has specialized in our issues. He writes for an elite newspaper, and I imagine that a small group of experts read his analyses, which are based on minutia dealing with various issues. This journalist's carefully prepared questions are based on broad sources of information. He follows meetings of Sejm committees. He studies statistical analyses and articles in special periodicals. Robinski manages to cause no difficulties, when he asks about detailed issues I often know little about.

[Question]: What do you think about the work of other British journalists in Poland?

[Answer]: The BBC, Reuters, and the important GUARDIAN newspaper have their representatives in Warsaw. British journalists are no different from other Western correspondents. I would say that the information about Poland in the GUARDIAN is somewhat objective. Reuters probably has a somewhat broader comprehension of Polish affairs than other Western agencies. BBC broadcasts, especially those in Polish, are often not objective. They broadcast even

obvious stupidities and misinformation, provided they are approved by political opponents of Polish leaders.

[Question]: You recently had the opportunity of presenting the Polish government's view in London. How did the visit go?

[Answer]: Formally I went as the guest of the Polish embassy, but the real reason for the trip was an invitation from Oxford, extended by the Strategic Studies Group, students and academics interested in international affairs. There was also an invitation from the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Our embassy filled out the calendar of my stay with other public and private meetings.

[Question]: What was of greatest interest to the British?

[Answer]: They were particularly interested in our view of what is going on in the Soviet Union. There were many questions about the directions of the democratic reforms there and in Poland. Beside that, there were many questions that revealed the conviction that the Polish economy is in a complete state of collapse. I was often asked how we want to reform it.

[Question]: How would you assess the way Poland is portrayed in the mass media?

[Answer]: At the moment this picture has changed. Not long ago Poland was pictured as a country in which a military junta was in power, one hated by a nation that was united against that junta. Now we are considered to be a governing group with moderate and inadequate but positive inclinations to bring about reform. On the other hand, the black picture of Poland has shifted from the political sphere to the economic sphere. As I already mentioned, there is the conviction there that everything is falling apart in the Polish economy. I tried to explain basic issues, but I must say that my audience was very resistant to any attempts to modify this over-simplified view. Among such issues, for example, I include the picture of the standard of living in Poland, shaped by statistical trends, consisting of a calculation of earnings in Poland in terms of the pound sterling.

[Question]: What sort of rate of exchange were they using?

[Answer]: Regardless of whether it was the official rate of exchange or the black market rate, to simply calculate our earnings in terms of the shilling without taking into account the difference in the prices for basic goods and services leads one to the conclusion that the standard of living in Poland is below the poverty level in Great Britain. Of course, this picture is inaccurate. I looked at carefully dressed gentlemen, carefully using cardboard on the bed against the cold, and I heard people telling them that if someone cannot afford to heat his apartment, let him wrap himself up in nylon bags at night.

[Question]: All this goes to show that the atmosphere of the meetings was far from formal courtesy.

[Answer]: At Oxford the questions were more polite than at the average meeting with students in our country, in that Polish students pose questions mainly to unburden themselves emotionally and tie up the speaker, while there they were really trying to satisfy their interest, expand their knowledge about various matters, and understand a different way of thinking. The people I met in Great Britain differed a great deal from one person to another. The most aggressive questions were asked at the International Press Club. The press conference there was dominated by old Polish emigres, what we call the London Polish camp. Unfortunately, this fact interfered with the meeting there. At it I was to present basic information about the situation in Poland to journalists from various countries, sometimes exotic ones, with accreditation in London, but every couple of moments some old Polish ladies got up and said that they had been in Poland and felt upset over the many shortages and defective social relations, and that their acquaintances had said thus and so. The meeting took on the character of a Polish family meeting and lost its nature of a normal press conference with a government spokesperson. Of course, journalists from Sri Lanka and Australia are not interested in our domestic quarrels. At a cocktail party after the conference, journalists linked to the London Poles conversed with me in a completely different tone, in a friendly and conciliatory way. These are older people looking to the past, people who today must assess Poland as one big nightmare, because that is the only way of justifying their political choice and bitter decades abroad. Even if Poland were a country flowing with milk and honey, they would be looking for a hole in it, to justify their remaining in London and their adoration for prewar Poland.

[Question]: You talked about the picture of Poland in the British press. And how does Jerzy Urban look in the mass media there?

[Answer]: Before my arrival, the DAILY TELEGRAPH published a very nasty text based on an interview with me. Later everyone referred to it. I have the privilege of a good deal of interest in the Western press, because I am atypical for them. I do not fit their way of imagining someone in the East European government machinery. I also had an opportunity to see how well computerized information on people works there. It seems that every Western journalist from any country at all who is interested in Urban receives a computer printout of the same information about me. Once in an interview for ZYCIE LITERACKIE I talked about how I had wanted to join the party and how the party did not want to accept me as a member. I talked about the various reasons for refusals during the 1950's, and I said that, for example, once they did not accept me, because I boomed out some song while I was drunk, one with "hilo, hilo" in the chorus. Well, this went into the computer as my not being accepted into the party on account of my having sung Nazi songs, and now every Western journalist asks me if at one time I had Fascist sympathies.

[Question]: Did new information go into the computer following your visit?

[Answer]: I don't know, but they wrote me and about what I say, and they were rather harsh. What I said about Polish affairs was reported like this: Urban tried to defend the actions of the Polish government saying that Poland is a country of growing democratization. He liked saying this or that. I was made to seem like a demon, and my role among Polish officials was overestimated.

[Question]: You have probably already become accustomed to such reactions. Your appearances and talks here in Poland are also received with controversy. Why actually do you, a government official, keep dabbling in radio talk shows?

[Answer]: Jan Rem's "Samosady" program is a form of engaging in politics. Once a week I write a column for SZPILEK, which I usually do Sunday morning. I do this mainly not to get out of practice. As time goes by, one loses skill in writing. It may still prove useful to me. I also write because sometimes my fingers itch over somebody or something. Besides that, I write to make some extra money. I write for SZPILEK for the money.

10790

CSO: 2600/531

PARIS 'KULTURA' WRITER ON CHURCH FINANCES

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 5 Feb 87 p 4

[Article by {J.}: "What Is Going On"]

[Text] In the pages of POLITYKA, there is an ongoing reader discussion of an article by Professor Jerzy Wislocki titled "What Blessing?" about the finances and income of the church in Poland. Jadwiga Kwiatkowska of Paris KULTURA contributed to this discussion by expressing in an issue of November of last year the following opinion of some of the political opposition:

"It is the ever-more obvious departure from the principle of the 'poor church' that is becoming the object of criticism. Completely wordly and even luxurious goods are being accumulated by not only individual priests but by the church itself. Of course, no one resents priests for owning automobiles but there is sometimes sharp criticism for parking them in luxurious garages, the grandeur of their presbyteries and their lordly manners. The same is true of the construction of new chapels which is unquestionably done out of concern for building up the network of churches but at the same time, it is also understandable for some churchgoers to criticize the magnificence of the new churches with their expensive stained-glass windows".

Ms Kwiatkowska then turns to her own observations and experiences and furthermore criticizes the Polish church for its triumphalism, for making light of lay initiatives, trying to dominate public thinking, stifling pluralism, reacting nervously to criticism and other such serious sins.

The title of her article is "What Is Going On?" and that is a very apt question that can also be applied to the text itself.

12261

CSO: 2600/399

MUSLIM COMMUNITY DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE

Warsaw KURIER POLSKI 16-18 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by [Tr]: "Kruszyniany, Capital of the Polish Tatars -- As-Sana al Jadida, the New Year -- 3000 Muslims -- Calendar for 1407 A.H."]

[Text] As-Sana al-Jadida is for Muslims what the New Year is to Christians. Of course, the two holidays occur at different times of year. The followers of Allah are presently in year 1407 After Hejira [A.H.].

There are about 3000 Muslims in Poland and most of them are of Tatar descent. This ethnic minority is chiefly found in Bialystok Province where they settled permanently in our country after the victory at Vienna.

The largest concentration of Polish Tatars is in the village of Kruszyniany in Bialystok Province which has a two-tower wooden mosque. This village was given to Kruczynski, the captain of a Tatar company, by Jan Sobieski for saving his life.

The second mosque is in Bohoniki while a third is being built in Gdansk. Polish Muslims live in 6 communities, each of which has its own imam. Aleksandr Chalecki is the imam of Warsaw and Bialystok and the chairman of the Liturgical Commission of the Supreme Council of the Muslim Religious Union. He is also the author of the Muslim liturgical calendar for 1407 A.H. which includes a list of the most important Muslim holidays.

The first such colorfully decorated calendar was published in the middle of the 1930's by the Muftiate of the Polish Republic. It included a rich selection of information on the history of Islam in our country, the geographical distribution of Muslim communities, a list of mosques, houses of prayer and cemeteries and the military service of Polish Tatars, etc.

The recent calendar is more modest but from it, infidels can learn about many of the "exotic" details of Muslim religious holidays.

Aside from the holidays already mentioned, other important holy days include Id Ashura (Day of Ahura), Mevlud-Bayram, I Taravikh (first day of the fast of Ramadan), Kadyr Night, XV Taravich (the last day of Ramadan) and Id al-Adha (Kurbam-Bayram). Many of the names of holidays are unpronounceable in Polish and the entire calendar was made on the basis of the khamail, a type of Muslim prayer book.

12261

CSO: 2600/399

BRIEFS

MUSLIMS MEET—On 10 January, the Supreme Collegium of the Muslim Religious Union in the Polish People's Republic met in Bialystok. The participants learned about the present situation of Polish Muslims including publishing and investment activities. It was announced that the construction of the new mosque in Gdansk should be completed this year and the preparations to build other mosques in Bialystok and Warsaw will be completed. The collegium highly praised the results of the visit to Poland by Sheikh Hasan Khalid, the Grand Mufti of the Libyan Republic. [Text] [Bialystok GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA 12 Jan 1987 p 2] 12261

SERBIAN TRADE UNION PRESIDENT DISCUSSES INTERVENTION LAW

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11-12 Apr 87 p 5

[Interview with Novica Filipovic, chairman of the Council of the Federation of Serbian Trade Unions, by Mila Jankovic: "The Limits of Worker Patience"; date and place not given]

[Text] "Now that the intervention law has taken effect, many sound work organizations, which in this political and economic situation must pull us forward, have been practically blocked off. This is the case not only in Serbia, it is also the case in the other republics. We recently had a meeting with the Slovenes and learned that some 10 or so of their extremely large economic systems, which had behaved quite well in distribution, had found themselves in a blind alley! This is because at times we do not examine the totality of a problem. To be specific, when we talk about personal incomes, we must see what is happening with social nonproductivity, which means life or death to personal productivity. If we do not look at the thing as a whole, I am afraid that this kind of partial attention to personal incomes will not yield the anticipated results."

This statement came from Novica Filipovic, chairman of the Council of the Federation of Serbian Trade Unions, in a conversation with journalists of the BORBA editorial staff for Serbia. In a conversation that lasted several hours many topical issues were raised, foremost among them the intervention law.

"We Were Not Even Asked"

"So," chairman Filipovic continued, "in Serbia we have reached a level of Europe and indeed of the world in individual productivity of labor, and probably this is true in Yugoslavia as well. But social nonproductivity is driving it downward. For instance, suppose that we from the trade unions go into a factory, and the workers tell us: 'What more should we do? We really cannot go on any longer. We have come to the end.' It is unfair, then, I think, that often, since this is not the first time, we attack personal incomes, while on the other side there is a great deal of space that is left open. We in the Serbian trade unions were unable to examine in advance whether and to what degree these measures would contribute to the republic since we were not even asked at the time when they were enacted, nor did any of us take part in their preparation."

"What does that mean?

"The trade union ought after all to state its position when certain measures are proposed. Especially since in our political system we are constantly talking about the division of labor under the Constitution, and now for all practical purposes we were unable even to express our suggestions. For all practical purposes, then, we were caught by surprise, we made statements on the basis of certain other statements that there would not be any freeze of personal incomes...."

"So, what is going on here?" Novica Filipovic went on. "The FEC later adopted all of our criticisms or suggestions as being realistic. We accurately verified and confirmed the number of those 'disobedient' work organizations which had paid larger personal incomes than permitted. In Serbia that figure ranges somewhere between 63,000 and 64,000 workers, and on the average each one must return about 3.6 million old dinars. We made an estimate of what those figures mean and what political weight they carry so as to draw a conclusion as to whether that was not after all too much over a period of 3 months. That is why it is important at this point, following the Federal Social Agreement on Income, that one also be signed at the republic level, and we will do that by the end of April. As for practical realization in the various branches and groupings, we will also have to do a sizable portion of that job. After all, all the signatories failing to complete this within the prescribed period will continue to be caught by the law."

In responding to the questions of our journalists as to how the law has influenced the political disposition of the workers, to what extent there are more work stoppages, and how great is the restraint and tolerance of the working class, Novica Filipovic had this to say:

"I think we have enjoyed understanding on the part of our workingman, who incidentally in all the crisis situations today has behaved properly. Our people know how to praise the severity of a problem and the gravity of the tasks related to it. Looking at the totals, we have had few work stoppages resulting from the interventionist measures. Much more of it consisted of talk about stoppages and a great deal of reflecting about whether to do so or not. There were also many work organizations in which the work stoppages involved few workers. By 17 March, for instance, we had recorded only 10 stoppages involving 1,023 workers, and then after that we received new figures which were much higher. However, taken as a whole, even this figure is not so disturbing. Nevertheless, I think that the true indicator of the stoppages will be the period from 5 to 10 April, when the accounting will be done for payment of March personal incomes."

Eight Years Ago

"It will not be easy. The drop in the standard of living is extremely large. On the basis of the estimates, it is at the level of 1979! It seems to be the price area that has not been sufficiently affected, although in the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program this was one of the central issues. Second, the monetary and foreign exchange area has not been covered either, if we

exclude the partial attempts a year or 2 ago, which unfortunately were not followed up and taken further. For all these reasons we have the consequences which you yourselves are aware of. The FEC has, it is true, been working in this area, and just now it is about to come out with a proposal related to price policy and monetary and foreign exchange policy.

"The question is no longer put as to whether it is fair, say, for a teacher in Belgrade to have a personal income of 9 or 11 million, but rather the question is whether with that personal income he can live in the capital or in other major centers," Filipovic emphasized. "In Belgrade the entire Rakovica basin, including 'Zmaj' and other large collectives, has incomes far below the average. When we add to this the large number of unsolved housing problems and the open question of rebates, then the pressure is quite great.

"Belgrade is a city with more than 600,000 persons employed, about 120,000 of them in physical production. Most of them are true proletarians, without additional means of subsistence. So, this, then, is a powder keg. It is difficult, I know," Filipovic said. "I know about the early attacks and statements by the Belgrade leaders, I know that in examination of the overall situation it was decided at one point that it was almost impossible to enforce the law. Belgrade is therefore preparing additional measures which are to moderate the shock to the status quo. The sensitivity is great, and the campaign must therefore be decisive. Of course, there are also certain trends here in the opposite direction, that is, attempts to push the law through on certain foundations or to find solutions so that it can be enforced. For example, a director simply pays a fine of 150 million old dinars, probably with the consent of the workers' council, and then Finnegan begin again. And that, it is clear to everyone, is no solution.

"Precisely for that reason leadership bodies are at this moment facing large tasks in modernization at all levels. The success of the social campaign depends on how this modernization is organized, initiated, and motivated. Recently, to be specific, each of us in the trade union has been assigned a particular region, opstina, and some large system, but still all of that is unsatisfactory, since we ought to be on the spot there more. It is also important that the members of the trade union councils in the opstinas do likewise.

"We all have to make a greater effort, since there is much more room for social action than we are filling."

[Box, left]

The Trade Union Is Not an Appendage

"The trade union is not a transmission belt either of the government or anyone else. We have to know that our entire program is bound up with the program of the LCY, and accordingly our policy commitments are based on that program. I would rather ask how successfully or unsuccessfully it has been performing its social role, how successful has it been in equipping itself and its leaders in terms of ideology and action to tackle the real and true issues which it is responsible for under the Constitution and the Law on Associated Labor.

"It is a fact that the small bodies of trade union leadership usually do not conduct affairs as they should, do not initiate actions, and it is evident that often the trade union is an appendage of some director, of someone within that professional management structure. At times, in certain organizations where the technocrats have managed to take over, they are almost alone in nominating the chairman of the trade union, the workers' council, and so on. In the assessment of the recent elections an important observation was made that the better personnel go in the direction of the party and the assembly, and what is left over goes to the trade union. We ourselves have to create the prestige of the trade unions through the battle for the workers' real interest, but not through opportunism and by protecting the interests of the workers at any cost, since often we avoid telling the workers that they are not right about certain issues."

[Box, right]

Sharing the Load

"When we talk about sharing the load of stabilization, I think this still has not taken place. That is my assessment. Salaries in sociopolitical and other organizations, in federal and republic institutions, are far above the average for the economy. For instance, personal incomes in January, February, and March rose more than 18 percent in those institutions, while in the economy they rose only 12.7 percent. I am deeply persuaded that this will cause still greater reactions from the workers, since people will see from this how firmly committed we are to something. And the trade union is living and working in those institutions as well and it has tasks there just like it does everywhere else. Is the trade union fighting there? Why is it keeping quiet?

"That kind of behavior will constantly dull the cutting edge of the campaign. That is why we must act against all offenders with rigorous measures. If we do this at least in part, then we can anticipate changes. If we do not use the same yardstick for everyone, the fate of the campaign will not be the one we desire."

7045

CSO: 2800/207

BACKGROUND OF INCREASE IN PETTY THIEVERY TRACED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 87 pp 30-31

[Article by Zoran Jelcic based on interview with Bora Kuzmanovic, lecturer in the School of Philosophy of Belgrade University: "Restructuring or the Lineup"]

[Text] The fact that in our country the political and economic crisis is mainly viewed through the prism of postponement of solutions and in the meantime acceleration of inflation signifies only that this pertains to summary indicators which do not as such come close to revealing what is happening on the individual, group, and social planes.

Bora Kuzmanovic, lecturer in the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University, talks about a new phenomenon in certain schools of the capital; hungry pupils are snitching a piece of bread from the student kitchen, this is pilfering because their parents have not paid for their school lunch. The explanation is simple if it is at all possible and acceptable. The stratum of people who according to the sociological categories live in social misery is expanding. Unlike the old settlers, who with time have become accustomed to their status, people who are now dropped down to that level refuse to acknowledge it, that is, allow their social position to be seen, and one aspect of this is saying in their children's school that they do not have money for school lunch. Thus the children come to school with an empty stomach and who knows what in their hearts and heads when they pass on to the teachers the parents' explanation that they have arranged meals at home for their children. That pilfered piece of bread increases the pain many times over. For everyone, including the teachers, since they do not have the power to obtain a different status for the school, to point it in some other direction.

There is no research on what is happening with the individual, what is happening in the family, but from the very fact that there is less and less laughter one can draw a reliable conclusion as to the direction processes are taking. A state of worry is increasingly pronounced, primarily because of uncertainty as to the duration of the crisis and the way it will be resolved. Kuzmanovic recalls the innocence at the beginning of this decade, the time when the crisis was being revealed to the public, when the most pessimistic officials were responding that the crisis would last all the way until the end of 1982.

The standard answer to the same question in current surveys is this: "Into the next century," or "I have no idea." Both answers, Kuzmanovic says, belie uncertainty, doubt, pessimism, and this develops not only an awareness that the crisis needs to be ended, but an out-and-out need to do so. This is an ideal overture to welcoming any solution, and therefore a solution which is only an appearance, which brings peace and order without touching a single one of the main causes of the crisis. Of course, a democratic offering is also possible, but for the present it does not exist or has not been adopted.

The Degrees of the Crisis

In answer to the question of what the persistence of uncertainty, and its intensification if one is to judge from the ever higher inflation, brings with it, Kuzmanovic explains that the entire system of a society's values is in jeopardy. This is a process of gradual changes passing through three basic phases from beginning to end:

"First of all, the individual continues to believe in the existing system of values, but he no longer adheres to it. In a way and to a greater or lesser degree he leaves that system to one side--for someone else, for better times--since in the crisis it proves to be inapplicable. At the same time he considers this postponement unimportant; that is, he justifies it by the pressure of the deteriorated situation. However, if you ask him whether the system of values should be adapted to this new divergent behavior, the answer is negative. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these responses in interviews. It is especially interesting that the prevailing situation has decisive influence on behaviors of that kind; actually it puts the actions of different individuals into molds."

One of the possible explanations, probably the most important one, follows from the fact that the present system is not offering people alternatives, is not affording an offering and competition of differing systems of values which can all be reduced to the concept of a socialist society as a common denominator. One of the consequences of this uniformity, combined with the simultaneous inability to transform the crisis into a process, lies in the turn toward something which already exists, which in a manner of speaking offers some alternative way of life. Out of that social flow Kuzmanovic looks on what is being referred to as a turn toward the church, toward the nationality.... After all, a man needs considerably more than satisfaction of his existential needs conceived in the purely material sense, Kuzmanovic says, recalling the cave drawings of the most primitive people. If socialist ideals have not been fulfilled over a number of years and if a question mark is slowly being placed on the concept itself, not just on its current protagonists, if differences between Communists and non-Communists are diminishing, then it is quite understandable that people should seek to conceptualize their lives in some other value systems.

But that is the third and last phase of the social crisis. In the previous one, alongside the already prevailing behavior opposite to the system of values that prevails and is still undisputed, there begins to be doubt about the system itself, its validity and justifiability, regardless of the time and

circumstances in which it would be valid. One of the illustrations of this phase, Kuzmanovic says, is the emergence of "a large number of those who are vacillating, that is, those who are no longer certain about their commitments. For instance, the most recent surveys of young people show an increasing number of those with mixed beliefs. For example, does the orientation toward self-management require democratic decisionmaking both at the level of the workers' council in the enterprise and also in society as a whole, or should this be left to some competent minority? So, it is a characteristic feature of this phase that the vision of the old value should be shaken, but clear and firm demands for establishment of a new system of values still do not exist."

The Role Model

The immediate occasion for the conversation with Kuzmanovic was the spread of petty thievery in the economy, that is, such things as pilferage of tools, gloves, parts, materials, and so on. Kuzmanovic calls attention to the negative or divided attitude toward the government and every form of property either directly related to the government or associated with it, which is to some extent traditional. This should not be identified with the criminal mentality, but arises out of the customary attitude of the government toward the inhabitants of this region. The government has always been taking something away from the individual without his seeing any benefit to himself in return, so that a kind of negative attitude has been shaped.

Kuzmanovic responds to the question of whether the individual perceives the "government of associated labor" in the same way by saying that this is not a simple topic. I have the impression, he says, that certain social and government institutions have been perceived in such a way that one can speak of a people's state. Of course, we are talking about how the attitude toward the government is refracted through average human consciousness. The institution of social property has received a similar treatment.

However, on the practical plane the old attitude toward government property has never altogether disappeared. And public property has always been treated more or less as everyone's and no one's, and it was justified to take from that treasury because no one was directly hurt by it. The attack on common property is even greater in our country than in societies where private property is sacred.

The prior removal of moral obstacles with the argument that no one is directly hurt, in a time of crisis when people face the fact that by their work they cannot survive or can barely manage, has now been broadened by the justified feeling of individuals that they are not to blame for the occurrence and this lengthy duration of the crisis. These are psychological factors, Kuzmanovic says, but they are reinforced by a number of tangible and measurable steps--such as the peaceful retirement on a comfortable pension of those people who because of their position bear principal responsibility for the present situation, such as various privileges of incumbent officials, all the way to the point that they receive good salaries for years although they have no job--which remove from the government the veil of being the people's soul-saver. Those to blame for the crisis either move from position to position or they receive high national pensions.

This is a decisive fact, Kuzmanovic says, since "the decisive thing is the level at which someone betrays the social values. In social psychology there is the term 'learning from models.' On a social scale public officials are a kind of model of behavior.

"To be sure, this seems like the logic of the bandit, but it makes some sense."

Any other behavior or outlook would be unnatural, even if there were nothing else but the most recent move whereby the earnings of those employed in the Federation were increased (see the article "Oil on the Fire" in this issue of NIN). Kuzmanovic feels that such a move was extremely ill-conceived, regardless of the number and soundness of the grounds for doing it, since it comes at a moment of a large number of strikes precisely because of the frozen and indeed even reduced salaries. However, although new research shows that people's confidence in the government and the leadership is melting away, Kuzmanovic warns that by no means should this be taken as a sign of abandonment of the need for authoritarianism: "This situation intensifies the authoritarian outlook. That is, even the person who is using one of the unlawful channels to get what he needs feels that this is taking on dangerous proportions and at the present state of chaos should be superseded. Unfortunately, in our outlook the 'firm hand' is the closest alternative."

Finally, Kuzmanovic agrees with the argument that order could also be restored by a strong dinar and a strong rule of law, but he adds that that outcome would require at least a different electoral system: "You see that managers in the economy still accept before the workers even that burden they are not to blame for. All out of a fear that the workers might go out into the streets. But this can and must be the behavior of only a person who has been imposed on the workers by some personnel commission or forces which it is concealing. Among other things, this leads to the conclusion that we do not even have technocracy. These are the tails of the bureaucracy."

And it is the offspring of this system unless a different conclusion is reached in the "ideological plenums."

7045

CSO: 2800/206

CEMA ELECTRICAL GRID PROBLEMS

State Energy Director Interviewed

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 Dec 86 p 5

[Interview with Gyozo Wiegand, State Energy Control director by Maria Lakatos: "We Will Have Something To Heat With." First paragraph is introduction by MAGYAR HIRLAP]

[Text] A balanced energy supply can be expected--when the dam will be built

What are we going to heat with this year if the weather grows colder? Will there be enough energy for factories and, on the whole, what winter are we facing? We put these questions to the director of State Energy Control. The conversation strayed inevitably from discussing the situation of domestic energy production and supply and the momentary supply problems, since it was announced in Czechoslovakia 2 weeks ago--and reported by Hungarian newspapers, too--that "the Czechoslovakian electricity network has to prepare for breaking away, if necessary, from the united electrical grid of the CMA countries".

[Question] May restrictions on energy use be introduced again this winter like in 1984-85?

[Answer] I really cannot predict the average mean temperature ---answers Gyozo Wiegand, State Energy Control director-- but we are much better prepared for the winter now than we were in 1984-85. Then consumption increased due to the extremely cold weather, there were several instances of gas restriction and power failure and finally, some factories even had to be closed down for the coldest days because of the shortage of gas. If the average daily mean temperature does not drop below -12 C, I think there will be no problems. We have a balanced gas supply and we are storing twice as much natural gas underground than 2 years ago. The coal-mining industry has also delivered the TUEP (Fuel and Building Material Trade Enterprise) 260,000 tons of coal more than it contracted for.

More Economical Behavior

[Question] It delivered more than the planned amount last year, too, yet people stood in line before distribution plants.

[Answer] But now there will be no lines: last year, recalling the previous, very cold winter, many people bought their fuel in advance, so the population has ample reserves. It is undisputable, however, that trade does not always offer what customers look for. They would buy more of the better quality coal of Tatabánya and Borsod, but we have to face the fact that these mines are gradually becoming worked out.

[Question] It has been a constant concern over the previous years that the energy consumption of the national economy, or at least the pace of its growth, could not be reduced. It is also true, however, that the population's needs have quickly increased, although their consumption still does not reach the amount of energy used by, e.g., Austrian households.

[Answer] From this aspect, the situation will improve this year. Along with a slowed increase of production, energy consumption has decreased as well. While we used 1,324 PJ of energy last year, this year's consumption can be estimated at only 1,315 as opposed to the planned 1,320 PJ. I am quick to add that there was no shortage of any kind of energy resources; we satisfied all needs. For example, the population's consumption in the first 3 quarters of the year was only 97.4 percent compared to the same period last year. Manufacturing industries did not increase their consumption. And, for example, electricity consumption has also been more favorable than expected.

[Question] So the figures reflect a more economical behavior on the part of consumers?

[Answer] Beyond doubts, it also plays a role in the decrease, i.e., in the slower than expected growth. But also take into account the fact that last year's basis was very high, and in the meantime it was exactly the price of electricity that went up. Besides, the investments made in the framework of the energy rationalization program, the new insulating construction materials and energy-effective heating appliances used by the population are beginning to exert their influence.

[Question] Nowadays very little is said about the scarcity of oil supplies, but electricity supply seems to be much more unstable than ever in the previous years. This is most unfavorable for us, since Hungary, alone in the world, imports 29 percent of all its electricity needs. Therefore, it is highly sensitive to the greater and smaller troubles of the united electrical grid of the CEMA...

Smaller Troubles

[Answer] I do not think that such concerns are justified. Let's have a look at the figures: as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, we have received 6.5 percent less energy so far. This is compensated for, however, by the extra

natural gas deliveries which have made up for the losses. Thus, we have not been damaged in calorific value. Here I refer to, first of all, the number 3 block of the Paks Nuclear Plant, already working with full capacity, and that the first two blocks of the plant are among the best in the whole world regarding operational safety. But as I have said we have much more abundant reserves than we had, so minor troubles do not cause a major problem.

[Question] In an interview given to the Rude Pravo, Josef Haman, substitute member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, said that some smaller problems occurred as early as this fall. How did this affect Hungary?

[Answer] We knew already in September that due to breakdowns and maintenance works in the network, there will be less electricity, so we prepared for the shortage. Accordingly, following previously made plans, we stopped approximately 200 factories for no more than 2 hours each. So this cannot even be compared to the closing down of factories because of the strict gas use restrictions in 1984-85. We have also modernized the restriction system, we have included new consumers from industry, agriculture and construction material industry, and have prepared for substitution of any potential energy losses.

[Question] Would Czechoslovakia's temporary withdrawal have an effect on Hungary's energy supply?

[Answer] We are connected directly to the Soviet Union, but, naturally, a system is less stable if a member withdraws, even if only for a short time. Czechoslovakia satisfies its electricity needs basically from the production of its own electrical plants, so its proportion of import is much smaller than ours.

[Question] In our long-term energy utilization program, will other energy sources gain importance? Can it happen that we return to oil?

Long Term Moderation

[Answer] I do not think so. To build a power plant is unbelievably expensive. The building of another nuclear plant that could substitute for our energy import would cost close to 200 billion forints. Working out the 7th 5-year plan, we set the goal to use all energy resources economically. We do not support the substitution of one energy resource with another one, since the different energy resources have become of equal value for the national economy. Of course, this is not true for biomass, geothermal energy, etc. Adjustment to these is considered savings. According to our calculations, energy use will only slightly be modified and shifted in the favor of natural gas. If I have to single out one energy resource to be especially economized on I mention electricity. For the time being, we have considerable reserves, but in the beginning of the 90's, until the completion of the Bos-Nagymaros dam and the two new blocks at Paks, supply will be more unstable. We are already investigating how to bridge this period. However, the pace of growth of electricity consumption has to be reduced by all means on the long term, too--this kind of energy must not be used for heating and heat-production.

CEMA Electrical Grid Meeting

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Dec 86 p 4

[Article: 'Meeting of the Electricity Cooperation Committee of CEMA']

[Text] The Electricity Cooperation Committee of the CEMA started a special meeting in Moscow on Wednesday. At the meeting there will be a discussion of measures that could make the work of the Soviet Union's united electricity system more efficient. Furthermore, the committee will investigate how the complex program of CEMA member countries' scientific and technological development is being implemented in the energy sector.

13212

CSO: 2500/149

ECONOMIC UNITS' GAINS, LOSSES IN 1986

Mixed Results Reported

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 9 Apr 87 p 5

[Article by Mrs. Janos Urban: "Fewer Enterprises Operate With a Loss--More Are Falling Behind"]

[Text] Two-hundred-fifty-four organizations doing business in one or another sector of the economy closed with a loss in 1986. Total losses amount to 5.1 billion forints. The Division of Control of the Ministry of Finance estimates that the number of loss operations has decreased by 3.4 percent, but the total amount of losses exceeds that of 1985 by 2 percent. The number of business organizations that experienced shortages in operating funds decreased from 180 to 85, and the actual shortage amounts to only 56.5 percent of the previous year's shortage.

People's economy data reveal that the number of business organizations operating with a loss or with a shortage of operating capital, as well as the amounts of losses and capital shortages, produced a trend that is contrary to the overall unfavorable trend experienced in the people's economy. The reason for this is that the number of business organizations operating under unfavorable conditions has decreased.

In the area of enterprises and cooperatives (not including the agricultural sector and small enterprises) 61 business organizations produced a loss of 3.5 billion forints, representing a 76 percent decrease as compared to 1985. It should be noted that it is not only the amounts and the numerical data that evolved contrary to the overall situation of the people's economy. Upon examining the organizations that registered a loss, one finds that 23 percent were small business organizations (e.g. 25 cooperatives), and newly formed organizations, mainly limited liability corporations, domestic companies and stock corporations.

Large-scale agricultural loss operations numbered 132, a decrease of 13 percent as compared to 1985, while the loss level--1.4 billion forints, remained essentially unchanged.

The number of small enterprises and small cooperatives has increased from 1160 in 1985 to 1777 in 1986. The increased number of these organizations produced a corresponding increase in the number of loss operations, rising from 45 in 1985 to 61 in 1986. One-third of the losing organizations was established in 1986. Accordingly, these organizations are in their initial stages of operation.

The number and ratio of low performers is also on the increase. This phenomenon may also be viewed as the remnant of many decades of survival psychology. From among the losing enterprises and cooperatives 15 had shown losses already in 1985, while from among the large-scale agricultural loss operations 56 registered losses in 1985 too.

Loss concentration has increased in 1986. This may be demonstrated by the fact that the seven enterprises that produced a loss greater than 100 million forints constituted 83 percent of the total combined enterprise and cooperative losses amounting to 3.5 billion forints. Of these seven enterprises two were in the mining industry, and four in the construction industry. Eight large-scale agricultural loss operations that "realized" a loss of 30 million forints are responsible for 22 percent of all the losses suffered within the agricultural sector. From among the aforementioned seven large-loss enterprises four had closed with a loss already in 1985.

Of the total people's economy loss of 5.1 billion forints, 1.9 billion forints were incurred by industry, 1.5 billion by the construction industry, and 1.4 billion by agriculture. Within industry it was the mining enterprises, while within the construction industry it was the high-rise construction industry that account for markedly large losses, although based on a central determination certain of these losses were settled during the year. In spite of this settlement, however, there are many construction enterprises that operate with a loss or with lack of operating funds. But this number is still less than what one would find, were these enterprises to be reviewed under strict operational criteria. Several of these organizations maintain their financial balance by selling fixed assets--primarily their workers' barracks and their office buildings. This then explains that within the construction industry as a whole, operating funds derived from amortizations and from the sale of fixed assets increased in 1986 by 36 percent over the 1985 levels.

Among several others, reduced production is the primary cause for enterprise and cooperative loss operations. The reasons for reduced production may be explained among other factors, by a shrinking market, delayed performance on contractual obligations, the rescheduling of existing contracts, incorrect base material supplies, work-force reductions, discontinuation of plants, in some instances difficulties experienced in the procurement of imported materials, changes in organizational profile, and on occasion, competition by small organizations.

In addition to the above, deteriorating quality and forced price concessions may be blamed for losses. Due to difficulties in finding needed labor to fulfill their 1985 contractual obligations, units of the construction industry "were forced" to hire subcontractors. Sub-contractors too constituted a loss center, because the older-type contracts contained price ceilings, while sub-contractors were paid at prevailing daily rates.

In many organizations scrappings and devaluations increased the losses, but one could also discover a deterioration in technological discipline as well as an increase in the ratio of materials consumed. A phenomenon characteristic of loss operations is an increase in overhead expenses.

Over the past several years the "common cure" frequently used by those in critical condition was a shift in time frame. This means the application of accounting techniques which, in essence, delay on paper the incurrence of losses, that is, they charge losses against the following year. There are several organizations which, by using this technique, were able to catch their breath in 1985 and earlier, but in the end were unable to show real accomplishments to offset the accounting delay. Accordingly, in such instances the financial situation did not deteriorate in 1986 only. It did so already earlier.

A significant part of these businesses shows organizational deficiencies, and laxities in direction and control.

Aside from a few peculiar features, small enterprise and small cooperative losses were caused by similar factors as in larger enterprises and cooperatives. These small enterprises and cooperatives are subject to simplified accounting procedures. Mistakes in management and direction assume a more decisive role in small enterprises and cooperatives as factors that resulted in loss operations, than in large enterprises and large cooperatives. Frequent changes in profile, the "accumulation" of activities, unprofitable business deals, leadership changes (moreover: leadership changes several times a year), lack of discipline, conflicts and paid out wages without corresponding accomplishments are related to these factors.

Inclement weather is the main reason for the agricultural losses. Although weather-related effects could be felt by all agricultural operations, not all showed losses during the year. Accordingly, weather was not the sole, exclusive reason for losses. In other words, besides draught and other damages caused by the elements, the unresolved financial tensions that have accumulated over the years served to create additional losses. (Due to the lack of financial resources, costs related to equipment leasing have increased; maintenance costs of deteriorating tools were high; losses that were incurred during previous years but accounted for in 1986 had increased; dues and penalties for late payments have also increased.) The role of mismanagement, and of deficiencies in organization and direction cannot be overlooked in the agricultural sector either, it is only their form of appearance that is different and peculiar to the agricultural sector.

It is not only the loss operations that experience financial problems, but also those who are unable to cover their expenses out of available operating

capital. Considering this scenario, sixty enterprises and cooperatives are anticipating a 4.6 billion forint operating fund shortage in 1987, while within agriculture, a similar shortage amounts to 0.2 billion forints. Twenty of the 60 organizations, and 13 of the 25 agricultural units experience shortages in operating capital, in addition to actual losses. Within enterprises and cooperatives more than half of the operating fund shortage is concentrated in two units of the machine industry and in four units of the mining industry. It is noteworthy though, that in light industry enterprises the shortage of operating capital is seven times larger than it was during the previous year.

From among the reasons for operating fund shortages the failure to adapt to actual market conditions, economic problems that remained unresolved over several years, the significant increase in the number of employers that engage live work (and thus, for instance, the increase in excess earnings taxes) are worth mentioning in addition to losses incurred, and failure to achieve planned levels of production.

Within the people's economy as a whole, after having used their own resources, 187 operations that showed losses and/or shortages in operating funds produced unsettled accounts amounting to 8.7 billion forints. In the case of subsidiaries, settlement is left to the parent organization. The founders are responsible for unsettled accounts in joint enterprises and in stock corporations, while in limited liability corporations the owners must foot the bills. The losses incurred by three organizations that merged and thus went out of business will be covered by the new enterprise. The number of organizations that wish to settle or stabilize their finances through new loans, refinancing of old loans or through the increasing trend of disposing of their fixed assets, is significant. In addition, some organizations seek exemptions from under the obligation to build up their reserve capital, while others, such as cooperatives, request assistance from their respective umbrella organizations that represent their interests. There are some, who seek relief by discounting their bonds. Several enterprises expect governmental action and assistance in resolving their financial problems, although hopes are fading in this respect. In the agricultural sector the appropriate authorities oversee the liquidation of loss operations, except for organizations that were stricken by draught. Regarding draught-stricken operations, the government provides compensation in amounts not exceeding damages caused by draught.

Average individual earnings within loss operations have increased, moreover the rate of such increase barely lagged behind the average rate of increase within the people's economy. This means that in certain loss operations, or operations that experienced operating capital shortages, the increase in earnings was significant. This makes one think twice, if for nothing else, because by virtue of their nature, average earnings in the organizations that incurred losses and experienced shortages in operating funds were already higher than the national average.

Enterprise, Entrepreneurial Forms Defined

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 9 Apr 87 p 5

As a result of decentralization, three basic categories of business organizations evolved during the past several years:

-- Enterprises and cooperatives (hereinafter: "Enterprises"),

-- Small enterprises, small cooperatives, etc. (hereinafter: "Small Enterprises"), and

-- Domestic companies, enterprise workers' business partnerships and work associations [vgm-s and vgm-k-s], specialized groups, etc (hereinafter: "Domestic Companies").

Management information systems corresponding to these changes in structural size and management form have not yet evolved.

NUMBER OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

	12/31/1985	12/31/1986
ENTERPRISES	5083	5127
SMALL ENTERPRISES	1160	1777
DOMESTIC COMPANIES*	32937	39575

* Number of companies reporting

DISTRIBUTION OF BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORIES WITHIN PEOPLE'S ECONOMY SECTORS--1985 (In percentages)

SECTOR	ENTERPRISE	SMALL ENTERPRISE	DOMESTIC COMPANY
Industry	7.4	3.2	89.4
Construction industry	5.2	4.3	90.5
Agriculture	78.4	0.0	21.6
Transportation, communication	6.7	1.4	91.9
Commerce	46.6	1.9	51.5
Water resource management	72.4	0.2	27.4
Other activities & services	7.1	2.5	90.4
Health, social, cultural svcs	18.9	4.6	76.5
Communal and other services	0.2	0.4	99.4
TOTAL PEOPLE'S ECONOMY	12.9	3.0	84.1

SELECT DATA ON BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
PER ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORY--1985

(In Millions of forints, unless otherwise stated)

DESCRIPTION	ENTERPRISE	SMALL ENTERPRISE	DOMESTIC COMPANY	TOTAL
Number of organizations	5,083	1,160	32,937	39,180
Number of employees	3,438,850	75,532	391,733	3,906,115
Net proceeds from sales	3,828,459	38,360	41,791	3,908,610
Net production value	579,796	12,912	26,481	619,189
Earnings	242,605	5,701	17,391	265,334 #
Total taxes paid	412,605	5,210	6,652	424,467
Assets	1,641,611	4,338	6,650	1,882,298 #
Result	224,333	4,338	4,953	233,824

Notes: Number of organizations: combined number of enterprises and member enterprises of trusts. Number of employees at domestic companies: combined year-end number of main occupation and secondary occupation members.

[# = the three columns do not add up to the figure shown, as presented in the original.]

AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
PER ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORY--1985

Enterprises	675
Small enterprises	65
Domestic companies	12

To date no summary description is available regarding the three basic categories of organization. True, their respective reporting requirements differ, and for this reason, the available data is hard to compare. Different regulatory requirements further complicate the situation.

In a recent publication of the Financial Research Institute ("The Organizational Structure of Business Organizations and Changes in the Organizational Structure" by dr Laszlo Galik, dr Ferenc Hallgato, Gabor Kamasas and Mrs. Janos Urban), associates of the Ministry of Finance, Division of Control attempted to clarify and to compare the meaning of economic indexes as those apply to the various forms of business organization. The following sampling illustrates the wealth of data contained in that work:

Having grouped the business organizations into 12 categories of employment/member levels one finds that:

-- within the enterprise form the 101-300 person level is typical. One-third or 1421 of employers falls in this category, (but at the same time the ratio for those with higher employment levels is also high, i.e. the two categories that employ 300-500 individuals and 500-1000 individuals respectively constitute 42 percent of the enterprises; and -- most small enterprises, i.e.

353 or again one-third of all small enterprises fall into the 11-30 person bracket, but there are 302 small enterprises, or 28 percent of all enterprises that fall into the 51-100 person bracket.

It is surprising to learn that 236 of the small enterprises and small cooperatives, i.e. every fifth such unit has employees or members in excess of 100 persons. Although regarding cooperatives there is a maximum limit of 100, this number can be exceeded substantially by having non-member employees. In other words, on occasion those small cooperatives and small enterprises are not so small at all.

-- More than half of the companies--18,000--are in the 3-10 employee bracket.

It is not surprising, but rather noteworthy that 168 companies have more than 100 employees (these are specialized groups). There are no personnel restrictions in force regarding these companies, as compared to other companies.

The distribution of personnel may be characterized by the fact that in more than 34,000 undertakings each having less than 100 persons, the total combined number of persons in such companies is less than what they are in 18 enterprises each employing more than 10,000 persons (a total of 430,000).

The criteria for measuring the size of enterprises varies from country to country. Let us assume that enterprises having less than 500 individuals working are small enterprises, and those having more than 500 individuals are large enterprises.

During 1985 there were 1693 undertakings each providing work for more than 500 individuals, and 787 of these provided work for more than 1000 individuals. Within industry, the number of units with more than 500 individuals was 620.

12995

CSO: 2500/304

NEW SERVICE SECTOR REGULATIONS ADDRESS PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEM

Substantial Work Time Losses

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 9 Apr 87 p 6

[Interview with Robert Martin and Karoly Bacskai, by "felix": "Got Some Time?"]

[Text] "Subject to forfeiting their performance bonds, service providers must begin work so that their clients' waiting period not exceed two hours, or at the maximum four hours," according to a recent determination of the Council of Ministers. We asked Gelka production office director Robert Martin and Electrical Cooperative (ELSZOV) deputy technical director Karoly Bacskai how they feel about the new requirements, and about the feasibility of complying with the new requirements. Gelka employs close to 1000 technicians, while ELSZOV has 100.

[Martin] Increased protection of the integrity of work time is primarily a governmental concern. Business organizations should not be held fully responsible for expenses incurred as a result of this governmental program. If, for instance, in our case, they oblige us to limit waiting time, they are at the same time obliging us to assume increased expenses. The service provider would not benefit from such added expenses.

[Bacskai] So far the technicians of ELSZOV exceeded the four hour waiting time only on occasion. I do not consider the maximum limit of four hours as unrealistic. I am convinced, however, that if this time frame is further limited, it will lead to the deterioration of services.

[Question] What kinds of specific problems do you envision in tightening the waiting period requirements?

[Martin] The spokesman has indicated a two, maximum four hour waiting period. In practice this means four hours, assuming that a specific rule would not change that requirement. I consider that as realistic. If, on the

other hand the waiting period is narrowed down to 2-3 hours, our production would be reduced by 15-20 percent, because we would be more cautious when accepting orders. Since we cannot count on the telephone service, we would have to establish some kind of communication medium to take immediate action regarding the transportation of items that cannot be repaired in homes, or, if the technician sees that he cannot finish on time, to request the dispatch of a substitute to the next customer.

[Racskai] If indeed the two hour system goes into effect, beside an increase in expenses some other tendencies would also prevail. The profit margin on services rendered to consumers is low, inspite of governmental subsidies. It is no coincidence that radio and TV repairmen do not make house calls. An enterprise motivated by profits is forced to seek out profitable activities. In our practice this would mean that if our profitability further decreases, we would give preference to institutional orders over those placed by individuals.

[Question] Wouldn't some kind of reorganization make the service industry more efficient, thus making it possible to comply with the more stringent requirements?

[Martin] Insofar as we are concerned, I see no way by which the capacity of our technicians could be improved. Their income is dependent solely on work performed. In addition to the cost of materials used, they are being compensated only by receiving a percentage of the amount we charge. There are limits to how fast one can work, if one wants to provide quality work.

Within the foreseeable future, the repair industry will not loose its manufacturing character. Improved instrumentation would not constitute a breakthrough either--after all a washing machine must be taken apart, the owner must be questioned, etc.

[Racskai] Our situation is similar. It would be beneficial if they would consider the service providers' side, before finalizing the rule. When taking calls, a lay client provides instructions to a lay operator, without understanding the trouble. In the course of repairs one finds unforeseen difficulties. The time required for repair is not being established by us. It is established by the magnitude of the malfunction. Our professionals move around in cars--parking problems and traffic conditions also influence their ability to arrive on time. But let's take a specific example: the client indicates that his television set does not work at all--no picture, no sound. We arrive, let's say at 1 PM, and at that time of course, there is neither a program nor a monoscope. We repair the set, but somehow there occurred a synchronization fault, which could not be detected in the absence of an actual program. In the evening, when the set is turned on, the picture begins to scroll. Who is at fault?

[Question] If I understand it correctly, the rule will contain provisions as to the size of the performance bond, in case of excess waiting time. Do you know anything specific about this provision?

[Martin] Just how much a customer can claim in a given situation--there is no specific indication in this respect, so far as I know. It is not quite clear to me just how a customer can collect on a claim like this. I am certain that regardless of what kind of solution comes about, the technician will always be able to circumvent the requirement.

[Bacskaï] I am not fully familiar with the sanctions either. We will endeavour to keep within the prescribed time limits, which I find realistic if the system provides a four hour waiting period. If the requirements are made more stringent, however, I doubt that today's service provider practices can be maintained.

[Question] How could one really improve upon the present unfavorable situation? After all, it is the Council of Ministers that is being forced to deal with this issue, which means that the public is dissatisfied with the activities of service providers, to put it mildly.

[Bacskaï] Some results could be achieved by increasing profitability. The question is whether the state could provide for increased profitability, or if the customers would have to be charged higher prices?

[Martin] The issue of service provisions is inseparable from the Hungarian economy as a whole, and the Hungarian economy is pregnant with contradictions similar to ours. The government spokesman has mentioned that only the evolution of real market conditions would provide an improvement in the situation. But no one knows when that will happen.

Solution Seen In Competition

Budapest FIGYELŐ in Hungarian 9 Apr 87 p. 6

[Unattributed article: "In Vain"]

[Text] In vain are we waiting for the repairman--personal stories, newspaper articles and readers' correspondence beginning with this statement are more than traditional works of art in our everyday lives. Undoubtedly, the present method of household repairs, most of which require a full day, or in fortunate cases a half a day of waiting, taken together could consume one's entire annual leave, unless one could somehow manage to stay at home during work hours, awaiting the TV repairman or the delivery of firewood. A determination of the Council of Ministers--part of a package plan concerned with the integrity of work hours--would require service providers to limit their customers' waiting time to two hours, or to a maximum of four hours. And if the service provider exceeds that waiting period, he would forfeit the performance bond, the minimal amount of which is 200 forints. This amount could be deducted by the customer from the service provider's bill.

According to current data, service providers are being paid 112 billion forints, and this is a significant amount considering the total out-

lay of the population that amounts to 956 billion forints. These numbers and ratios alone give us a sense of the significance of the governmental determination.

One thing is certain: the two-hour obligation, and in particular the requirement to forfeit the performance bond simulates market conditions of consumer service provisions. As the government spokesman indicated: "real progress will be made only if in this area too the real market conditions take shape, by increasing the supply of services, by broadening the presently limited capacity of service providers." To see the full picture one must understand that the organizational changes of the past years--the breaking up of the mammoth repair industry and the gains made by small enterprises--did not yet bring about the desired market conditions. This is a result of the fact that service capacities are still inadequate to satisfy the demand, accordingly, a further broadening of the service industry would be needed. On the other hand, service supply is being limited by the lack of instruments and component parts. The latter truly serves to paralyze the satisfaction of mechanical maintenance needs for cars, for example, in an expedient manner.

This is why service providers are sceptical; this is why within their circles there is heated debate about the governmental determination and concerning the implementation of a prescriptive rule. Nothing would be easier than to disregard these concerns by saying that service providers are too comfortable. There is some truth to that too, because lack of competition makes one feel comfortable. But compared to the previous situation the new rules would have the advantage of at least basing the situation on simulated market conditions, thus prompting the satisfaction of needs, and the reduction of waiting periods. Another measure that serves as a substitute for competition can be seen in the other new rule which prescribes the quality of repair provided to consumers, and provides mandatory warranty provisions and for the preparation of rules of conduct by service enterprises.

One can only hope that sooner or later competition will prompt the industry to perform repairs expeditiously and well. Meanwhile the mandatory prescriptions that are in the public interest will help a lot.

12/95

Q81: 7500/306

JOINT VENTURE DEVELOPMENTS

New Regulations In 1987

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 9 Apr 87 p 9

[Article by Laszlo Esztocsak: "Accounting Procedures for Joint Ventures"]

[Text] Joint enterprises domiciled in Hungary and supported by foreign investment capital may use simplified accounting procedures in 1987. The financial accounting notice in effect as of the beginning of this year contains only minimal, nevertheless mandatory rules.

Joint enterprises domiciled in Hungary are incorporated according to the laws of Hungary. For this reason, their accounting systems must be consistent with the basic criteria of the Hungarian financial reporting system. This requirement also means that joint enterprises must harmonize their internal financial reporting systems with accounting procedures and financial reporting criteria required by law, as those apply to other domestic enterprises and cooperatives, nevertheless with due consideration for their peculiar situation that flows from differences in their financial regulation.

Joint enterprise accounting systems must be consistent with account categories established within the people's economy. General rules of accounting procedure apply to all account categories within the people's economy, and are contained in a rule promulgated by the Minister of Finance. This rule also provides for the content and the analysis of accounts, and for the manner and time of closings.

The system of financial accounting notices was also established by this rule and serves the purpose of establishing, modifying or amending rules pertaining to various account categories. Accordingly, it is on the basis of these rules that the Minister of Finance uses the financial accounting notices system to provide for accounting procedures that deviate from the general rules of accounting procedures, and those which must be observed in addition to these

rules in order to ensure uniform accounting and financial reporting throughout the people's economy. These legal provisions provide an appropriate framework for the establishment of accounting procedures adequate to satisfy both the internal and external reporting requirements, and at the same time to respond to the peculiar management, production and organizational features of joint enterprises.

The financial accounting notice that provides accounting procedures for joint enterprises went into effect on January 1, 1987 and contains minimum mandatory requirements. This means that within the given minimum framework, and while observing the overall general rules of accounting procedures requirements, joint enterprises may establish their own accounting system the way it best suits their internal reporting needs.

Consistent with international practice, the value of intangible assets contributed must be shown as a separate item among the joint venture's fixed assets. The depreciation of intangibles, or the writing off of intangibles based on depreciation may be accounted for only on the basis of special permission by the Minister of Finance. Intangible assets purchased or created in the course of operations cannot be treated as fixed assets.

The standard for the amortization of tangible fixed assets will be established by joint ventures within their own jurisdiction, except for the fact that in calculating the organizational tax base, depreciation rates in excess of those provided for in the amortization schedules applicable to state-owned enterprises, must be disregarded. Such excess amounts of depreciation must then be transferred from the fixed asset account to the operating fund account. Amortization accounted for in this manner must be separated within the operating fund account, so as to maintain a clear record of investments financed from this resource available to joint enterprises. Similarly, operating funds accrued through excess amortization may be used as collateral for the repayment of investment credits. In this sense, then, joint venture operating funds have in part assumed the role of the operating capital in domestic enterprises.

Joint enterprises may charge their investment expenses and their repayments on investment credits, among other expenses, against their net balance within a fiscal year. Using this method, however, the organizational tax base would increase. If an organization finances its investment expenses out of the previous year(s)' undistributed reserves [those not distributed to members], the corresponding amount must be transferred into the operating fund account. Charges against these funds must be treated in a manner similar to charges against accumulated amortizations.

Other payments for developmental purposes, as such payments are specified in Hungarian laws pertaining to investments, (investment taxes, fees, liquidation expenses, etc.) can be paid from the same account as investment expenses. The difference is, however, that such charges against the net balance will not increase the organizational tax base.

In establishing the gross value of fixed assets joint enterprises must comply with rules applicable to Hungarian enterprises within the various account

categories. Deviations from these rules are not permitted. Accordingly, the balance sheet must show the value of fixed assets consistent with the net book-value of those fixed assets. In other words, regarding fixed assets, identical rules of valuation apply to both joint enterprises and domestic enterprises.

Joint enterprise supply inventories, on the other hand, may be valued in a manner different from that used in domestic enterprises. If, however, a joint enterprise uses and reports in its balance below-cost values for purchased or self-produced supplies, the organizational tax base must be increased by the actual/reported cost differential within a given fiscal year.

The setting aside or utilization of, or dividend payments to organizational members from certain funds created from excess income (e.g. risk funds, participatory funds) within a given fiscal year are subject to a regular balance sheet deposited with and approved by a membership meeting or a general meeting. These are rules that equally apply to both joint enterprises and to domestic enterprises.

Just as any other business organization domiciled in Hungary, joint enterprises too must submit financial reports. The annual financial report must be submitted on a set of pre-printed forms, as required for the applicable account category within the people's economy. Aside from the fact that a uniform set of forms must be used, the annual financial report to be submitted by joint enterprises requires far less financial data than what is required from domestic enterprises. Joint enterprises must show only the balance sheet, the final balance, and the final results. Forms covering expense classifications and informative data require only limited data.

The requirement to prepare an annual financial report is announced in a financial accounting notice issued by the Ministry of Finance. Because of the unique features of joint enterprises, they receive special instructions for the completion of the pre-printed forms.

Balance statements must be submitted to designated authorities by February 15 of the following year. The final balance and the financial statement must be deposited to the joint enterprise's financial control authorities by April 30, at the latest. The time differential provided by the two submission dates enables member meetings and general meetings to ascertain the correctness of the financial data reported.

Joint enterprise statements concerning their previous year's state budgetary relationships must be submitted to the Capital City Directorate of the Ministry of Finance, Division of Control by April 30 of the subsequent year. The financial settlement of budgetary matters must take place pursuant to rules governing enterprises, as well as organizational taxes.

Joint enterprises need not prepare interim accounting reports during a given year. They are obliged, however, to submit simplified statistical reports once a year.

Following some initial difficulties, the new features that emerged in the creation of joint enterprises, including the present rules of accounting procedure, appropriately encourage the attraction of foreign capital. But aside from these encouragements, we must continue to search for new forms and new solutions, which would assist the effective implementation of tasks.

Soviet-Hungarian Enterprise Functioning

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 9 Apr 87 p 9

[Unattributed article: "A Five Year Tax Exemption--Mikromed Began its Operations"]

At the beginning of April, Mikromed Ltd. of Esztergom, a joint Hungarian-Soviet enterprise, began its operations. Established through a 50-50 capital share contribution provided by the Hungarian Medicor enterprise and the Moscow VNIIMP [Soviet Federal Medical Instrumentation Scientific Research Institute], Mikromed specializes in the field of medical technology. An agreement providing for the establishment of the enterprise was signed in December, 1986, and on March 31 the ten-member directorate held its organizational meeting. At that meeting the directorate elected the joint enterprise's first chairman, the chairman and members of the oversight committee, as well as the president and the deputy president, and approved the bylaws, as well as production, financial and developmental plans for the period 1987/1988.

The initial stock amounts to 6 million transferable rubles. Both parties agreed to increase the initial stock in 1988 by 1 million transferable rubles each. The enterprise projects a volume of 3.5-4 million rubles for the present partial year. Initially the new enterprise will have 60-65 employees. Personnel will expand at a rate lower than production, thus assuring increasingly improved profitability. Long-range plans call for a 13-15 percent profit margin after adjustment to prevailing price levels.

The joint enterprise produces screening systems used in health care facilities, primarily for sale in the large capacity Soviet market, but also within the domestic market, of course. Sales in third world markets are also being considered. The involvement of Mikromed actually completes an innovative chain. The Soviet founders conduct research and development, while the Hungarian partners, in addition to past research and development experience, also contribute a diverse experience in the field of production. The Soviet Union has promised to rapidly test and licence the use of products to be manufactured by Mikromed. This testing and licencing process will largely determine whether this year's projected volume may be realized at its lower or upper limits.

Mikromed does not intend to manufacture complete systems. Its purpose is to produce the "guts" of these installations, such as the electronic components. Mikromed may possibly order the manufacture of other component parts from other enterprises. But even at that, Mikromed intends to maintain control over the entire process of development, production and sale. Initially,

Mikromed is establishing a commercial and service branch in Moscow, but it is already examining ways by which it could engage the production capacity of the Moscow-based Ritm factory for the manufacture of certain component parts.

Long-term objectives include a sales volume increased to 100 million rubles by 1993. To accomplish this the founders have mutually agreed to reinvest all profits until 1992. Pursuant to Hungarian legal provisions governing joint enterprises, Mikromed enjoys a 5-year full tax exemption.

12995

CSO: 2500/305

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE RENTALS LAG BEHIND EXPECTATIONS

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 9 Apr 87 p 6

[Interview with dr Erno Herrer, Chief, Division of Budget and Control, Ministry of Domestic Commerce, by Peter Felix]

[Text] It seems that the hoped for success of the leasing arrangement did not come about. As initially perceived, there should be 3000 leased commercial facilities by now, but in reality, on a nationwide basis, there are barely a thousand. And this includes the hospitality industry. We discussed the causes with dr Erno Herrer, deputy chief, Division of Budget and Control, Ministry of Domestic Commerce.

[Question] While the number of contractual business arrangements has increased, the hoped-for popularity of the leasing arrangement did not "take off". What was the basis of your prediction that several thousand people would be interested in pursuing some kind of business in the form of a lease?

[Answer] Prior to introducing new management forms, we viewed representative samples taken in Szolnok and in Budapest. Altogether we questioned 1500, from the accounting viewpoint unregulated store-managers: what would they prefer to do, managing a private shop that is leased to them, or managing a store under contract. Fifteen percent of the respondents voted in favor of the leasing arrangement, and 10 percent of the respondents' employers indicated that they would be willing to lease their stores. Using this measurement we assessed the situation and drew the conclusion that the leasing arrangement would be popular with a certain group of entrepreneurs.

[Question] Soon you will have six years of experience on the record. On the basis of that experience, what do you see as the reason for lack of enthusiasm shown by both the entrepreneurs and those who should be leasing their stores?

[Answer] Regarding the entrepreneurs: although the perception of the private sector has changed favorably over a period of time, there was hardly any

favorable change in terms of capital supply. In plain Hungarian, there just isn't enough credit. And besides, most persons suitable for this kind of arrangement are frightened by being forced to give up their employment. For decades the authorities emphasized the importance of employee loyalty, of sacrifice for the sake of the community, of the collective spirit and of being a member of the main core. And besides there are such things as employee loans in case of apartment problems, and later a kindergarten, a nursery and the loss of a score of other subsidies. These losses influence people in a direction in which they are reluctant to exchange the modest life style they are accustomed to, for a supposedly larger but insecure income.

Regarding this issue the enterprises' thinking may be characterized by feelings in which disadvantages weigh heavier than advantages, and therefore they seek other solutions.

[Question] What are these advantages and disadvantages?

[Answer] It would be advantageous for business organizations to lease their stores, because they would be freed from administrative duties. Their risk would also be small, because the entrepreneur would obtain merchandise in his own name. Some operating capital too would be freed, because from the moment a lease is consummated, the cost of running the store would be borne by the entrepreneur. On the other hand, enterprises are deterred by the uncertainty of whether in the long-run they can retain their leased stores. This is clearly a deterrent. They are scared that the leased stores would be detached from the enterprise through governmental action, and they are even more scared because a large number of the stores in question is not owned by the enterprise but by real property management enterprises [IKV], which in turn have leased the stores to the enterprises. The volume of these stores is not considered to be a part of the enterprise's volume, the number of workers in the store is not viewed as part of the enterprise work-force. It is important to stress this factor, because as of today, the prestige of an enterprise president does not primarily hinge on the profits he is able to produce, but rather on the number of people he manages, alternatively on the number of stores or shops he runs. Beside all this it is not negligible that the classification of an enterprise also depends on volume and the number of employees. Accordingly, it makes a material difference to enterprise managers whether they are classified in the "A" category or into the "B" category.

[Question] Frankly, I do not fully see the business angle IKV-s have when they lease premises to other enterprises, rather than negotiating directly with entrepreneurs, thus giving the IKV-s a chance to pocket all the rental proceeds.

[Answer] If IKV-s were to break their lease agreements with the enterprises there would be great disturbances in merchandise supplies. At the time they entered into those leases, we didn't even dare to think about the private sector as a lessee. And by now these stores have a name, a name that's worth some money, and so it would be unfair to deprive the founding enterprise from intangible assets like goodwill. To top it off, the IKV-s only manage these

stores, because at the time the IKV-s were formed, the state bestowed these stores upon them.

[Question] In earlier days, when leased stores operated under an unregulated accounting process, most such stores constituted loss operations. Aware of this fact, can we at all talk about goodwill? The enterprise would be better off leasing the store than continuing to run the store.

[Answer] Goodwill exists nonetheless, because shoppers already know and are used to a given store, and thus entrepreneurs would have an easier job as if they were to open a brand new store. So far as the past record of losses is concerned, an enterprise has the opportunity of choosing between leasing and contractual arrangements. Until recently the latter form appeared to be more attractive.

[Question] From what you have told me it appears that it would not be worthwhile to enter into lease arrangements either for the entrepreneur or for the lessor. Or would it?

[Answer] It would seem that as of recently the situation is changing. More stringent regulations instigate enterprises to reduce the number of workers, to save on rents and to liquidate their loss operations. In order to accomplish this, some enterprises may find it useful to broaden their leasing arrangements. With the establishment of enterprise councils the threat of having the leased stores detached from the enterprise also ceased to exist. This explains perhaps why, as of recently, more enterprises advertise store leasing opportunities than before.

[Question] And are there enough entrepreneurs?

[Answer] I think that there are more of those willing and able to invest capital into one or another business undertaking. This assumption is borne out by the fact that last year the number of private merchants has increased by 13 percent. The leasing arrangement provides a substantially more independent form of management than the contractual arrangement. For this reason I envision the possibility that in the future the number of those who want to take a risk, and with more work want to achieve higher levels of income, will increase.

12995

CSO: 2500/306

PROSPECTS FOR RENEWED TRADE WITH U.S. VIEWED

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 3 Apr 87 p 5

[Article by special correspondent Henryk Chadzynski: "Polish Mercury Beyond the Atlantic: Good Weather for the Enterprising"]

[Text] I landed at the busy Chicago airport shortly after Poland's most-favored-nation status had been restored and credit restrictions had been lifted. The LOT plane was full the whole time, with only part of the travellers being replaced by others at Montreal. Most of the passengers on the charter to Chicago had made private plans, however. They were going to visit relatives and friends, but most of them also intended to find some job and return with some "green stuff." There actually were not many business people, and only the directors of Stalowa Wola and Bumar were met at O'Hare by Zbigniew Hayder, head of Unitronex, a Polish-American company.

After restoration of most-favored-nation status, they had come for 2 days to negotiate with their American partner on how to divide the benefits after tariffs were reduced, and also to discuss further details of the joint venture, which is to come into being in Poland, as one of the first companies involving American capital.

Cooperating in the realm of building machines is actually an exception that has lasted through difficult times. Actually, during the most difficult period, this cooperation took on new aspects. This is an eloquent example that the trade climate is favoring the enterprising, that even under conditions of high tariffs and an unfriendly political climate cooperation can be maintained, if it is built up with a mutual interest and the sort of technical and commercial activity on the part of the Polish enterprise that gains the partner's recognition and respect. "Bumar" intends this year to double the value of its deliveries to that market and is actually the only firm in our electric machine industry with exports to the United States that count.

In the 1970's the United States was one of our largest foreign trade partners among capitalist countries. In 1978, that is, at its peak, income from Polish exports to the United States reached 450 million dollars, but imports reached their peak in 1980, 770 million dollars. We imported mainly farm products

from the United States, and we received credit. For example, in 1930, the figure topped 800 million dollars.

Then came the lean years. The recession actually started before the revocation of most-favored-nation status and the introduction of prohibitive tariffs, but the greatest breakdown came in 1983, when the value of exports fell to 197 million dollars. This was the result both of a decline in our offerings and of the economic sanctions and political campaign against Poland.

Last year things were somewhat better. Exports increased to 255 million dollars. An American journalist made a simple comparison of the value of last year's exports with the peak years and wrote that restoration of most-favored-nation status would give Poland more than 200 million dollars right away, but life is not so inclined to adapt to regulations as shown by simple mathematics. For understandable reasons we wanted to go back to the export level of the good years, but the people who know the realities tell us that this is going to take a great deal of effort, as well as time.

A few days after my arrival, our trade consul in Chicago, Piotr Kozerski, set up a meeting with the most important representatives of Poles abroad conducting business with Poland. It is estimated that their purchases represent nearly 12 percent of the goods our country supplies to the American market. During the talks, I became convinced that we agreed generally that immediate benefits following the elimination of recent restrictions could be anticipated largely in the sphere of climate: a more friendly approach, that is, a normal one, to trade with Polish suppliers without political prejudices. We will have to wait for the economic results.

Mitchel Kobelinski, acknowledged trade and financial expert on both sides of the Atlantic, gave the most moderate opinions. He said that the way for Polish firms to gain the American market is extremely difficult. First of all, within the United States now there is a tendency to reduce foreign purchases, and competition has therefore greatly increased. The reason for this is the American balance-of-payments problem. It is true that Polish deliveries are only a drop in the bucket, but it will be difficult even to get back to half a billion dollars, because nothing is automatic in returning to the market. The gap that occurred when Polish goods were dropped was immediately filled by others.

Often technical progress is so rapid that a technical breakthrough is necessary to adapt a product to market requirements. In other areas there are active competitive suppliers from Asia, including China, especially in the realm of ready-to-wear and other goods of light industry.

Operations can be facilitated by using our companies existing here, as well as local intermediaries familiar with the market. Beginning in July, trade realities may become somewhat more favorable, when certain suppliers from Asia, such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, that used to sell without tariffs, will start paying the same tariffs that Poland pays, giving us an equal chance, but success will depend on how active producers in Poland are, on the strength of export energies, and on the desire to take the American market seriously. In addition, the weakening of the dollar's

position creates a natural tendency to prefer other customers, although in the long run the large, receptive American market may again prove attractive.

How similar this opinion is with what I heard in New York from our trade counsellor, Jerzy Kapuscinski. He said that there had been a process of leaving this market, that there would also be a process of gaining back the position. Some goods which have been traditional exports, like textiles and footwear, along with household glass and crystal, have fallen to a marginal position, owing to the rise in tariffs. The chemical industry has dropped out just about all together. The same is true of ball bearings. Machine tools for metal were an important item. Cepelia had to get rid of its shops.

Nonetheless, even where these exports were maintained, it is still not possible simply to continue them. An example is golf carts, whose sales may increase, provided a diesel motor is introduced. Overall, success will be determined above all by the quality of the goods. Therefore, we should be very careful in assessing our chances for returning to the position we previously held. If our country's offerings fit market conditions, then within the next few years there is the possibility of increasing our exports to the United States by 150-200 million dollars.

Producers in our country have received signals from our companies and from people in the trade counsellor's office about the possibilities and essential directions of action. Stalowa Wola is an example. They undertook very specialized, modern production of a new generation of machinery. They are the best testimony to the fact that effective action produces results, but construction machinery and light bulbs have recently been the only examples of expanded exports.

Overall, then, success depends not only on market conditions but above all on what sort of offerings come out of Poland. Formal normalization of trade creates the right conditions, but there is still the ban on exporting modern technology to Poland or other socialist countries, and, after all, the attractiveness of offerings depends to a great extent on technical progress. On the other hand, we must remember that this is an extensive market, and success depends on an appropriately large scale of operations.

An analysis of the possibilities for finding customers for our goods shows that this very year (assuming a more dynamic variant), we could increase our exports by about 70 million dollars. Concrete proposals have been sent for consultation with partners in Poland, but their aspirations are far more modest. Thus, the export weather and the new climate will favor the enterprising. There are examples of undertaking such activity, expanding bridgeheads that have been maintained, and of coming up with new instances of initiative. This is worth taking up separately.

10790

CSO:2600/553

KRUPP SIGNS AGREEMENTS FOR MODERNIZATION OF STEEL INDUSTRY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 May 87 p 15

[Article by Dt. Warsaw 20 May: "Krupp To Modernize Poland's Steel Industry. DM 200 Million Framework Agreement"]

[Text] Krupp Industrietechnik GmbH of Duisburg and the Polish Ministry for Iron and Steel Production and Mechanical Engineering have signed a framework agreement for the modernization of the Polish steel industry. At the same time, the first agreements concerning the delivery of two continuous casting plants for the Katowice mills [Huta Katowice] in the amount of DM 150 million and a slag processing plant for between DM 40 and 50 million were concluded.

Krupp CEO Berthold Beitz and board members Dr Wilhelm Scheider (chairman) and Dr Kurt Piller has come to Warsaw for the signing of the agreement "for technical, industrial and commercial cooperation in the iron and steel sector." Negotiations had been carried on for more than 3 years and, for a time, also dealt with the question of founding a joint enterprise for scrap processing. A Krupp-built scrap shear, it was reported in Warsaw, had at that time been completed but, because of the decline in world scrap prices, was excluded from the cooperation agreement.

Krupp is confident that all deals covered by the agreements will be self-financing. The Polish iron and steel industry does not now have either a continuous casting plant nor a slag processing capability. Warsaw is counting on substantial economies and greater opportunities on the world market from these processes. Financing is said to be assured primarily through joint marketing of steel in third countries. The agreements have a 10-year term and contain clauses covering a possible expansion of output.

Krupp Industrietechnik is also negotiating with Warsaw for the construction of a rapeseed oil plant, the delivery of electronic control gear for the food processing industry as well as cooperation in the shipbuilding sector. The creation of an engineering consortium was also indicated as a realistic joint-venture project.

/9274

CSO: 2300/292

OFFICIAL DESCRIBES NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 4-5 Apr 87 p 4

[Interview with Jerzy Bijak, Government Plenipotentiary for Nuclear Power Development and undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Mining and Power Industry, by Janusz Moszczenski: "Nuclear Power in Poland and the World: Prospects for Accelerated Development"]

[Text] [Question]: Nuclear power has been taking on greater importance all over the world. What is the Polish program for developing that energy like? Given the fact that we have enormous hard and soft coal resources in Poland, is nuclear power necessary?

[Answer]: Throughout the world there are presently nearly 380 nuclear power blocks operating in 26 countries. Their total output exceeds 270,000 megawatts. Nuclear power is therefore a very important economic factor in the world, and there is no turning back.

Poland's program for the development of nuclear power is part of the comprehensive program of development of the country's fuel and energy management. In 1985 the Polish Sejm passed a resolution on the basic directions of action to provide for the national economy's fuel and energy needs to the year 2000. In it the development of nuclear power was described unequivocally. According to current forecasts, the country's total demand for power will call for 320 million tons of conventional fuel. This figure is to be reduced by 70 million through consumption rationalization measures. Therefore, the real demand may amount to 250 million tons of conventional fuel.

In think that Poland, which is rich in hard coal, will be able to extract about 195 million tons of coal by the year 2000. This figure for annual extraction is not the result of an estimate of resources, which amount to 63.5 billion tons, but of taking into account the technological barrier to increasing extraction. Insofar as lignite extraction is concerned, it will reach about 81 million by the year 2000. We will have to provide about 23 million tons of crude oil for our economy, including imports of 13 million tons of crude oil and 2 million tons of petroleum products from the USSR, which means we should plan on importing 7 million tons of crude oil from other

countries. The remaining energy sources will provide us with 6 million tons of conventional fuel altogether.

Therefore, to fill the gap it is absolutely necessary to figure in nuclear energy amounting to the equivalent of from 13 to 15 million tons of conventional fuel, which is about 5 percent. This percentage corresponds to the program for nuclear power development to the year 2000, with a figure of 7,860 megawatts. The program provides for the construction of three nuclear power plants. The first one, in Zarnowiec, is to have four 465-megawatt power blocks. Six 1,000-megawatt power blocks would be set up in the second and third nuclear power plants. An in-depth assessment of the country's fuel and energy needs and supply shows that nuclear power will be essential in Poland's future.

[Question]: What are the conditions for carrying out this program?

[Answer]: The Polish program for the development of nuclear power includes three areas:

Creation of an industrial base and expanded production of nuclear power equipment for domestic needs and specialized export production for CEMA countries;

Creation of a contracting base and development of the potential of enterprises and investment contracting;

Construction of nuclear power plants.

Thus, the program for nuclear power development is complementary and therefore complicated. The country's economic situation will determine to a great extent how realistic the program is.

[Question]: During the past five-year period, the socialist countries have made enormous progress in nuclear power. What is the basis for carrying out the program for the development of nuclear power in the CEMA countries?

[Answer]: In the CEMA countries excluding the USSR, nuclear power plants totaling about 50,000 megawatts are to be put into operation by the year 2000. This is a great aspiration, but without it, intensive development of our countries will not be possible. This was what the heads of governments decided at the 42nd session of the CEMA in Bucharest.

The implementation of the program is based on the fact that production of specific equipment for the nuclear plants was divided up among the various countries, because no CEMA country by itself except the USSR could produce all the equipment, build the nuclear plants, and provide them with a supply of nuclear fuel. Thus, Czechoslovakia has undertaken production of the reactors for 440-megawatt blocks. Poland will produce pressure stabilizers, heat exchangers, and so on. The countries will supply each other with equipment. It is only altogether that they make up a technological whole. The base for this sort of distribution will be a unified Soviet power plant project. The execution of the various power plants will be based on agreements between the

government of each country and the Soviet government. In the agreements, the Soviet government will insure that all the requirements of nuclear safety are met.

[Question]: Nuclear power plants have shown their suitability, economic effectiveness, and ecological purity, but the development of nuclear power also bears with it grave potential hazards. After the Chernobyl mishap, the International Atomic Power Agency initiated a rapid process of tightening international cooperation in building a nuclear power security system. In what stage is this process at the present time?

[Answer]: It has already been 33 years since the USSR built its first industrial nuclear power plant in Obninsk. During that time, despite failures in which no radioactive fall-out was emitted, no fatal nuclear accidents have been reported. It was only the Chernobyl accident that caused us to think seriously how important nuclear safety is. This accident showed all of us who deal with nuclear power problems that we have to increase our efforts to raise the level of safety not only in terms of the technical equipment but even more in terms of the people operating the plants. This also made us think about the fact that the nuclear safety issue is a worldwide problem.

This philosophy lay at the source of the actions the USSR instigated following the accident and effectively undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Taking into account the global nature of nuclear safety, the IAEA worked toward the signing of two international conventions last September: one on giving early warning to countries about the danger, and another about mutual aid in the event of a nuclear threat. These are important documents on the international scale. I think that in a relatively short time on a worldwide scale we will have a system of bilateral agreements on early warning and assistance. We know that this sort of agreement already exists between the Soviet Union and Finland. I can tell you that initial talks on this subject have begun between Poland and Sweden, and similar talks are being readied with Denmark.

[Question]: Expert information prepared by the Polish Academy of Sciences concerning the future of power shows the need for accelerating construction of two or three nuclear power plants by the year 2000. How do we intend to reconcile the accelerated development of nuclear power with the intensified requirements of safety?

[Answer]: A group of Polish specialists is showing that there is a need for the rapid development of nuclear power. We are about 10-15 years late beginning. Accelerated development does not mean an accelerated rate of plant construction. The requirements of safety are inviolable and immovable. The target of accelerated development of nuclear power in Poland presumes proper planning, in-depth study of conditions for it in terms of the country's economic realities, and the creation of the socioeconomic conditions for carrying out the program.

10790

CSO: 2600/553

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MULTISKILLED WORKERS

Bucharest REVISTA ECONOMICA in Romanian No 8, 20 Feb 87 p 13-14

[Article by Constantin Alecu, "Multiskills--A Basic Requirement of Modern Production"--boxed material by author as indicated]

[Text] The fact that our national economy is being provided with the most modern equipment and that the latest advances in science and technology are being introduced into production demand that our work force be capable of fully exploiting them. Given that the work force is the principal element in economic progress, one of the basic tasks of social and economic development is to better the work force, to ensure there is a cadre of qualified personnel for all sectors of the economy and to continuously improve the professional training of the entire work force.

The Work Force in Step With the Level of Technology

The introduction of technological advances and the modernization of production capacities necessarily changes the technical, technological and organizational conditions in which production take place. All of these factors demand a well-trained cadre with the advanced understanding and skill levels that are in keeping with contemporary scientific, technical and technological realities. The stepped-up technical and economic, as well as functional, parameters of equipment require a high level of training, skills and specialization in the work force. Given this, it is imperative that there be wide-scale polytechnical training, grafting the specialization of any profession or trade to the fundamental areas of thought--mathematics, physics, chemistry or biology--as well as the adoption of highly durable learning and work styles.

Responding to the demand to shape men through complex and high-level training, Romanian education has the capacity to satisfy the imperatives of intensifying the qualitative aspects of development. Referring to the role of education in the formation and professional improvement of the work force, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu has observed, "We must continuously improve education and strengthen its connection to science and production in order to provide the necessary cadre of high-quality workers and specialists for all sectors of activity. We must fully apply the provisions of the Education Act and the programs regarding multiskill development and the creation of workers and specialists with skills and understanding in a number of fields if we are--in keeping with the socio-economic needs of society and with the new advances in science and technology--to pass easily from one activity to another."

Keeping in mind the continuous growth of the role of the work force in the process of modern production, it is imperative that we train highly-qualified specialists able to perform exceptionally complex tasks, given the growth of interdependence among different categories of personnel. In this regard, it is essential that the idea of permanent education be a fundamental principle in organizing and carrying out the training of the work force. This mandates an improvement in the level of understanding so that every worker--if need be--can work on a number of machines or production lines. A primary factor in ensuring the best service in the workplace is equipping the work force with the most modern techniques and methods of work.

Previous experience has demonstrated that those economic units which have a judicious policy of training and bettering the work force outperform those which do not. As a result, it is necessary that as you equip economic enterprises with modern, highly-efficient machinery, you also ensure that the workers learn two or three related skills. This is achieved through a process of multiskill training and steps to keep abreast with new technical developments in those professions by improving training.

Multiskilled means obtaining a secondary qualification in addition to the basic trade. Depending on the situation, it means either obtaining a skill and knowledge in a secondary trade related to the first which allows the worker to perform operations and work necessary for production in the first trade, or obtaining a secondary skill unrelated to the first which can be performed alternately. Through multiskill acquisitions, an enterprise can secure the preparation of workers to perform a wide range of duties. This can ensure that the workers are fully engaged at all times and facilitate their transfer from one workplace to another depending on the demands of the plan at a certain time. It also improves the tradeskill structure of the work force at an enterprise thereby ensuring the full complement of workers with the requisite qualifications.

Multiskills have an important role in the stabilization of workers in important sectors of the economy. We have in mind, first of all, establishing multiskilled workers in the trades of the miner, the driller, coker, and caster-moulder; orienting machine construction facilities to train lathe operators as tool setters, electricians and fitters; maintenance fitters and electricians as sanitary engineering installers etc. Similarly, there is an effort to have support personnel--those in maintenance and repair--to pursue multiskill acquisition so that they can carry out a broader range of duties. Workers with jobs in the social and cultural arena would be included in this category as well. All of these measures lead to a more efficient use of the workforce.

[Boxed item: --As a result of having one worker tend to two or more pieces of equipment, the Sibiu Auto Parts Enterprise realized a relative savings of 3/3 workers who were then assigned to other production lines. 312 pieces of equipment were multi-serviced.

--The Resita Steel Works has proposed that 20 of its electricians and 50 machinists be trained additionally as coal cokers while the Galati Steel Works has suggested that 75 of its machinists be qualified as steel-makers and 20 of its steel-makers be trained as brick masons and clay-firers.

--To make better use of oil workers, especially on overhauling machinery, the

enterprises involved in oil drilling will train 150 roughnecks as machine drivers and the mining facilities will train 3500 miners as mechanics (2700), mine electricians (375), pyrotechnicians (400) etc.

--At the Tirgoviste Petroleum Equipment Enterprise, 157 machinists are being additionally trained as lathe operators (90) and welders (67) while 102 lathe operators are earning certification as milling machine operators. Electroputere Craiova is training 30 machinists and 30 electricians to become sanitary engineering equipment installers.]

The Appropriate Management and Methodology for Multiskill Training of the Work Force

To respond to the demands of modern production brought on by the sophisticated equipment in use and the modernization of production structures, a program for workers' multiskill certification has been established for every ministry, central and enterprise and for each trade employed therein. Concurrently standards have been set for the methodology to ensure the unified organization and implementation of multiskill training in all areas of activity.

Multiskill training for workers is established where the uptime or load level of machinery (equipment or plants) in which a number of different or related job skills is employed allows the labor force which services the machinery to work (either simultaneously or alternately) on two or more pieces of equipment (multi-servicing); where the work in the primary trade at a particular worksite is not sufficient to keep the worker fully and efficiently employed, so that there is spare time to work in other skills; where during the performance of the work there are from time to time, operations and tasks in related skill areas which cause shutdowns or slowdowns but which do not justify hiring another full-time worker in the related skill area; and where the basic trades are of a discontinuous or seasonal nature and, thus, do not provide full use of the personnel year around.

Precisely determining the requirements for workers for which multiskill training will be offered is of particular importance. To this end the following factors must be taken into consideration: present and future production needs as well as data on the percentage of use of workers time--presented as a function of the particular trade involved so that one can make a sound statement of the skills required at a workplace, a team, brigade, section etc.; the percentage of time the workers are employed which will provide the time that work can be performed in the second trade; production stoppages caused by delays in obtaining the repairmen for the equipment (some of these repairs could be performed by the workers who operate the machinery and equipment provided they receive adequate multiskill training); the shortfall in qualified workers in certain basic trades or the requirement to modify the current work force structure depending on production needs determined by work or personnel norms.

The number of workers to receive multiskill certification is determined by the economic organizations based on sound analysis and then is included as a specific goal in the annual programs for staffing, training and upgrading the work force. According to the Law on Education and Training, no 28/1978, multiskill certification is achieved through multiskill courses, organized similarly to qualification courses and approved for each year by the elements responsible for formulating the plan--the ministries and other central

organizations, and the executive committees of the county peoples' councils and of the Bucharest municipality--with the consent of the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Education and Training. Where the number of workers requiring multiskill certification is small and does not justify establishment of a course at the enterprise, training can be given after hours at some centralized location, at other industrial units, at high schools, professional schools or at centers for certification and training.

Multiskill certification courses are aimed at teaching the skills and understanding required by the stipulated qualification requirements for the trade in which the worker is to receive multiskill certification. This is intended to ensure that production tasks and work standards are met. Workers who already have one skill certification and are at least in category 3-a are eligible for the multiskill certification programs--in line, of course, with production requirements. To enroll in multiskill certification courses, workers must have a qualifying certificate in the primary trade or craft as well as a medical certificate indicating that the applicant is fit to multicertify in the respective trade.

Multiskill certification courses follow instruction plans and course development programs (for multiskill certification) which are developed by the units that are organizing the course and approved, depending on the unit, by the ministries or other central organizations or by the executive committees of the county peoples' councils and the Bucharest municipality. Training plans and multiskill certification course programs are drawn up differently depending upon the complexity of the trade that is the subject of multiskill certification, the level of certification of the primary trade and the degree of relationship between the two trades. They must take into consideration: the knowledge, skills, aptitude and work experience which the personnel have prior to certification that are applicable in the new trade, as well as the knowledge, skills and aptitudes which the respective personnel will need in the trade in which they are multiskill certifying.

The teaching plan and the course programs are made up both of theory which represents 20-40 percent of the class time in the teaching plan for multiskill training, as well as practical instruction which is carried on throughout the entire course. During practical instruction, those taking the classes work on a general contract and receive pay that corresponds to their production in the new workplace, for the trade in which they are pursuing multiskill certification. The course programs encompass the theoretical and practical knowledge set down in the list of requirements for certification in the various trades, as well as specialized knowledge called for in the respective education plans and school programs. These programs also teach the practical knowledge regarding the operation of equipment and the working principles that must be mastered by the personnel seeking multiskill certification.

Course length vary from 3 to 12 months depending on the amount and complexity of knowledge to be gained and the skills that must be mastered in the new trade. The number of hours of theoretical training is proposed by the organizing socialist enterprise and approved, on an year-by-year basis, by the element responsible for drafting the plan, with the concurrence of the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Education and Training. Theoretical training is planned by week (4-6 hours) after work hours. The final examination is given in front of the workers' technical commission of appointment and promotion in work and certified by specialists who taught the

principles of the trade. When multiskill courses are given at educational institutions or training centers, the chairman of the commission is the director of the respective industrial organization.

Work that must be performed for the practical examination is determined by the examining commission and approved by the organization leadership. It is required that this work should present a level of difficulty corresponding to the work category of the graduate and should allow verification of the training in all activities specific to the respective trade. The practical exam is given at the workplace where the candidates performed their practical exercises and should be completed within the time limits and at a level of expertise called for in production. The theoretical examination can only be taken by those who have passed the practical exam. If after taking the practical test and the theoretical examination in the new trade, the worker fails to obtain certification, he will be barred from taking another multiskill certification course for 3 years. Workers in category 3-a and above who took a multiskill certification course prior to the establishment of these current regulations may obtain a certificate of qualification in the second trade by passing the practical and theoretical examinations in front of the technical commission of appointments.

During the entire period of training for a second trade, the worker maintains the category and step level which he has in the first trade. Workers who qualify in other trades can be enrolled in these other trades--after completing the qualifying coursework--up to the category and step held previously, on the basis of the practical examination and the verification of knowledge by the theoretical commission of appointments and promotion of workers. In determining seniority in the trade, the time spent in the other trade can be considered. These provisions apply for workers who successfully complete the multiskill certification courses and obtain certificates of qualification in the new trade.

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DATA ON 1986 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DISCUSSED

Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian No 1828, 13 Apr 87 p 13

(Article by M.M.: "Business Operation of the Economy: Can It Get Even
[?"])

[Text] Domestic analysts and statisticians have long ago been accustomed to high double-digit growth rates in the year-end statements of the economy. The figures of the Social Accounting Service for last year which have just been published are also full of "spectacular" numbers. Thus the gross income of the economy rose 79.4 percent (which repeated the rate in 1985, but under the conditions of higher inflation), costs rose 74.8 percent; the economy realized 99.3 percent of its gross income on the domestic market, while the share of receipts from abroad dropped from 10 percent the year before last to 8.7 percent. Among miscellaneous revenues the fastest growth was in interest on credits (105.8 percent), and their share rose from 2.3 percent to 2.6 percent.

The difference between the growth of gross income and costs brought a 2.6-percent rise in the economic efficiency of business operation. Within the category of costs material costs rose 72.6 percent, depreciation 79.2 percent, but the fastest increase was for interest on credits for working capital (with a growth rate of 101.3 percent, it represents 87 percent of all interest paid and 6.8 percent of total expenditures). Even without a "real economy" the rate of accumulation of the economy dropped from 4.7 percent the year before last to 3.7 percent, and the rate of reproductive capability from 8.9 to 7.8 percent. If we omit losses from the accounts, the rate of accumulation was 2.4 percent and the rate of reproductive capability 6.5 percent, and in both cases the rates were less favorable than in 1985 by more than a percentage point.

What Is Left to the Economy?

The share of the economy in what is referred to as distributed income has been deteriorating uninterruptedly since back in 1981, but in no other year except last year has the economy lost all of 3.9 points. Thus the economy was left only 61.5 percent of distributed income last year, while 7 years ago it was left about 75 percent. Compared to 1985, however, the share of appropriations for social services rose from 21.4 percent to 25.6 percent, and payments for government rose from 2.6 percent to 3.2 percent. In analyzing the unbroken

chain in which less and less money is left to the economy, we should also take into account changes in the accounting system beginning in 1985, when a large portion of interest was transferred to costs. By contrast with the personal sector, the economy is an ever more important financier of government and social service expenditure. Last year the economy accounted for 55.5 percent of that burden and the personal sector 29 percent. The annual changes of this ratio have not been drastic, but the picture is clearer when we give the figures for 1981--at that time half of the money for government and social service expenditure came from the economy, and 35.4 percent from the personal sector.

Net income last year was divided up in the proportion 82.3:17.7. It is a question, then, of another record low rate of appropriation for accumulation, which in 1984 was 27.5 percent, while the year before last it was 24.5 percent. Advocates of limits on personal incomes will probably be happy to cite these figures, as well as last year's growth rates of personal incomes and expenditures for social services on the one hand and those for accumulation on the other (110.2 percent as against 43.2 percent).

Nevertheless, we should wait not only for the consequences of the limited earnings on inflation and distribution of net income, but also for the effects in the domain of production (its growth is one of the rare things the administration boasted about last year), on product quality, and so on.

We Can No Longer Get By Without Losses

Any survey of the business results of the economy has for years had to include figures on losses. Current losses declared in year-end statements for 1986 reached 633.8 billion dinars, that is, 91 percent more than a year earlier. We should also add to this amount approximately 30 billion dinars of losses not made up from 1985 and earlier years. And the total amount represents all of one-third of the money set aside for accumulation and reserves and exceeds by more than 150 billion dinars the reserve funds of the economy. According to an analysis of the Social Accounting Service, in the breakdown of current losses there is an increase in the share of that portion that has occurred because of excessive payments of personal incomes for which sufficient net income had not been realized.

Only five sectors of the economy ended the year without losses, while in 14 sectors losses were smaller than in the previous year. Four-fifths of the losses were in industry--they were highest in the chemical industry, the electric power industry, and the food industry. Nor are there any surprises in the list of enterprises with the largest losses: INA "Petrochemical" of Kutina--28.7 billion dinars, INA "Petrochemical" in Omisalj--13.6 billion, "Rolling Mill" in Smederevo--12.5 billion, the Rijeka refinery--11.9 billion, the "Matroz" OUR "Cellulose" in Sremska Mitrovica--10.6 billion, the RO "Ivan Milutinovic" Waterway Construction Enterprise in Belgrade--9.6 billion, and so on (of course, we should mention that the reasons for these losses and their "quality" vary greatly). About 37 percent of total current losses of the Yugoslav economy were covered at the time when year-end statements were drafted. A large number of organizations took advantage of the opportunity to expense as much as 50 percent of depreciation over a longer period of time,

that is, to reduce current losses at the expense of the business fund. The losses were mainly covered with money that does not have to be returned, usually from the reserve funds of basic organizations which assume that obligation by agreement. There is a legal obligation to make up the remainder of the losses before the end of the 1st half of this year, but it is certain even now that there are no real sources of money for that kind of major operation. It will be up to the government not to be surprised by the fact that the Law on Financial Rescue and Bankruptcy will truly be difficult to implement to any extent that is at all noticeable.

Finally, all the well-known adverse events related to the economy's liquidity, the level of self-financing, excessive inventories, etc., continued during 1986. Total inventories were up 80 percent over 1985 and thus reached the amount of 11,691 billion, which is 35.9 percent of total working capital. According to the figures of the Social Accounting Service, internal sources of financing have in fact doubled, and their share in the structure of total sources of financing increased even from 39.4 percent to 42.2 percent. Nevertheless, this accounting also includes the effect of revaluation of raw materials and supplies, revaluation of fixed assets, and a portion of amounts collected on the basis of refunds of taxes and other charges resulting from exports, without which the level of self-financing would have been still lower.

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SPECIALIST VIEWS YOUTH PROBLEMS, APATHY TOWARD LCT

Zagreb VJESNIK (SEDAM DANA supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 18 Apr 87 pp 6-7

[Interview with Dr Srdjan Vrcan, professor of sociology at the University of Split, by Djurdjica Ivanisevic: "Where Are the Young People of the Eighties Headed"; date and place not given]

[Text] It seems as though cases of unacceptable behavior by a segment of young people in Slovenia have suddenly awakened a need in other regions of the country as well to make an analytical examination of the problems of young people and not merely the consequences that arise out of those problems. It is interesting that in recent weeks this topic area has been taken up on two occasions: in late March in Sinj at a scholarly meeting on the topic "The Young People of Dalmatia in the Eighties," and just recently in Split there was a round-table discussion on a still more closely defined topic: "Yugoslav Young People of the Eighties Between Political Apathy and Autonomous Political Subjectivity." There are very few researchers concerned as scientists with youth issues. One of them is the distinguished professor of sociology at Split University Dr Srdjan Vrcan, who presented at the meeting in Sinj the results of his survey of the generation of Dalmatian young people born in 1957. He moreover obtained data which make one think. For example, that all of 8.5 percent did not finish elementary school, which means 1 out of every 12 inhabitants of Dalmatia born in 1957! Graduation from elementary school was the furthest point reached in schooling by 20.1 percent, that is, one out of every five inhabitants. Only 8 percent received junior and senior postsecondary education. By and large the young people in that age group became workers. In researching unemployment Professor Vrcan said that Dalmatia has been especially hurt by unemployment. In 1981 it had 882,050 unemployed persons, which is 19.1 percent of the total population of Croatia. While unemployment in Zagreb was 1.7 percent in late 1984, in Split it was 5.3 percent. Srdjan Vrcan would conclude: "Unemployment in Dalmatia shows the signs of depressive unemployment with a growth trend.... Conclusions concerning the rise of deviant behavior of young people follow from this. The numbers and the thoughts presented are disturbing. It is with precisely that observation that we began our interview with our sociologist.

"Those observations were deliberately cast in drastic terms so that they would not be evaded and forgotten. Observations to the effect that in certain respects things in Dalmatia are more drastic than in other regions of Croatia

have also followed from other surveys. The question is why this is so? Probably we have here a structural lag over a long period of time which then has an impact on general conditions in Dalmatia. Another thing is that the bills are now being paid in Dalmatia, at least in certain regions, and that also applies to the area of Split, for a type of one-sidedly developed policy which earlier was dominant in a segment of the leadership structures, those who had the last word. The type of economic and social development that was very one-sidedly concentrated on the city and its closest vicinity was dominant for a long time. Split grew very rapidly and became swollen. According to the research data which I obtained from the 1985 Population Census, one out of every two inhabitants of Split born in 1957 came from elsewhere. This type of movement was favored by the particular development policy, by the concentration of construction in the city, by the concentration of formal education in the city, culture and health care.... It probably was also favored by the fact that this region is sensitive in the sense of migration. The outflow of people to work abroad allows for greater migration in the direction of the city on the basis of remittances from abroad to places where there is no work. Another factor here is the lengthy neglect of the necessary scientific work."

[Question] In your research you shoot down several deep-seated opinions to the effect that young people often do not want a job, refuse particular jobs, or do not want to travel to them, and they quit.

[Answer] I would like to shatter conceptions which tend to make consciences easy, to create alibis. That is the type of conception which holds that we have practically no unemployed (on one occasion this was stated in public). In this view our unemployment is not involuntary unemployment, but voluntary unemployment. It is not, then, young people seeking employment and wanting a job but unable to, but the other way around--they register with the SZJ, but they have no intention of working! This is an erroneous conception, just as erroneous as the judgment that young people are tied to the town they live in. There are figures which refute both of those conceptions. All you have to do is compare the number of real job vacancies and the number of applicants. According to the working group of the Kraigher Commission in 1982, this ratio was 10:1. A few years ago much was written in the Split press about how some young people were refusing jobs offered them outside Split. At the end of the year when our sociologists undertook to make this comparison, they found that there were about 9,000 unemployed young people in Split, yet only 70 jobs were offered outside Split.

[Question] According to the research, the unskilled have the hardest time getting a job. You say that in Dalmatia, again by contrast with opinions differing from yours, that there is no surplus of educated people.

[Answer] My fundamental position is that we do not have a surplus of educated people. There is the whole story about surpluses, that story is ridiculous when you look at the entire world. If we were now to go from opština to opština in Dalmatia we would see that the percentage of those who have gone no further in their education than elementary school climbs no higher than 40. It is also thought that young people are by definition against production jobs. Again I refer to the datum in the population census, I think for the

generation born in 1957: in 1981, 40 percent had worker qualifications and no other.

By and large the young people in the 1957 age group became workers.

[Question] What region in Yugoslavia can be compared to Dalmatia with respect to these percentages and problems?

[Answer] Dalmatia is very complicated. There are situations which do not differ much from Kosovo with respect to unemployment, although there are parts which are somewhere near Slovenia, not with respect to unemployment it is true, but in certain other respects. Just as Yugoslavia in the European context contains two extremes--one part of it, Slovenia, which along with Switzerland and Austria, has the highest rate of employment in Europe, while Kosovo and Serbia have the lowest rate of employment in Europe. That also applies to Dalmatia, and probably the processes of that type of differentiation are more pronounced in Dalmatia than in other regions.

[Question] Split is a city without a school of philosophy, without a university library, without a reading room, with no periodicals for young people, with a youth center which has been under construction for years and very probably will become a disco club. Has this had an impact on the ever more pronounced deviant behavior of young people?

[Answer] Split has ceased to be a city with an urban center, it resembles more an agglomeration of settlements of varying type and varying level of development. In this sense it is difficult to make a general assessment about Split, and naturally it is also very complicated with respect to forms of political behavior, as shown by the data from surveys of behavior of young people in past elections, where within Split you have local communities in which one out of every two young people did not go to vote, while on the other hand you have parts where almost all of them voted. This is a reality in Split and it is very difficult to get out of that reality.

[Question] Is this type of behavior influenced by the problems we mentioned before?

[Answer] It is a fact that today the life of university students is less present in Split than 15 years ago. When the university schools were just established, there was something called the student club, there was the journal VIDIK, and there were lecture series in the schools of the university. All of that gradually died out, and one reason was the particular policy in general, but also the policy toward the university and toward the students, a policy aimed at breaking up the university and turning it into a fictitious community which had no influence whatsoever, not to create what is contained in the word university--universitatis studiorum, much less a community for study and a community for living together. I agree that matters are very problematical at the level of the life of young people. That is why I am not surprised at all that Split should be at almost the last place compared to other cities with respect to the number of young people who belong to the LC. The share of young people in the membership of the League of Communists in the Split organization is below the average for Croatia, not to mention the

Yugoslav average.

[Question] One of the things that was said in the round-table discussion of Yugoslav youth in the eighties is that in 1968 young people were spoken about as a generation of optimism, while we can speak about the young people of the eighties as a generation of cynicism....

[Answer] There has been a wave of cynicism, but that is nothing specific to us. It is another matter when that cynicism is more evident in one segment of young people than ever before. Still the problem lies elsewhere, but certain surveys in Europe show that the relationship between optimism and activism has changed. Before it was characteristic that those young people who showed an optimistic orientation toward the world and life were willing to become involved as activists. The most recent research, in West Germany, for example, has shown a change of direction for the first time: the optimists are passive, and the pessimists are active.

[Question] The round-table discussion of young people also touched on the question of the image of the youth official who often tries to copy old officials and careerists. Actually the young generation develops an abhorrence of such an image. Probably this also has an effect on the orientation of young people.

[Answer] The youth leader as a type has been dominant for some 10 or 15 years in our country: He was supposed to be a representative of young people in forums, in discussions, at public events, while on the other hand we had the type of the youth politician, whose function was by contrast to pass on the directives and suggestions from the political elite to some kind of group of youth activists. This type of youth official, if he ever had any justification, no longer has it today. It is also an open question today what kind of political organization of young people is needed and necessary, is there any need at all to have a political organization of young people following established patterns?

[Question] Do you think this has something to do with the ever fewer number of young people in the LC?

[Answer] Probably. And I do not share the opinion of those who feel that the decline in the number of young people in the ranks of the League of Communists is an insignificant fact. People are even inclined to say that the party does not need quantity but quality, and I am supposed to conclude that it makes no difference whether there are 10,000 or 15,000 of us. Nor do I agree with those who think that the decline in the share of young people in the League of Communists is more or less the result of technical mistakes in enrollment, i.e., the problem is simply that not enough of them have been enrolled. The decline in the share of young people in the membership of the League of Communists is only one of the indicators of something broader, and that has been very effectively proven by the empirical data. If the drop in the number of young people in the League of Communists was the result of only technical mistakes in enrollment, it ought to have been accompanied by a relatively high desire to be in the League of Communists and a relatively high level of

willingness for social commitment. The experimental data show the opposite trend.

[Question] By contrast with the already hackneyed term "Slovenian syndrome," which refers to the events in which young people in Slovenia have participated in recent months, there is something which we might call the "Dalmatian syndrome." Mitja Ribicic has said in an interview: "We are afraid of verbal crimes, our prisons are full in this regard...as though we are afraid of every opinion; we seem to be prosecuting people for poems, plays, and creativity...." In Dalmatia punishment of young people for verbal crimes, usually for singing "undesirable songs," is often on the agenda.

[Answer] There is a type of political thinking characterized by the belief that certain administrative or repressive measures are effective in driving certain people into "mouseholes" and creating a favorable social climate. I am not altogether certain whether the desired effect is being achieved in this regard when it comes to verbal crimes. First, when it comes to young people, the effect of such measures is not certain. Some young people are being formed who now think that they are heroes: they are beginning to behave in that way and to take the penalty. The second question is whether these measures can in general be used to propagate socialist values and make young people associate with them? Some parts of the country are, of course, more sensitive on this matter than other parts. Which is why some things in Slovenia need not have the same proportion at all which they might have with us. It is just a question of whether this is the only way of dealing with things. If you want me to be quite frank, I am skeptical about what happened recently on Hvar. Often people do not think about the consequences of their acts, some measures are adopted in haste, and I therefore sincerely doubt that there will be any great social effectiveness from such measures. All they can demonstrate is the willingness of the regime to wrap people on the knuckles. In the end we come to a situation where it is up to one or two people to decide which songs are permitted and which are not. Likewise it then depends on five or six people to evaluate what is a provocation and what isn't. Second, there are differing types of provocations and differing sensitivity to provocation. So long as we are discussing songs, I think that some of the songs express the opinion of those present, while other songs have symbolic importance; they are sung because of the aura that has been created around them. Young people select symbols they know certain people are allergic to, and this is a way of showing a certain resistance, an ironic attitude attached to a particular symbol.

[Question] Nor can we bypass the alternative groups in this interview. I would mention Jozse Smole, who in Zagreb in a discussion organized by the SAWP pointed to what is constructive and progressive in talking about these groups: the ecological groups, for example, but in spite of all that we still have a fear of the alternativists.

[Answer] I am just now writing a study of this. It is clear that we cannot merely assume that every initiative is legitimate and warranted, but that a warranted innovation at the level of cultural and social life cannot come from anyone else than from a forum! Certainly under the condition that we agree that our society is one that is self-managed and recognizes the existence of

some kind of pluralism. It is clear that we cannot assume that a system of sociopolitical organizations in the form of officials at the level of the reality of our society can be the only space which has a feeling for all the new needs, all the new sensibilities, all the new aspirations which can emerge in a society or in individual segments of a society. We cannot assume that in that regard we have what might be called a "perfect system," so that it is capable of feeling every new need and of articulating it itself. I see no reasons why in our society there might not be certain social needs and interests allowed to emerge outside the established system, and there is no reason why they must necessarily be negatively labeled for that reason, i.e., that only what emerges through the organizations is constructive, while everything else is negative. On the contrary, it seems to me that one of the values of democratic self-management lies precisely in allowing the possibility of various innovations being created at different points in society.

[Question] In this context of rebellion could we also touch upon the poster for Youth Day? What did you think when you saw that poster?

[Answer] The poster is a deliberate political deception. What is really frightening is not that it occurred to someone to make such a poster, but that the poster was allowed to pass. My first association was this: What kind of foolishness is this that we should come out with a triumphalistic theme of a poster, torches and bared chests when we are in a very difficult situation with young people! I saw the poster as a caricature. Second, it seemed to me that in graphic terms the poster was substandard, that graphically we are going back to something that belongs to socialist realism or even to posters in the West after the pattern of "Uncle Sam Wants You," and that is a style of graphic expression that is altogether out-of-date. I was amazed that young people today could not do something more modern and up-to-date at the level of graphic expression. It is most disturbing that the poster should have been allowed to pass, which means that many bits of foolishness of a similar nature can also pass. These are all questions which probably will be seeking answers at some ideological plenum in the near future, since the recent round-table discussion in Split about Yugoslav young people between political apathy and autonomous political subjectivity seemed to incorporate Zlobec's observation, even though it was not expressed so explicitly: "I even think that the problem of young people is the central problem of all social systems. A society which does not know what to do with its young people and how to do it will have a hard time."

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